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Albania: European Socialists Oppose Antigenocide Law

AU2601101396 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 25 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Arlinda Causholli: "Change the Antigenocide Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Jean-Francois Vallin, general secretary of the Socialist Party of Europe, said into the microphone, "There can be no fair elections in Albania without changing the Antigenocide Law. We will make a claim in the Constitutional Court for this law to be reviewed. The next elections can only be democratic by changing Article Three, which excludes from the elections those covered by the law." The representatives of the European Parliament have been very brusque in their judgments, although Vallin said that he did not know the entire law but only two of its articles. The Antigenocide Law and the Nano case were two of the main points tackled at the meeting with journalists yesterday. Meanwhile, Vallin added in connection with this law, "Changing it is not simply a party issue, but a democratic principle. We will propose a resolution in the European Parliament for this purpose, and we are convinced that the Christian Democrats will also vote along with us." Thus the European Socialists are seeking to have the Antigenocide Law changed. They will also address a claim to the Constitutional Court, which, according to Vallin, "did not comment on this law because it is on the verge of making a final decision about the denunciation of the law by the Social Democratic Party, and this is a gesture that must be respected. The delegation is convinced that the court will make a fair decision." The general secretary of the Socialist Party of Europe also reconfirmed that he was not permitted to meet the imprisoned Nano. Regarding the present situation of the Socialist Party leader, he said yesterday, "A former prime minister cannot be a common criminal, especially when his guilt is not evident. Nano's imprisonment and the approval of Article Three of the Antigenocide Law mean that there are political forces here that are not interested in a dialogue of ideas," Vallin concluded. While he himself returned to Strasbourg yesterday, his delegation will remain a few more days in Tirana for other meetings with government and state officials.

Albania: Socialists Said Preparing for 'Civil War'

AU2601141296 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 26 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by Edi Paloka: "The Socialist Party Prepares for Civil War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The local leaders of the Socialist Party [PS] have lost no time after the call from Deputy Chairman Pellumbi to "take to the streets." Astrit Llanaj, PS chairman for Sarande, announced that he has prepared what he calls "special squads," which will "physically look after" the ballot boxes at the elections. In fact, it was G. Ruci and N. Dokle who earlier issued the call to create these hit squads, and Llanaj confirms that he has formed the squads on instructions from headquarters. A short time ago, it was Ilir Meta, another PS deputy chairman, who announced that the ruling Democratic Party can only remain in power after a civil war. This announcement was added to the conservative PS leaders' pile of other statements about breaking skulls on St. Bartholomew's Eve, statements that were capped by Deputy Chairman Pellumbi's call for militant PS members to take to the streets on election day to seize by force what they will not be able to win by a free ballot. The creation of these hit squads serves precisely this aim. The PS chiefs might stand up tomorrow to deny their intention of forming such squads, justifying them on the pretext that they were intended to protect the votes of Socialists from the state, but the PS leaders know perfectly well that not only are "special squads" (whether of the government or the opposition) forbidden in polling stations, but not even propaganda slogans are allowed in their proximity. Thus, the deployment of "special squads" in the polling stations is totally illegal. Of course, these squads will consist of former Sigurimi operatives, the types who came out on the streets of Albania on Ruci's orders in 1990 and 1991 with rifles and rubber truncheons, in order to prevent the Albanians masses from demanding freedom and democracy. Ruci, Pellumbi, and Dokle, who have pulled the black lists out of the drawers, know full well that those who could not stand in the Albanians' way, even when they had all the apparatus of violence in their hands, will not be able today to oppose the free will of free men, and will not even dare to think of doing so. They hope, by means of a strategy of tension, to create incidents that will lead to clashes among Albanians, to the point of civil war. Of course, such criminal ambitions, fully worthy of this former Sigurimi chief [Ruci] and this most ardent defender of Marxist theories of the class struggle and violent revolution [Pellumbi], will receive a proper reply not only from the law-governed state, but from all Albanians who value democracy. Hundreds of thousands of Albanians were stained with blood as

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they fought against Ruci's special forces. Hundreds of thousands rose to their feet, in order never to return again to the dungeons of the dictatorship. There are thousands of families who still today are seeking justice for their relatives who were killed by Ruci's squads on the border or in the streets of Albanian towns. These people now live in peace in the state for which they fought. They are calmly waiting for the day when, by their own free will, they will cast in the polls the free votes for which they struggled. However, these people have not forgotten how they won this peace and they will not, on any account, allow Ruci's evil squads to hijack everything that they have won at the ballot box.

Albania: Editorial Criticizes 'Savage' Democrats

AU2601101296 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 25 Jan 96 p 1

[Editorial: "Savage 'Democrats'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Look at the progovernment press of the last few days! It has turned savage. Listen to the communiques of the president's spokesman on television! To say they use harsh language is hardly a start. Listen to the speeches by the Democratic Party [PD] leaders! They show the state of alarm of our rulers. Why, one wonders, all this panic, and this rude language in their newspapers? Why do the "Democratic" members of our government talk in this Enveresque style? There is only one reason. The closer they draw to the elections that could leave them without their jobs, the more they feel the prospect of their profound and deserved defeat. They are like mice, who, it is said, are the first to detect earthquakes. Here lies the reason for their savagery. The terms "democrat" and "savage" are mutually exclusive, and cannot coexist. Savagery is the manner of behavior of uncultured people with nothing democratic about them. We Albanians know this style of behavior well from the long years of communist violence, while the democracy of which we dreamed involves different behavior, and stimulates dialogue. Yet how can the savages of the PD understand what dialogue is? Democracy stimulates tolerance. But how can the savages of the PD understand why Albanian society needs tolerance? Democracy calls for understanding, while the savages of the PD are to blame for the quarrels, disputes, spats, and disagreement that today pervade the country's entire political life. There is another reason why our rulers today have turned so savage. They are required to answer to Europe for their antidemocratic behavior in this delicate phase of Albanian transition. When Albania was admitted to the Council of Europe last year, the PD rulers blew their trumpets as if this were a great success and extraordinary achievement of their party and the government's policy. They forgot that Europe opened its doors for us not only to allow us in, but to allow Europe itself to come see how the fragile Albanian democracy is progressing.

Several team including the names of highly respected European personalities have now come to Albania to check how far our government has responded to criticisms and has performed its obligations, in order to deserve formal member status of an authoritative organization of our continent such as the Council of Europe. Because the PD rulers have not met the demands of democratic Europe, Albania remains without a constitution, and this solely because of the stubbornness of the PD leadership. In Albania, the scandalous dependency of the courts on political power still survives. The PD is coming to the end of its mandate while still keeping in prison Fatos Nano, the head of the Socialist opposition, etc. The PD leaders are now in a state of alarm. This is why they are so tense, and are blaming the opposition for this. This is a lost battle of the PD. This is a preface to what will happen when we all go to the ballot boxes.

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Bulgaria: Goal of Zhelev-Intellectuals Meeting Viewed

AU2601140996 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 24 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Maya Lyubomirska-Krusteva: "Zhelyu Zhelev and 50 Intellectuals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidential candidacy undoubtedly is a matter of politics and not philosophy or literature. Therefore, every candidate who respects himself should seek the support of one of the two basic political forces in our country—the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] or the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. On the other hand, it is well-known that Zhelev's chances to obtain the support of one of those two forces are minimal. At the same time, regardless of how generously people like Dimitur Ludzhev [New Choice leader] and Stefan Savov [Democratic Party leader] praise the president, it is obvious that their support will not impress the broad public. Even Ahmed Dogan [Rights and Freedoms Movement leader], who joined them, would hardly change something. Therefore, in an attempt to seek support for his presidential candidacy, President Zhelev organized a meeting with the 50 intellectuals.

To claim that Zhelyu Zhelev met with the Bulgarian intellectuals is, to put it mildly, exaggerated. The Bulgarian intellectuals are people who participate in various social activities, and many of them are directly related to specific political parties. This is the case with Valeri Petrov, Damyan Damyanov, Svetlin Rusev, and Toma Tomov of the BSP. This also is the case with Svetoslav Luchnikov, Blaga Dimitrova, Dimitur Korudzhiev, Filip Dimitrov, Mikhail Ognyanov, Boris Khristov, Bozhidar Kunchev, Atanas Svilenov, and others from the SDS. Therefore, one cannot claim at all that Zhelev met with intellectuals. With a few exceptions, the people who met with Zhelev have always appeared en bloc since the days of the Grand National Assembly, when some of them made an obvious physical effort to be present at the Grand National Assembly's sessions, only to be one of those who signed the Constitution.

In other words, the meeting was not between Zhelev and Bulgarian intellectuals. It was more an attempt to form a party of Bulgarian intellectuals that would support Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev of the size and importance of parties such as the Party of Democratic Progress, the Fatherland Labor Party, or the Party of Bulgarian Liberals in Pernik. The basic core of the group that met Zhelev has been acting for a while as a party that is launching Dr. Zhelev's name, promoting his works, and trying to compare him to Havel, despite the fact that the evidence shows that the president prefers to imitate Lech Walesa, at least in the intellectual field. This hard core of the group, which consists of people like Georgi Mishev, is also known as Zhelev's deputies from the time of the Grand National Assembly.

Zhelyu Zhelev's meeting with the 50 intellectuals was aimed at suggesting to the Bulgarian public that Dr. Zhelev is close to the Bulgarian intellectuals, and that they will make him president again by utilizing their influence over our society and the relevant political parties. However, it is very questionable whether the 50 intellectuals invited by President Zhelev indeed were representatives of the Bulgarian intellectuals, whether they have any influence over public opinion in Bulgaria, and whether any serious political force will pay any attention to them.

Bulgaria: Videnov's 'Hard' Leadership Style Criticized

AU2601124096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24 Jan 96 p 6

[Commentary by Genka Markova: "Videnov's Style"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Since 23 January the cabinet has two new members. An extraordinary National Assembly session and a secret vote provided the parliamentarian seal of approval to this act. Some 122 deputies voted for and two against. The rest preferred to walk out to protest the lack of possibility for expressing personal views and assessments. According to the prime minister, this situation reflected true parliamentarianism.

Apparently in an attempt to avoid repeating the style of any of his predecessors, the prime minister sinks more and more into the hard style he has adopted. He demonstrates hardness toward the other state institutions and political parties, except for the ruling coalition. Even the prime minister's vocabulary has become full of words such as destabilization, dictates, and shooting targets. Despite the generous Bulgarian Socialist Party's promises to act to achieve a consensus, promises made mostly when the party was in opposition, Videnov appears to be close to finally destroying the idea of reaching at least a minimal political consensus on the country's basic problems.

It appears that Videnov is wrongly interpreting the hard style that the country's government needs at present. The style of the decisions adopted by the executive power must be hard toward the economic groups that lurk in the shadow of friends' circles, and this also applies to the spheres of crime and society's basic security. Videnov's present behavior brings him back to an obsolete and nonproductive course.

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Czech Republic: Zieleniec Explains EU Application

AU2601101496 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 23 Jan 96 pp 1, 19

[Interview with Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec by Jan Zizka; place and date not given: "The Eastward Expansion of the European Union Is Equally Important for Both Sides"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Czech Republic's European Union membership application will be submitted in Rome today by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to the representatives of the EU chairing country. On this occasion, the head of Prague diplomacy, Josef Zieleniec, granted an interview to HOSPODARSKE NOVINY.

[Zizka] The Czech Republic is the last of the associated countries to submit its application. How do you explain this phenomenon?

[Zieleniec] The Czech approach to the entire process of integration into the EU has always emphasized the importance of our domestic effort . our domestic changes. We have always been wary of substituting for the essential by ostentatious gestures. This does not apply only to the membership application. Moreover, precisely in the instance of the application, we wanted it not to be just an empty political gesture but, rather, to express the actual state of readiness of society. We base this on the fact that, following 1989, we have worked hard to do our homework successfully. We are submitting our application at the time when we have become members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD].

[Zizka] Are you implying that the other countries were not ready at the time they applied for membership?

[Zieleniec] When applying for admission, every country is guided by its own domestic political considerations. I do not want to dissect the reasons that whichever country submitted its application at the particular moment it did. Moreover, it is not even appropriate to do something like that. I am only telling you how we think. I believe that we have chosen the right moment to submit our application. The system reform has been completed, as the OECD admission confirmed.

Membership in this organization demonstrates that our system is identical with the economic systems of the advanced West European democracies. We have become one of them. The economy has reached the stage at which we are in fact collecting the fruit of the reform efforts. We have very dynamic growth, low unemployment, a stable currency—even one of the most stable in Europe– and a balanced budget. All of this illustrates our responsible approach to the application. I believe that we took a step that is in the tradition of not only Czech diplomacy but also Czech politics per se—warranted, businesslike, and therefore respected.

[Zizka] Is there any connection, after all, between the later date of application and the Czech Republic's more passive position at EU meetings with the associated states than that of Poland's, for instance, which is knocking on the EU's door with much more force? Is such a relaxed waiting approach on the part of the Czech Republic appropriate in the situation when the date of admission has not yet been decided and the entire schedule is foggy?

[Zieleniec] This again has to do with what I said in the introduction. It is not our style to submit an application for any other reason but the knowledge that the country is ready. Knocking on Europe's door, to use a metaphor—that is, the constant calls for a schedule, a date, without any clear links to domestic development and domestic changes—is not our style. This does not mean that we dissociate ourselves from the countries that proceed otherwise. On the contrary, we cooperate intensively with them within the framework of the Central European Free Trade Association, for instance. Moreover, we are submitting our application shortly before the opening of the EU intergovernmental conference. It will deal, above all, with the EU's internal problems, the question of its structure, and should enable the Union to make the decision on how to begin negotiations with the membership hopefuls. So, we have also timed our application according to the development within the EU. It was clear that the EU would not begin to deal with the membership applications before the intergovernmental conference, and we did not consider it right to place the application on a Brussels shelf, where it would have been lying for years, just to make a political gesture.

[Zizka] Do you believe, then, that the EU schedule for the membership hopefuls is satisfactory and that we should welcome it?

[Zieleniec] We welcome it openly. This EU plan says the following: As early as during the intergovernmental conference, the EU will begin preparing studies on the individual countries, so it would be possible to start the membership talks within six months after the conclusion of the conference.

[Zizka] Of course, this is not a clear commitment that the talks will actually begin by that time, although it is possible.

[Zieleniec] The procedural problems will be significantly simplified by the creation of the conditions. All the information and documents needed will be on the table. The fact that the admission process of the Czech Re-

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public and other countries has not been separated from the admission process of Cyprus, for instance, is also telling, because Cyprus is by many indicators a more advanced country, and it has the support of the Mediterranean countries of the EU. This shows that the process will have strong support in many European countries. It is actually a matter of consensus between the southern section of the EU and the countries advocating extension eastward—that is, above all, the Federal Republic.

[Zizka] In your opinion, who will be ready first—we to enter the EU, or the EU to admit us?

[Zieleniec] It is a well-known fact that the EU has internal problems regarding expansion. We have frequently pointed it out. I have said several times that, just as we have our homework to do, to turn our country into an advanced efficient Western-type society, the Union must modify is decisionmaking structure, the redistribution of funds, and many other mechanisms. It is not possible for the Union to operate according to rules drafted by the European commonwealth after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, when just six countries started the process of European integration. The rules must accommodate the large number of diverse member states, which could be higher than 40.

[Zizka] What problems do you envisage on our side?

[Zieleniec] Of course, we are facing a lot of tasks. We want to join the Union but do not wish to be the least developed country in it. Our strategy is clear. We are changing the state in the direction that is clearly drawn—advanced market society, efficiently working economy, stable political and social spheres. For us, both things, the goal and the roads leading to that goal, are clear. They are subject to various political discussions, but, in the principal issues, everything is clear. The Union's task of seeking the direction in which to move to be able to open itself to so many countries is much more complex. The politicians of the individual Union member states are concerned with implementing the European concept drawn up after the war. They know that without us the Union is a bad Union for them, too.

[Zizka] Does without us mean without Central Europe?

[Zieleniec] Without the expansion eastward. It would be a union incapable of facing the challenges of the 21st century. The present division is artificial. We belong together by both our civilization and our culture. The expansion is just as pressing a task for them as it is for us. Therefore, we have a guarantee that this development will continue. If the expansion of the EU were important only to us, the entire process would certainly not proceed the way it does. We rarely realize this. We are not in the position where we ask and they either do or do not comply. The common interest is obvious.

[Zizka] Do you believe it reasonable to expect us to be ready to join the EU by the end of the century? This means that our legislations would be in harmony by then.

[Zieleniec] We are in a rather good position in this respect, in a better one, I believe, than many other countries that have either already joined or applied for membership. The main reason is that we have created a revolution in our legislation since 1990. We inherited a communist legal system that could not be a legal basis for the work of a state in a free society. Therefore our parliaments have been very intensively reworking the entire legal code. The intensity is unprecedented, and I would guess that the parliaments averaged a rate of a new law every two or three days. That is good enough to go in the *Guiness Book of Records*. Because the entire process was done with the objective of becoming a member of the EU, a large part of the work has been done already. Of course, other problems await us; there are many details we still have to harmonize. After all, the government has aimed its efforts in that direction. I do not believe this will be the main problem in the future.

[Zizka] What do you think about the skepticism that, according to some observers, characterizes the position of some Czech representatives to the EU's projects? Could this complicate our efforts?

[Zieleniec] I would not say that skepticism is widespread in our country. We have our opinions, many discussions in the EU are echoed in our domestic policy and are certainly commented on. The official documents, however, our memorandum on the membership application, for instance, are absolutely clear. The ship is on a direct course in all of the areas we observe. From this point of view, I have the feeling that it is a much more direct course than that of the ships of other countries, which declare unconditional acceptance of all kinds of things. After all, the very fact that we are discussing the EU projects is a sign of how responsibly we perceive our future membership. Only those accept everything without any problems who do not really believe that the words will soon become reality. The fact that we are dealing with the future of Europe also testifies to this being a topical issue for all of us. We all believe that the Republic will soon be a part of the Union. It is necessary to discuss these matters, and it is absolutely legitimate.

[Zizka] Some experts believe that, if we had better coordinated our approach with the other Central European

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states, we would have a better chance of early admission to the EU. Would you care to comment?

[Zieleniec] We are communicating with the other states. The term "coordination" is strong when changes in domestic policy are considered. To coordinate knocking on the doors does not make any sense for reasons I discussed earlier. That is our position, which is based on our traditions and our view on how to articulate our interests and present our republic abroad.

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Slovakia: Warning of Chechen Attacks Against Aeroflot

AU2501180696 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Jan 96 p 5

[Unattributed report under the "Monitor" rubric: "Aeroflot Office in Bratislava Guarded by Policemen"—reprinted from 23 January issue of Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak]

[FBIS Translated Text] A two-member police patrol was standing across the street from the office of the Russian Aeroflot airline on Laurinska Street in Bratislava all day on Monday [22 January]. After 1400, they were joined by two more policemen. According to eyewitnesses, members of the Police Corps have been keeping patrol at this place around-the-clock for a few days now.

A source that did not wish to be named told us that this was no routine police activity. A few days ago, someone allegedly threatened the Russian airline with a bomb attack. According to the above source, Chechen extremists could be involved.

Yesterday, at the Bratislava Municipal Police Corps Headquarters, we did not find anyone competent to either confirm or deny this information, and the Slovak Interior Ministry's Press Department did not avail itself of any information about this operation.

In the afternoon, we also asked an Aeroflot representative for a comment: "No, no one has threatened our Bratislava office with a bomb attack by telephone or otherwise," Viktor Antonovich Parkhimovich, manager of the Slovak office, told us.

In spite of this, NOVY CAS has learned from circles close to the Police that the assignment of the Police Corps members patroling at Laurinska Street is to guard, first and foremost, the building and employees of Aeroflot because, in recent days, the Police, or, respectively, the secret service, have obtained findings that Russian firms and organizations operating in Slovakia could become targets of attacks.

[Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 24 January on page 8 carries a 350-word report by Karol Wolf, the paper's Bratislava correspondent, entitled "Slovak Police Are Guarding Aeroflot Day and Night." After quoting the NOVY CAS article, Wolf says: "Slovak Interior Ministry Spokesman Peter Kuchar yesterday refused to comment on the information that the Slovak Information Service [SIS] had warned against the possibility of attacks by Chechen terrorists on Russian facilities. Asked why, for a few days in a row, one police car and four policemen have been standing directly before the entrance to the Aeroflot building for 24 hours a day, which is not the case elsewhere in the center of the city, Kuchar replied: 'They have to stand somewhere, don't they?' The grapevine in Bratislava has it that SIS Director Ivan Lexa himself may have brought the warning directly from Moscow, where the leadership of the Slovak secret service was last week. Moreover, Slovakia established unusually close political and economic ties to Moscow in recent months."]

Slovakia: SZA Lists Conditions for Ratifying Treaty

AU2601102296 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 23 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by TASR: "Five Demands of the Slovak Green Alternative"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak Green Alternative [SZA] [member of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia parliamentary club] will support the basic treaty between the Slovak Republic and the Hungarian Republic in parliament only after its five demands have been fulfilled, SZA Chairwoman Zora Lazarova told a news conference in Bratislava yesterday. The SZA demands that the Hungarian Republic condemn the persecution and crimes against Slovaks committed during the occupation of southern Slovak territories by fascist Horthyite Hungary in 1939-45. It demands, furthermore, that Hungarian coalition deputies manifest their loyalty to the Slovak Republic and that they dissociate themselves from the Komarno Appeal of 1993 [demanding self-rule for ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia], and that the law on the protection of the Republic and the education act be adopted. The SZA recommends waiting [with treaty ratification] until the basic Romanian-Hungarian treaty is concluded.

Slovakia: SDL Criticizes Government's Planned Reform

AU2401152796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 22 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "suj": "Party of the Democratic Left Criticizes Government's Proposal for Slovakia's Territorial and Administrative Arrangement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] supports the reform of public administration, which it understands as a significant step in the further development of the democratic foundations of society. However, it considers the government-proposed draft law on the territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic, which foresees the formation of eight higher administrative entities (regions) and 81 districts, to be very superficial and flawed. According to SDL experts, the government's proposal does not solve the problems of territorial self-administration and does not guarantee its equality with

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state administration. Quite the contrary, it actually reinforces the position of the state administration.

The SDL voices concern over the current course of local public administration reform, which it considers to be unsystematic, incompetent, and undemocratic. Unless changes in territorial and administrative arrangement are harmonized with all concomitant changes in public administration reform, it would be better to retain the status quo, in the opinion of the SDL. The changes in the territorial and administrative arrangement could otherwise result in society's polarization, territorial lobbying, growth of state bureaucracy, and multibillion expenditure from the state budget. The SDL advocates the following sequence of steps: a) decision on transfer of powers to local self-administration, b) definition of the basic functions, powers, and methods of constituting regional self-administration bodies, c) decision on the arrangement of territorial state administration and its powers and, subsequently, new territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic. In the opinion of the SDL, not only decentralization but also democratization should be applied in reforming public administration. This means that territorial state administration must not hold a dominant position in the regions. The SDL advocates a rational horizontal integration of local state administration, viewing this as a chance to make local state administration more transparent, raise its efficiency, and, last but not least, reduce the number of civil servants. The SDL regards as an optimal variant of administrative and territorial arrangement 11 regions and 77 first-level [prvostupnovy] offices of general state administration. At the same time, the geographic bounds of regional self-administration must be identical with those of regional state administration.

Slovakia: Legitimacy of SPZ Leadership Challenged

AU2401154496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by "ba," TASR: "Trust in Original Party Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dolny Kubin—The all-Slovak assembly of the Party of Entrepreneurs and Tradesmen (SPZ) of the Slovak Republic, held in the Park Hotel in Dolny Kubin on 20 January, dealt with the party's internal situation. The assembly was attended by 44 delegates from 26 districts.

The assembly expressed full support for the original SPZ leadership headed by Vladimir Randa and dissociated itself from the group of former party members around Ivan Sykora, which attempted to destabilize the SPZ late last year. The delegates approved a change in the party statutes to prevent a recurrence of similar "incidents." The participants issued a statement, which states, among other things, that the assembly voiced profound concern about the administrative mistake of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, which accepted from SPZ nonmembers changes in the SPZ statutes, in spite of a notification that the legitimate SPZ leadership addressed to the Ministry of Interior on 28 December 1995. The delegates agreed that changes in the SPZ leadership are to be decided by the supreme party body, the all-Slovak assembly, and no one else. The party congress did not convene any all-Slovak assembly in December 1995. The assembly appreciated the course of action by the SPZ's political partners, which have not interfered in SPZ internal party affairs. An exchange of party membership cards will be carried out in the SPZ in the course of the first quarter of 1996.

According to information provided to TASR by Zuzana Majerova, head of the Slovak Interior Ministry's Section for General Internal Administration, on 15 January, "The SPZ chairman is Ivan Sykora. This transpires from the contents of documents that the SPZ of the Slovak Republic submitted to the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic." She was reacting to publicly expressed conjectures about who is the party's legitimate chairman—its former functionary Vladimir Randa or Ivan Sykora. In a statement of the SPZ Political Board that Frantisek Muzik, SPZ deputy chairman, provided to TASR yesterday, it is stated that "the SPZ of the Slovak Republic declares with all due seriousness that Vladimir Randa has once again blatantly deceived the public, staging a meeting of people close to him in Dolny Kubin on Saturday, declaring this meeting the Assembly of the SPZ of the Slovak Republic." At the same time, Muzik enclosed an extract from the Slovak Interior Ministry's Register of Political Parties and Movements, which confirms that the party's chairman is Ivan Sykora.

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Hungary: Kovacs Discusses Nation's Minority Policy

AU2601122496 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 25 Jan 96 p 9

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Laszlo Daroczi; place and date not given: "Combativeness Will Not Help the Hungarian Beyond the Borders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Daroczi] In your new year's lecture, you said that the triple priorities of Hungarian foreign policy were unchanged; however, both the domestic opposition and the political circles of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders have the feeling that, even if not sacrificed, the minority issue is neglected along the integration policy. How do you explain this? Can you deny this?

[Kovacs] I can explain the concern of the Hungarians living beyond our borders by the fact that they are not living in Hungary. Obviously, it is different to be an ethnic Hungarian living in Slovakia, Romania, or Vojvodina and to occasionally face discrimination, limitation of minority rights, or laws limiting such rights compared with me, for example, who is living here in Budapest. Therefore, I do not even regard as incomprehensible the occasional irrational expectations that overestimate the possibilities of Hungarian foreign policy and do not take into consideration the real circumstances, expectations that have no basis in reality. I also understand the opposition, because its task is to attack and criticize the government. I do not question the feeling of justified concern here either, but there are quite a few unfounded domestic-policy-oriented attacks as well. For example, an opposition representative in the parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee tried to prove once that the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic treaty was better because it contained autonomy. I gave him the treaty and asked him to show me the word "autonomy" there, as I cannot find this word there, probably because I am not a lawyer. It turned out that the word "autonomy" was not there at all.

The Voice of the West

[Daroczi] You spoke of irrational expectations and ideas. Do you also mention in this category the fact that Miklos Duray recently urged turning the minority policy into an "internal affair" even at a ministerial level? Would turning the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders into a ministry emphasize that this issue enjoys constant attention in Hungarian foreign policy?

[Kovacs] I do not regard this as justified. By raising the level of this office to that of a ministry, we would show that the minority issue receives more attention than at the time of the Antall cabinet, rather than constant attention. It would seem that support for Hungarians living beyond the borders is the most important Hungarian foreign policy issue, and integration is secondary, because we do not have an integration ministry. Likewise, it would seem that our relations with the neighboring countries is a secondary issue, because we do not have a minister in charge of neighboring countries. I continue to believe in the balance of the three action directions. It is clear that placing any trend above the other or subordinating any trend to another would harm all three in the long run. If we moved the issue of ethnic Hungarians living beyond the borders to first place, this would make our relations with some neighboring countries more tense and, occasionally, even more tense. This would have a negative effect on the situation of the Hungarian minorities living there. If there is increased anti-Hungarian mood in these countries, the unfortunate atrocities that occasionally affect the minorities will only intensify and, no matter how belligerent, no Hungarian Government could defend them from such atrocities.

On the other hand, if our relations with the given neighbor become more tense, this will also be detrimental for Hungary's international evaluation and, subsequently, our chances of integration will also decrease. Now that Hungary has taken a series of initiatives toward its neighbors, the West is appreciative of our neighborhood policy. They agree with this policy and support it and, subsequently, they do not judge us by the same standard as our neighbors while, previously, there was such an intention. One can take a look at the relevant international political circles: They definitely differentiate between Hungary's attitude and that of some of its neighbors, in Hungary's favor.

[Daroczi] This sounds good, but could you give an example to support this? In spite of all this, it seems that, compared with the previous enthusiasm, the process of our Euro-Atlantic integration has slowed down, both regarding NATO and the EU. A concrete example: We received quite encouraging promises from the OECD at the beginning of 1994, but nothing has happened so far, while the Czech Republic is alreay a member of this prestigious organization.

[Kovacs] Being an economic organization, neither the minority policy nor the relations toward the neighbors is among the OECD membership requirements. I do not have any information that Hungary had the chance of becoming an OECD member at the beginning of 1994, but I know that there is a very big chance of becoming a member this year. I also know that, at the end of 1993 and at the very beginning of 1994, the prevailing Hungarian Government and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] were certain,

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or almost certain that Hungary would become a NATO member at the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. Nothing supported this optimism at the time. The Hungarian Government showed readiness for this, but NATO did not show such readiness. I am convinced that Hungary has got considerably closer to both EU and NATO membership since then and, naturally, this is not primarily the success of this government, but is connected to the fact that the rather slow process of NATO enlargement has advanced. I would mention here that we prepared a report in the Foreign Ministry which shows that Hungary's evaluation has become more favorable in the foreign press. I could also mention the favorable statements on Hungary made by leading Western politicians.

Little Room for Maneuvering

[Daroczi] One can often hear the government's argument that improvement of the situation of Hungarians beyond the border and support of the various autonomy concepts is hardly possible without the support of the international community. However, to what extent can we trust the international community when the experiences are not always encouraging? Without this support, is Hungarian diplomacy indeed without any tools? Is this not too comfortable a stance? On the other hand, would it not be possible to make more use of the international forums than before?

[Kovacs] The success of foreign policy largely depends on the extent it can take the possibilities into account and how accurately it can assess the country's foreign policy room for maneuver and to what extent it can use this. Well, if we take the means of supporting the Hungarians beyond the border in turn, we have to see that broadening and widening bilateral relations is one possibility because this improves the atmosphere. If the trade turnover increases, an increasing number of joint ventures are set up, if cultural links are expanded, the possibilities for crossing the border are better, contacts between the two armies are expanded, then all these will in the long run—I strongly emphasize in the long run and indirectly—have a positive effect on the fate of the Hungarians living there because they reduce hatred, mistrust, and reservations against them.

Contacts are also needed because otherwise there is nowhere to raise the problems. I do not think that one can reach any effect with canceled visits. If the presidents, prime ministers, or foreign ministers do not meet, then what will make the situation change? This is a fundamental difference in understanding between the current and previous foreign affairs governments which tended to be proud of not having any meetings and not talking to each other. Of course, if there was a major difference between the sizes of the countries, for example, Hungary was a world power of 250 million and the neighboring countries were as they are, then I believe that the cancelation of a foreign ministerial meeting would be a warning, and the countries in question would take it as such.

In addition to bilateral relations, support from the international organizations and forums is the other means, because these formulate certain norms. Hungary plays a very active role in these, and also has done so in the previous four years during the Antall and Boross governments, in the interest of these international organizations to accept as many norms and requirements as possible, which can then be referred to as European norms when rights are demanded or requested for the national minorities. However, it has to be taken into consideration that these forums apparently take a long time to accept the importance of these issues. Indifference and counterinterests also exist. Certain countries do not even like to hear about national minority issues and are ultimately interested in not formulating these norms. Therefore, Hungarian diplomacy does not have an easy task but one has to be clear about the fact that Hungary has no coercive means either in political, economic, or military sense.

[Daroczi] Also taking these arguments into consideration, how does the government intend to avoid the mistakes made with the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty—for example, being too trusting—in implementing the announced Hungarian-Romanian reconciliation?

[Kovacs] I do not think that the lesson of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty is that we were too trusting. Two possibilities exist: I either trust that the partner will fulfill his obligations and then I make an agreement or I do not believe this and then must not make an agreement. If I start from the premise that the partner will violate the agreement, then the notion of good and bad agreements loses its meaning because it makes no difference what an agreement contains if it is not adhered to. Then the whole international legal system collapses. From time to time I am advised not to believe this or that neighbor because the particular country or people has been lying for so many years or decades. One cannot hold talks on this basis.

All I can say is that we also want to make a good basic treaty with Romania, one that meets Hungary's interests, and it of course cannot be contrary to Romania's real interests, either. We can look upon an agreement like this, which meets the European norms, as a point of reference. The Hungarian-Slovak treaty is like this. It is not Hungary's fault that it has not yet been ratified, and the international community does not blame

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Budapest for it. And if Slovakia does not adhere to the treaty after it is approved, the international community again will not blame Hungary. Therefore, I cannot see any other solution in the case of Romania, either, than to make an honest basic treaty and to sign honestly worded documents of reconciliation, which will provide international legal points of reference. As for the guarantees, over and above international law, force can only be a guarantee. No one seriously thinks that Hungary wants to guarantee national minority rights through military force.

[Daroczi] It is rather difficult to make the concept of honesty compatible with the Funar-type anti-Hungarian attitude, like his attempt to falsify history in connection with King Matthias. How can we take a stand against this, particularly in view of the fact that Funar's party is currently a government force?

[Kovacs] We can take a stand against this precisely with treaties that are valid internationally and which exclude such phenomena and steps, steps against which international law provides guarantees. In other words, if the basic treaty is good, it is formulated according to European and international norms, and this is just what Hungary is striving for. So far, Romania has not agreed with this, and this is why no basic treaty has yet been signed between Hungary and Romania. The existence of a basic treaty is also important because, if necessary, there is a document one can refer to. Now, for example, among other things, the basic treaty is precisely the system of arguments we use and the ethnic Hungarian parties use in the case of the Slovak language law. Miklos Duray and others, too, refer to the basic treaty, quite justifiably, because the language law opposes this treaty, a treaty they and the Hungarian opposition condemned.

Agreement Traps

[Daroczi] Yes, but do you think this is a trap? Because Bratislava will ratify the treaty in vain if, aware of the dictate of the Slovak National Party, the price is too high and the new laws adopted prior to the ratification contradict the spirit of the treaty. All this can also be imagined regarding the basic treaty with Romania.

[Kovacs] I find it an artificial connection to blame the basic treaty for the emergence of the language law in Slovakia. Instead, the matter is that the national forces that demand such laws would also demand the legislation of such laws if we did not have such a treaty. They are convinced that these laws are needed to create the identity of the new state. The basic treaty represents precisely a factor that limits such efforts, because international obligations must be in harmony with the domestic legislation in the parliament of a given country, based on the priority of international law. The constitution of every cultured state declared this, and this represents some kind of a defense against the legislation and application of such laws. For example, referring to the basic treaty, one can demand the minority language law that the Hungarian parties are now formulating in Slovakia.

[Daroczi] In spite of our reference to justice and international law and constitution, laws and bills that contradict the basic treaty are prepared with full force. In view of this, one automatically questions the other side's good will. Can one speak of any achievement at all after all this?

[Kovacs] Although it is clear that not everyone in the relevant countries really thinks in a European way, I still hope that Slovakia and Romania are developing in the European direction, because these countries also set out the goal of European integration for themselves. I also hope that, while national state efforts are present on one side, the values that strengthen connection with Europe will also emerge, so that the latter will have more weight. Of course, for this to happen, the domestic policy balance of forces and public thinking must change. I think that nothing is left to believe in if I do not believe in this. In my view, we can only choose between a catastrophe scenario and a scenario of a basic treaty advancing very slowly and with difficulty, but nevertheless a positive scenario based on the basic treaty, dialogue, and international organizations. Even if the latter prevails, we will have to take contradictions, regress, atrocities, grievances, and steps contradicting the main process into consideration; nevertheless, this represents hope and a solution.

[Daroczi] To what extent do the budget restrictions affect the Foreign Ministry? Do you think that, because of the not very attractive diplomatic service, the ministry will remain without well-trained experts in the long run?

[Kovacs] The fact that, unfortunately, the officials are very badly paid is valid not only regarding the Foreign Ministry, but also regarding the entire public service personnel. They even have subsistence problems. There are several leading officials in the Foreign Ministry who have several children, and they would even be entitled for local council aid. I consider this to be a catastrophic situation. At the same time, one can feel a very strong professional commitment in the Foreign Ministry apparatus. This does not mean that some people do not leave the ministry for better paid jobs in the private sector but most of them remain here, and there are even people who returned here from the private sector. In any case, it would be preferable to

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couple professional commitment with greater financial recognition.

[Daroczi] What would you be satisfied with in a year?

[Kovacs] First of all, I would be satisfied if, in one year, most Hungarian people would understand that the government's restrictive measures do not derive from some kind of arbitrary sadism, but represent a painful but inevitable treatment. Second, I would be satisfied if the population already started to also feel the favorable macroeconomic indicators, not only reading about them. Perhaps we will be able to say all this at this time next year. Third, I would like to see our foreign policy as successful as last year.

Hungary: Kovacs on Disputed Slovak-Hungarian Issues

AU2601104596 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 22 Jan 96 pp 1, 14

[Interview with Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Pal E. Feher and Julius Lorincz; place and date not given: "This Government Is Not Willing To Plunge Into Adventures"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [PRAVDA] For a long time, Hungarian foreign policy used to be described as successful. More recently, however, it has come in for a fair amount of criticism at home. Some doubt, for example, whether it makes sense for Hungary to seek NATO membership. Others say that your negotiations with neighboring countries have been a flop. How do you assess these critical voices?

[Kovacs] Two matters are decisive for me when it comes to the assessment of Hungarian foreign policy. First is how Hungarian voters assess it. Surveys of public opinion on the activity of the government show that foreign policy is the area of government activity with which voters are most satisfied. In the evaluation of the level of expertise of individual ministries, in the last 18 months the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ranked second three or perhaps four times, otherwise it always ranked first. Perhaps I can be a little bit immodest: The results of a survey published by MAGYAR HIRLAP last week show that the minister of foreign affairs tops the ranking of ministers.

Second, leading politicians from Washington to Tokyo assess Hungarian foreign policy very well. The same goes for Brussels, for the head offices of the EU and NATO. They say that Hungarian foreign policy has done a great deal for the improvement of relations with neighboring countries and, thereby, also for the reinforcement of stability in this part of Europe.

[PRAVDA] Nevertheless, opposition in and outside parliament raises these objections.

[Kovacs] It would be strange if the opposition did not criticize the government's foreign policy. Of course, I can also imagine that, if the opposition felt great responsibility, it would realize the importance of foreign policy consensus from the viewpoint of the international assessment of our state. Unfortunately, we are often being condemned for things that do not even have any real, factual foundation.

[PRAVDA] Does this perhaps also apply to the critics who demand a "reassessment" of Trianon?

[Kovacs] It is a question of concepts, of differences in concepts. They would like Hungarian foreign policy to do things, to which this government does not intend to lend itself and that it will not do because it does not want to endanger the existence of the state and the future of the nation. This government is not willing to plunge into any adventurous undertakings. For example, it does not want to enlarge the territory of Hungary, because such attempts existed before, and it was precisely because of them that the country has become as small as it is. And if such attempts were to repeat themselves, I am afraid that this state would cease to exist.

[PRAVDA] Let us return specifically to the quest for NATO membership and to existing doubts about whether it is worth the effort.

[Kovacs] The government is convinced that Hungary's future and its security and economic and social modernization can be achieved only when this state becomes part of the euro-atlantic structures. We view membership of the EU and of NATO as an organically linked single matter. As a matter of fact, the West, too, regards the enlargement of the two organizations as a mutually complementary process. This does not mean that we will join both organizations simultaneously, but the direction is the same.

[PRAVDA] However, do you not see the danger of a new policy of blocs?

[Kovacs] No. As for the enlargement of NATO, it means, as we are convinced, the enlargement of the zone of stability. In the last decades NATO has never attacked anyone, but has created stability on its own territory, and today it is trying to establish stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, outside its framework. This is why Hungary wants to join it.

[PRAVDA] And what about the opposition's doubts about the effectiveness of talks with neighboring states?

[Kovacs] I am not such an inordinate optimist as to believe that negotiations with neighboring countries

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will instantly yield solutions to problems that have existed for centuries or at least decades. There exists no other path, however. Even the longest journey starts with the first step and this government took it. And it took even more than this one step. The basic security, economic, and political interest of Hungary, like that of any other country, is to have settled relations with its neighbors. And there is yet another viewpoint—the fate of Hungarian minorities living there.

[PRAVDA] How are these two interests related?

[Kovacs] The expansion of neighborly contacts, growing trade turnover, more joint ventures and banks, improving relations in culture and education, or contacts among soldiers create a better atmosphere. This helps to dispel aversion and hatred, suspicion and prejudice, and to establish a way of thinking that contributes to a European, civilized treatment of minorities. Of course, this cannot be accomplished overnight. It is a process that will take many years, but it is necessary to make a start.

Political contacts and talks are immensely important in this process, because they provide an opportunity to discuss problems or negative phenomena complicating, for example, the situation of the Hungarian minority. A law is passed, for instance, that—in our opinion but, and that is decisive, in the opinion of Hungarians living there—complicates the preservation of their identity and limits the possibilities of using their mother tongue in education, in the provision of information, in public life, in public administration, and so forth. We can discuss those things only when we meet, when there are Slovak-Hungarian meetings at the level of heads of state and ministers. Their limitation is not effective.

[PRAVDA] You mentioned the Slovak law on the state language. It seems that you cannot come to terms with it.

[Kovacs] At home we are being attacked: You see, simultaneously with the basic treaty, and as its consequence, the law on the state language was born in Slovakia. I reject this criticism because I think that this law came into being in defiance of the basic treaty, is against the treaty, and does not conform with its spirit. However, this matter can be settled when a law on the use of the minorities' languages is passed that will supplement the law on the protection of the state language. This is not just a Hungarian interest, but also a Slovak, Romanian, or Serbian interest because the internal stability of these states is in their interest. And a condition of stability is the satisfaction of citizens regardless of their nationality. This is what I told my partners, including Juraj Schenk. Their governments need not satisfy the Hungarian or any other government with their minority policy, but the minorities. Whether their minority policy is a good one is decided by the feelings and experience of minorities, not just the Hungarian one. Whether the Hungarian Government's minority policy is correct and good is decided, for example, by the contentment of Slovaks who live here. This is what I consider to be the yardstick. When the Slovaks here are dissatisfied, the situation is bad and we have to look where we made a mistake, and not claim that our minority policy is above European standards.

[PRAVDA] There is a difference between the position of minorities in Hungary and Slovakia and the principle of reciprocity can scarcely be applied.

[Kovacs] From a number of points of view, reciprocity cannot be of a mirror nature. The historical backgrounds are different, and so are the conditions. Hungarians in Slovakia live, relatively, in a more compact territory. Slovaks in Hungary live dispersed in 15 or 16 counties, there has been resettlement, there have been population swaps.... Regardless of these differences, it is desirable, however, that Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary be content with their lives.

[PRAVDA] How do view the fact that the ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian basic treaty keeps being delayed in the National Council of the Slovak Republic?

[Kovac] I consider the delays deplorable. After all, the prime ministers signed the treaty in late March last year and the Hungarian parliament ratified it in June. Getting the treaty ratified was not easy. You know that discussions in our country were very tough, the government was being accused of high treason, it was labeled as a traitor of the nation and as being anti- Hungarian. We signed the treaty with the best conviction and with sincere good will, and we managed to have it ratified. We are sorry that, so far, the Slovak Government has not managed to achieve ratification in parliament. We have heard many new promises, and now it seems that the treaty will be ratified in February. I hope so, because I know that this document is a good one, not just from the Hungarian point of view but also with a view to the interests of Slovakia. Everyone who holds dear and realizes the real, and not fictitious interests of Slovakia and Hungary must opt for the ratification of the treaty.

[PRAVDA] Some National Council of the Slovak Republic deputies are planning to approve in parliament a special statement, which is supposed to represent some kind of a more specific interpretation of the treaty.

[Kovacs] There exist two options when it comes to the ratification of international treaties—you either accept it or you turn it down. The treaty cannot be revised,

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or adapted; it is not possible to explain it. Of course, individual parties may accompany the treaty with their own interpretation of it. This is pointless, however, because it is not binding on the other contracting party. At the same time, there is the danger that confidence in the treaty and in one of the contracting parties will be undermined, which surely is not a good thing. I would therefore be glad if the Slovak parliament approved the treaty in the same way as the Hungarian parliament. In our country, too, there were demands that we add something or that we modify this or that, but we rejected it.

[PRAVDA] Some political representatives of the Hungarian minority frequently emphasize their quest for autonomy. However, neither the United Nations, nor the Council of Europe, nor any other similar international organization has so far adopted a document that would define the term autonomy and make it incumbent upon governments to extend autonomy to their minorities.

[Kovacs] The autonomy issue is being raised because there exists an example in international practice—South Tyrol—where autonomy brought a solution for the local population. This is an attractive example. It is true that there exists no internationally valid multilateral document that would make the provision of autonomy mandatory. However, a government need not do only what some international organization obliges it to do, but can do that to which it is prompted by its own correctly perceived interest. I do not see any threat or danger in autonomy. Autonomy is confused with separatism only by those who are not really inclined to extend rights to members of minorities. I would like to stress, however, that it is not possible to apply the same model in every state, in relation to every minority and every region, because there are different conditions, situations, and historical developments, which must be separately assessed and discussed everywhere. I believe, however, that the generosity of the majority nation will, at any rate, make itself well paid in stability and contentment. It is in the interest of the majority nation that people belonging to minorities be satisfied citizens because, in that case, they will do much for their homeland, which is Slovakia for Slovak Hungarians, in the same way as Hungary is the homeland for Slovaks in our country. The Hungarian Government supports the quest of Hungarians beyond the borders for various forms of autonomy, but at the same time it says and this must be negotiated, and a solution must be found, on the spot between the majority nation and the minority community.

[PRAVDA] Of course, extremist views exist on both sides, in the environment of the majority as well as among the minority.

[Kovacs] Unfortunately, extremes reinforce one another. They influence each other, and extremist statements usually trigger extremist replies, which generates tension.

Hungary: Szabo Views Situation Before MDF Elections

AU2501214996 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 25 Jan 96 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Szabo, parliamentary group leader of the MDF, by Ildiko Csuhaj; place and date not given: "It Is Not Too Late To Clarify Matters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Csuhaj] Lajos Fur [chairman of Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF] called the MDF's tenth national meeting decisive. In your view, what will be at stake at the renewal of officials in March?

[Szabo] It is difficult to specify the differences we are arguing about. It is certainly troubling that a tendency is emerging that thinks in terms of the MDF before Antall [former chairman]. This can mean a qualitatively different party: I find it hard to imagine that this party would remain the same without the Antallian entirety and without an outlook toward the European Christian democracy.

[Csuhaj] The tendency defined by Sandor Lezsak would also like to have Fur's support—unlike in Antall's case—even as an honorary chairman for life.

[Szabo] Due to his integrity, the party chairman has become a symbol of the whole MDF. Fur is the most honest MDF member I know. He wants to rise above certain group interests. It is no secret that the reason for his current hesitation is that he feels it is his fault the MDF's unity has not been achieved. I hope that he will be able to put this psychological problem behind him. I would not like to refer to private conversations with Fur and would not like to start a debate over who supports whom, but I am certain that Fur's trustworthiness cannot be questioned. As a matter of fact, Lezsak did not mention Fur's name in Godollo when he listed the people he would like to work with.

[Csuhaj] It became obvious from Lezsak's statements that he is in favor of the civic alliance, although in the past many people had thought that the alliance policy was dividing the MDF.

[Szabo] We know each other well enough to recognize the essence of statements made for the public. For this reason, we must conduct our debates internally.

[Csuhaj] At the previous meeting where the officials were renewed, you came second behind the elected Fur

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with a minimum difference. Has the membership's opinion changed to such an extent that they would withdraw their support from the MDF's first two people?

[Szabo] At the eighth national meeting, my announcement that I would not withdraw from nomination was received with frantic applause. The MDF's membership likes to have a choice: I think that if I had also withdrawn to Fur's benefit, then half the delegates would have "smashed the furniture" and gone home. However, an incredible discrediting campaign has been conducted against Fur and me in the past 18 months. Dissatisfaction among the membership has indeed grown because of the criticisms appearing weekly and the labelling.

[Csuhaj] Many people believe that the real conflict is between Szabo and Peter Boross on one hand and Lezsak on the other. Why would you not accept nomination if Fur also runs?

[Szabo] Because this would divide that section of the membership that takes a definite political stance. In the past year, Fur has clearly embodied the same political line in the MDF that I do and, therefore, it is not by accident that a number of local organizations nominated both Fur and me to the position of party chairman. Therefore, it would only be for personal motivations if I wanted to be chairman against him. As I do not have such ambitions, I am a forced candidate for chairman.

[Csuhaj] Do you share the opinion that the MDF is in crisis?

[Szabo] Every party has to go through the process of purification once. In my view, groups and individuals who have realized that they are not in the party they originally thought they joined are in crisis. One cannot be surprised at the fact that, after the change of the regime and two parliamentary elections, amidst nuances, political sympathies, and ideological differences, it has to be made clear who belongs where. The MDF was not organized on the basis of ideologies, but now I have to say that I cannot imagine a party without a unified ideological stance. We have now gotten to the point where we argue about what fits into a broad spectrum of ideologies and where the borders are. It would be a tragedy if we were discussing all these at a national meeting in spring 1998, but two years before the elections is not too late.

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B-H: Izetbegovic Asks Koschnick, Owen To Resolve Mostar

AU2501194096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prompted by the failed negotiations in Mostar, the Office of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic has issued a statement that reads as follows:

We call on Messrs. Hans Koschnick and Roberts Owen to continue efforts aimed at resolving controversial issues in the city on a negotiated basis.

In case of failure, we authorize them to pass a decision on the remaining controversial issues through arbitration, to which both sides have agreed. It is necessary for the deadlines agreed to during the talks between Kinkel, Koschnick, Granic, and Sacirbegovic to be met, so that Mostar is not an obstacle to the implementation of the Federation. We believe it necessary for the Dayton Agreement for Mostar to be implemented consistently, which means together with all other provisions of the agreement that guarantee the freedom of movement, the return of refugees to their homes, and private property of all citizens.

The Dayton Agreement's ultimate objective is the reestablishment of the destroyed demographic picture throughout Bosnia, which would annul the results of ethnic cleansing. We have accepted the forming of several municipalities in Mostar, but only under the condition that the city remains integral and that full freedom of movement is established. An integral and free city is a goal that we will not renounce, because it is in the interest of all Mostar citizens, with the exception of certain groups that are terrorizing the city and are maintaining their privileged positions on the basis of its present division.

We have learned with regret that religious and political rights and liberties have been suspended in the western part of Mostar. Mostar is an integral and indivisible part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic and free country. Regardless of all resistance, no anachronistic monoconfessional, mononational, and monoparty authority will be able to survive in it. We believe that we shall have the international community's and public's consistent support for this stance, reads the appeal of Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic to Hans Koschnick and Roberts Owen.

B-H: Karadzic Views Dayton, Future of Sarajevo

AU2501173196 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 2015 GMT 24 Jan 96

[Interview with Radovan Karadzic, president of the "Serb Republic," by unidentified moderator of the "Ask the President" phone-in program on Pale Srpska Televizija on 24 January — live relay by Banja Luka Srpski Radio; broadcast in progress]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Moderator] ...stressed what Dayton has brought, to say once again to our viewers what kind of state has the Dayton Agreement given to the people, the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Karadzic] You are right. I have not appeared for some time, and this has given rise to some speculations. However, I had nothing special to say, so I wasn't in a hurry to appear in the media.

However, one thing is certain. Dayton was signed, and transformed into Paris, where the first Yugoslavia was created. We have been implementing the Dayton agreement and are implementing it fully and consistently, even in an accelerated manner. We are clearly implementing it from the top position, from the highest level, in both the state and the army, despite the fact that the international community has assumed an unacceptable stand toward General Mladic and I. Nothing of that would have been (?implemented) had both I and Gen. Mladic not ordered that this be implemented and respected consistently.

Of course, we are dissatisfied with many aspects. We Serbs accept things with difficulty, but when we accept something, we implement it. The international community knows that. The Serbs find it difficult to accept something that is difficult for them to accept. But (?after) they accepted it, signed it, this thing has been implemented very strictly.

What happened in Dayton and Paris? Bosnia-Herzegovina ceased to exist as a republic. Two entities have been created, but they have not formed a union yet, as joint organs do not exist yet. General elections and so forth have not been held. The constitutional arrangement for the union cannot be applied. In any case, the existing situation has more or less been made legal, official. You know that there are some territorial changes. However, the political and military situation is that there are two entities, even three entities, as the Muslim and Croat entity is complex, very very complex. Relations are very complex in every respect.

So, a real situation has been endorsed as official. According to this real situation, the Serb Republic

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is a state of the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has links with the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. In other words, it constitutes one half of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The former Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer exists. We have no relations with it whatsoever. We constitute a half of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslim and Croat part, if they remain together, constitutes the other half. If they separate, they will create two parts.

Of course, we do not have full sovereignty. But if you think about it, there is no country in the world with complete sovereignty. No EU country has full sovereignty. Many of them were helping us as much as they could, but could not help us in some things as they had obligations toward the EU, they were bound by their limited sovereignty. In this respect, as far as our internal matters are concerned, we are fully sovereign. We are a state, we have the highest legislative, judiciary, and executive authorities. There is no one above our assembly. Nor can anyone pass laws for us. They will be passed by our assembly.

There is no one above our supreme court, nor can anyone try our citizens, pass verdicts, or lodge complaints. The highest organ in our judiciary is our supreme court. Our executive authorities are made up of the president of the republic and the government, as executive organs. They will not be appointed by anyone, but elected by our people. So, we have gotten a state. In this respect, we should not be depressed. We have achieved an epochal result in this respect. This result can be compared with the results of Karadjordje's uprising [first Serb uprising against the Turks in the 19th century], even more so as, after all, Karadjordje's uprising failed. It can be compared with the accomplishments of Knjaz Milos during the second Serb uprising, after which he received a decree [hatiserif] in 1830 and a second one in 1833. This is perhaps even more than these decrees. Although this were very important, as this was the first Serbian state after Turkish occupation, nevertheless we have achieved enormous results, epochal results that every nation in the world can dream about.

I often meet opposition and state leaders and discuss the meaning of the border drawn up by the international community and how strong the AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders were, the borders that were not drawn up anyone, so to speak. They were decided on in an extremely arbitrary way. And yet they played such an important role. Our border is drawn up by the international community. It guarantees the border, it has confirmed it, it has created it.

We often make comparisons with the Kurds and the Chechens. There are 25 million Kurds, 15 million in Turkey and 10 million in Iraq and Iran. And you see, no one is protecting the Kurds. Everyone is beating them. No one cares much to find out what Turkey, Iran, or Iraq are doing to the Kurds. On the other hand, there are only 1.2 million Chechens. They often feature as the top news in all television stations in the world. The only difference is that the Chechens have a border and constitute some kind of entity.

Speaking of entities, if we tried to translate the word entity, then we would have to say that it means a being or a whole. So, we have gotten a being. We are a state. The level of sovereignty in relation to international matters is another matter all together. Our main goal was to stay in Yugoslavia or to unite with Serbia. Full sovereignty was never our main goal. We simply hope to transfer the part of sovereignty that we are going to delegate on our half of the union, if we delegated it, and if we create this union, we hope to transfer it one day to Yugoslavia.

[Moderator] The Dayton Agreement stipulates that the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation have their armies and police. There is even a clause according to which the army of one entity, of one community, cannot cross the border of the other entity without the consent of that state entity. This means that this is, after all, a form of a guarantee of absolute security and safety in the area in which we live.

[Karadzic] It is clear that the Serbs cannot rely on anyone's guarantees and that the only guarantee for the Serbs is the Serb army. This has been the case for centuries. It is unfortunate that this is so. It would have been much better if had some good ally (?nearby). The Croats, for instance, have the Germans, who are indeed reliable allies. The Germans have always protected Croat interests. Our allies are far away and high. Our ally is God. Regarding terrestrial allies, we only have allies when they need us. We were allies with the Russians, the Americans, the French, and the British in both World War I and World War II. If World War III happens, they will again chose the Serbs for allies, as, after all, the Serbs are the strongest nation in the Balkans. But when we need allies, many allies did not behave as allies. This is why we must have our army. We are not so mad as to waste a large part of our budget on the army. Of course, we must enable the economy to exist and function well, to improve the standard of living, and so forth.

We do not want to militarize our lives, to spend everything we have on the army. However, we must have an army, a small army, a deadly army, a well-

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trained, professional army. You said yourself that when you have your own army and the police, (?money), when you yourself pass and implement laws, what are you if you are not a state?

[Moderator] Mr. President, the war is over. We hope that peace will, after all, take deep root and that there will be peace in this region. This means that the state will have to turn itself toward the issue regarding internal organization, internal development. There is much work to be done on it. There is much to be done. What are the first steps that should be taken to tackle these issues as soon as possible?

[Karadzic] You see, we believe that peace will take root, as you said, but we must be ready if it does not. We do not know what kind of surprises could happen. First of all, there could be a major war between the Croats and the Muslims, as they have not completed the most important part of the job. They have not separated themselves. They do not know what belongs to whom. This is a big problem. Second, a question has been raised as to whether there could be a war between the Serbs and the Croats, that is, between Serbia and Croatia. Of course, I do not wish a war, not even for the Croats and the Muslims, let alone for the Serbs. However, we must be prepared for every situation, for every possibility that cannot be ruled out completely.

Our first job will be to consolidate the state administration. As regards the internal organization, we do not have a state administration, nor did we have it. We created our state in the war in 1992. We proclaimed our republic immediately before the war, on 9 January. During the war, we made some kind of state administration from the existing organs in the municipalities. This administration is very loose, unskilled, inexperienced. In any case, the administration was able to carry [word indistinct] until the blockade was introduced on the Drina River.

Let us recall, before the blockade on the Drina River, we had salaries and pensions for both the army and pensioners, and for everyone, although we only worked with 10 to 15 percent of our capacity. In that economy, which was a liberal economy, an economy in which directors enjoyed much freedom and were resourceful, we could secure both salaries and pensions. Of course, I must say that we owe much to the soldiers and the pensioners. Pensioners are wonderful people, they have (?suffered) much in this war. They had a hard time surviving. They are the most loyal supporters of our policy and are very energetic in their demands for us to preserve our state. The soldiers, too. Since the introduction of the blockade on the Drina River, they have been receiving small salaries irregularly, like everyone else. But the soldiers and pensioners represent the greatest section of the population that has suffered the effects of the blockade on the Drina River, and, I must say, other blockades.

The another group of people who have suffered very much are the refugees. And for a very long time; we had refugees from 1992. I believe that you are also a refugee from 5 April. I am also a refugee from 5 April 1992. This section of refugees has, in a way, managed to find a way to live. It was also easier for the whole of the country to help them find that way. However, the refugees from the Serb Krajina represent a horrible, painful problem, people who [words indistinct], as well as from the High Krajina, our Croatia, who were here last autumn. This has been very difficult for us. We still have about 10,000 people in collective accommodation. Many of them have been accommodated by families and, from that point on, they will be repairing residential units and settling in them. However, we still have about 10,000 people in collective accommodation. Finally, we have that part of Sarajevo about which we are probably going to speak, where an exodus of the population is threatening, which we have to prevent; that is, to make sure that the people do not suffer, do not lose their property, and stay as long as they want to; that is, leave when they want to.

The most urgent measure for us is to consolidate the state administration, to have government measures be implemented without exception, to have the authorities function, to have the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] be engaged in this respect also on clearing up its own ranks. It must reject people who are not up to the tasks and only take good, high quality fighters who are now demobilized, who must be accepted into the MUP as honest fellows who will manage to fight crime and to [words indistinct] with crime. We must establish economic relations with Yugoslavia very quickly so that we will be able to pay incomes to pensioners and to employed people. It would be correct perhaps for the people performing labor duties to take their vacations now, so that the soldiers who are coming home now could work a bit, until the economy starts to work at full swing. To be honest, labor duties used to be a sort of privilege, wages used to be better and the exertion less than at the front. Therefore, the soldiers who are now being gradually demobilized should be accepted immediately by firms so that they can work. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] Many viewers called in today and asked one question: unity within the leadership. Who is in charge and have past events possibly led to some disunity and to different options appearing in the very top state leadership?

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[Karadzic] Yes, well our enemies [word indistinct] are timing our media appearances and saying how often Karadzic, Koljevic, and Krajisnik appear. Mrs. Plavsic appears rarely. The length of people's appearance has no importance. The leadership is united. Everybody is doing what is envisaged by the Constitution for him. I am president of the Republic according to the Constitution, and all my associates are very correct and very loyal. Not a single meeting with foreigners takes place without my consent as, according to the Constitution, only I or somebody I have authorized can represent the republic. Only the foreign minister is, by definition, authorized to hold meetings. Therefore, every meeting with IFOR [Implementation Force] people or with representatives of the international community is authorized by me, and it is fully clear that the Constitution is functioning here. Just the same, corps commanders and the like cannot meet without the consent and authorization of Gen. Mladic. In this respect, we have a completely well-ordered state, nothing is happening without the state bodies.

For some time in the past, the leadership itself used to be less together because we were scattered — some were in Banja Luka, some in Paris, some in Dayton, some in Sarajevo. Nevertheless, on the whole, there are no problems and everything functions in this state. Of course, there are difficulties with this functioning and these difficulties occur exclusively due to the blockade. It is exclusively due to the blockade. The blockade is to be blamed for the lack of cash, for the lack of a greater level of production, for the lack of wages and pensions. All is due to blockades, and it will be clear the moment that the blockade is lifted, and it should have been lifted by the entire international community on 19 January. Of course, Yugoslavia should have done so much, much earlier.

After 8 September, when we attended the first (?meeting) in Geneva, we talked with Holbrooke in President Milosevic's presence. We said to him: You introduced the blockade on the Drina River because we left the peace process. Now that we have returned to it, why do you not lift the blockade on the Drina River? Holbrooke said calmly: I am sorry, that has nothing to do with me, it is between you two, and he pointed to Milosevic and I. Therefore, we could have had and should have had the blockade along the [words indistinct] lifted.

As for what happened in the UN Security Council today, I think that it is a matter of details and of days, if not hours. The Serb side has been meeting everything envisaged by Dayton. There is a small delay in releasing prisoners. However, we cannot simply release them because of the parents whose tears we can see. This must be a comprehensive process. All prisoners of war must be released and, as for disappeared persons, both we and the opposite side will search for them, for five years if need be.

[passage omitted] [Moderator] A citizen from Pale is wishing you all the best. He wants to hear your comment on Alija Izetbegovic's statement on a customs and military union with Yugoslavia.

[Karadzic] Military? [laughs]

[Moderator] Yes, joint customs and joint army, that is what the report said.

[Karadzic] Yes, I have seen that. I do not really know whether Mr. Izetbegovic just wants not to have to chose Tudjman or whether there really is a trend among the Muslim national corps that is for cooperation with Yugoslavia. Events will show. [passage omitted] Now, after all the bloodshed, it is possible for the Muslims to have some kind of link with Serbia. It will be very hard for them to survive without Serbia. They are going to have a particularly hard time in their marriage with the Croats. A generation of Muslims will come that will realize that they cannot possibly survive without the Serbs. Now, however, that link can be only on a very different basis. We, the Serbs, do not want any more joint states ever again. We want our own state, and then we can establish relations with anyone we want. I hear that there is some hesitation in Tuzla, that Tuzla wants to turn toward Yugoslavia. That is all very fine, but we have not spilt our blood in vain. We are not giving up our Serb Republic. We want, very soon, to become either a part of Yugoslavia or a part of Serbia, there is no problem there, but never again will we be in the completely same state as our enemies. We can have some sort of an association, but not a joint state.

I do not understand how a military union would work, a joint army. Everything is perhaps possible. Time cures all wounds, but we, the Serbs, have learnt our lesson. If we had been given these borders, the ones we got in Dayton and Paris, in 1918, then the entire history of the Serbs would have been different. The massacres of 1941 and 1991 would not have happened, everything would have been different. Borders are sacred, and we are not giving up our borders at any cost. Those who want to be with us within these borders will have to seek agreement with us.

[Moderator] Branko from Zubac near Trebinje is asking you about who is supposed to protect the population in the yellow zone. The Croats are already carrying out sabotage operations, and IFOR is not reacting and protecting the people in that zone. The people there are unprotected.

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[Karadzic] We have the right to protection, and I think that IFOR has to protect the 2-km zone. If it does not, then we will protect it with our police and the civilian bodies of authority, and even with the army if need be. We have accepted the Dayton agreement on the understanding that the other side, too, has accepted it, and we have been implementing it on the assumption that the other side, too, has been implementing it. The international community owes us a lot, and it has to be held accountable if the Dayton agreement is violated. We will not violate it, but we have to protect our people.

[Moderator] I now have a question from viewers from Ilijas. They say that immediately after the withdrawal of the Serb army to the agreed lines of separation, the Serb population from the places close to the line withdrew. The Serb villages have therefore been abandoned, especially the village of Kopaci near Ilijas, which is in the zone of separation. The Muslims have entered the village, destroyed all houses, and stayed in the village. Does the same fate await and can the same thing happen in Cekrkici, Ljesevo, and other parts of the Serb Sarajevo?

[Karadzic] Had the Serbs stayed, no one would have been able to enter the village. This is the essence of everything. The Serbs must stay in their homes. We will agree if and when they need to leave.

Talking about Sarajevo, I think that no one should have any illusions. We don't want the Serbs to stay under Muslim rule anywhere. We haven't accused Izetbegovic of ethnic cleansing. But you see, we are being accused of ethnic cleansing. However, if you look — I think in 1993, THE JERUSALEM POST carried the official figures collected by the Red Cross — there are more Serb refugees than the Muslims and Croats together. If anyone has been cleansed, then it is the Serbs who have been cleansed.

However, we were very happy to see every Serb that the Croats rescued from Zenica via Kiseljak, every Serb that escaped to their republic over the fence. It was not important whether they were going to return and when. What was important for us is that they escaped from being killed.

Regarding Sarajevo, we are in favor of Serbs staying there as long as they have their authorities there, as long as they have their police. Had the Serbs stayed in Kopaci, no one would have dared enter Kopaci. This is why it is very important that the Serbs stay. We are not asking them to stay if they cannot (?elect) their own authorities.

We will create the conditions, we are creating the conditions around Sarajevo, in Serb Sarajevo, in the Serb part of Sarajevo, the Serb part of Sarajevo that has stayed on our side. We are creating the conditions for the people to slowly start moving if they decide to do so.

By working together with the international community, we have become aware of the truth that the international community must say something about and acknowledge. The authorities cannot be replaced until the elections. No one can replace the existing authorities in, say, Grbavica. These, are the authorities that have been elected at the elections. They will remain in their place until the elections. The police will also stay there until the elections, even after the elections. Who will be electing these authorities? They will be elected by the Serbs. They will elect Serbs. The Serbs will appoint Serb policemen and will have their protection, unless they want to leave.

However, the departure from Sarajevo should not happen in the way some people are leaving now, in a chaotic way, fleeing with their personal belongings. Personal belongings are guaranteed. They can be taken out whenever individuals want to have them taken out. If a person could put wheels under his house, he would have the right to take it out, the entire house. We are sure that we can secure the safety of the Serbs in Sarajevo with the help of the international community and our own police.

If someone asks us about our strategy for Sarajevo, we say: We want the Serbs to stay in Serb Sarajevo, in both the part that has stayed in the Serb Republic and the part that is on the other side, provided the Serb have their rights and have these rights recognized. They should stay as long as they can use their rights to form their own authorities, their own police. But they may also prepare themselves to leave.

So we, have a strategy. The strategy is not just to go or just to stay. The strategy is both to stay and go, so to speak. In other words, to stay but to leave if need be. On the other hand, our strategy is no longer to build a new town, but to expand the existing Serb Sarajevo.

On the Serb side, we already have some 50,000 residents. In Lukavica and (?Grlica) and other places, over 20,000 residents. Here, in Pale, we have over 30,000 people. This is a good base. We have a base for a university. All technical colleges can work in Lukavica. Here [word indistinct] Brdo we have a college for social studies. We have a base for a chemical center, [words indistinct] which we will expand with help from the international community. We have factories and will have more factories that we will build and develop.

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So, the Serbs from Ilijas or from [word indistinct] will be able to live in Ilidza and work in Lukavica or in Pale or Mokro while living at their homes, until they decide otherwise. Perhaps, one day, the Serbs will decide to sell everything they have in Sarajevo and to go slowly to their part, this part of the town.

But, until this happens, until they decide so, they can stay, because the entire international community is monitoring the situation and giving them guarantees, as do we. We will not keep anyone for longer than we can retain our authorities. But, until then, my heart breaks when I see a man carrying a sofa and paying a large amount of German marks to people with trucks to transport it for him. Why? Guarantees do exist. Even Bildt and Leighton Smith have said that private property is guaranteed.

It is one thing to flee Sanski Most during an offensive, it is another thing to flee when there is peace and when no one is able any longer to committee any crime. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] Viewers from Hadzici and Serb Sarajevo have many questions. One is whether you know that IFOR is confiscating personal weapons from citizens in Kijevo. Do they have the right to do that? Will they return the weapons? Do you know that IFOR members are entering people's apartments on the pretext of searching for weapons, and even taking away some of the citizens' private property?

[Karadzic] All this should be reported to our commission, which cooperates with IFOR. All these are illegal activities. We have to determine certain things, though. A machinegun is not a personal weapon. [laughs] One should not have one in a zone where a machinegun is not expected. However, personal weapons — and we know what they are — for which one has a permit, should not be confiscated. We have to clear up these misunderstandings with IFOR. I am in favor of not aggravating relations with IFOR. I understand those young men, they are afraid for themselves. They have come here as guests, they have come to a foreign country. No matter how well-armed and trained they are, they are still fewer in number than us. Sometimes they, perhaps, overreact out of fear. I think that our people should show understanding for these young men so that they are not afraid. Then they will understand that they should not enter Serb houses.

[Moderator] [passage omitted] Here is one more question. Milan Turkovic asks you [words indistinct] somebody else takes over power from us, the people who have never fought for the Serb Republic. Cadre changes have even been announced in the ranks of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party]. When are they going to take place?

[Karadzic] Well, that has already taken place. There was first a change in the organizational pattern. We changed to the presidential system, as I find it really difficult to get to all places and we have very prominent party vice presidents, seven of them. They are Boro Sendic for Banja Luka and that region, then Slobodan Bijelic, Dr. Blagoje Simic, (Zora Arsenovic), and Zoran Vujanovic in charge of refugees. He will have to travel throughout the republic and include refugees in the republican level, both regarding the party and municipalities. Then there is Aleksa Buha and so on. They are esteemed and prominent personages who will now assume the patronage of municipal committees. I think that the people really know who fought for them. I do not believe that there is any danger of some anational or antinational force taking power from us in any way. It cannot do so by force or at elections. The people may reproach the SDS for many things as they passed through a Golgotha of sanctions when, as some say, [words indistinct] and many other things were lacking. Whoever was in power in the municipality would be blamed. However, very few of our officials disgraced themselves. A huge number were real martyrs who were giving [words indistinct], as people say. We will have to get rid of some people who compromised and disgraced themselves and renew the party with respectable people with high qualities. They, these prosperous people [domacin] should take over the power. I am sure that such prosperous people who know about the values of being Serb will never vote for some anational variants. I do not think that there will be any essential changes. I can also see that the international community asserts with regret that the SDS is still the most respected among the people and that the elections should be postponed as, if they are held now, the nationalists — as they call us — would win again.

[Moderator] [Name indistinct] from Lukavica greets you and asks for how long will some stooges keep going to Serbian President Milosevic and for how long will others be undermining affairs in the Serb Republic and threatening the memory of our fighters who gave their lives for the Serb Republic?

[Karadzic] Well, I am also sometimes resentful about people going. If they have to, I always say that President Milosevic should be and should become the president of all Serbs by way of being president of our mother state.

Whoever would go to President Milosevic should tell me and I will convene the meeting. In this way, an impression is being created of something being wrong

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here so that people have to go to Belgrade to make these things work, and that is not true. If someone wants to see President Milosevic and has a good reason for doing so, we will convene a meeting for him without any vanity or any jealousy. However, really, that thing should be solved in [words indistinct].

[Moderator] Many questions concern the forthcoming elections. Viewers are already asking if you will allow elections to be held in the planned time and if all the registered parties will have equal rights both in the media and in any other respect.

[Karadzic] Certainly. Why would we not allow elections? Elections are in our interest, so we can confirm our legitimacy. We are not afraid of elections. There are few parties in any nation that have formed a state. These are huge achievements. Of course, the international community would like to postpone these elections as long as possible, hoping that our standing among the people will weaken. The international community wants to create Bosnia-Herzegovina again, and it can do so only if it disqualifies the SDS; that is, the national forces. However, it is not going to do so because our roots among the people are very strong. We have a huge number of members. Every local community has our committee, our officials, and so on. This is because, in 1990, we said exactly what would happen. We told the people precisely that we should fight to the last man to save the people from genocide and save it from the NDH [Independent State of Croatia — Croatian state in World War II] and the NDBH [Independent State of Bosnia-Herzegovina]. Because the NDBH is [words indistinct] and it is unacceptable.

In 1990, we included SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] members in our list, we even have a deputy who is an SPO member, who is in our assembly, and whom we put on the list. We also included Radicals and SPO members in the executive bodies. Of course, that is the SPO of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As we see it, at elections now, we are probably not going to rule alone, but let other national forces to take part in executive bodies, particularly at the municipal level. It is not our goal to rule alone. Our goal is to create the conditions for the Serb people to prosper. Then why would we not do so? Since we held the campaign in 1990 with a smile on our face, this time we will also hold one with a smile, particularly as Serb parties are involved.

[Moderator] A viewer from Pale asks if the president will run at the coming election.

[Karadzic] Well, many of our enemies would not want me to run, so I am asking myself whether I should do what enemies want me to do or what they do not want me to do. [passage omitted]

[Moderator] A viewer from Ilidza asks what will happen after (?D-90) when the Muslims return to the Serb part of Sarajevo. Where will the Serbs live?

[Karadzic] Where will the Muslims return to? The Muslims cannot return to where Serbs are already living. No one can return to an apartment where someone is already living, irrespective of whether this is a state-owned apartment or some other. Therefore, a long time will pass before things settle down. A Serb from Ilidza should not move anywhere until he can secure normal housing conditions in Lukavica or Pale, if he wishes to live there. We are not at war, it is peace, no one can harm him. He has his authorities, which cannot be deposed, except in elections. Therefore, the authorities in Ilidza will remain Serbian until elections, there is no other way. It is not possible to appoint other authorities. He will decide for himself. I do not know what to wish. I want the Serbs to stay until the elections, as long as possible. However, deep in my soul, I want all Serbs to, one day, move to that part of the city that will be in the Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

[Karadzic] I am convinced that charges can and must be filed against Izetbegovic, because he is responsible for starting the war, for rejecting the Lisbon document, for the general mobilization, for giving the order for attacks on barracks, for the massacre in Tuzla, in (?Dobrovoljacka) Street; he is responsible for many massacres, he has been seen in certain places and camps where Serbs were tortured. We know of the existence of several mass graves. We have discovered over 50 mass graves along the Drina River containing from 10 to 50 Serbs. Gen. Morillon attended the internments, it was quite obvious. We have excellent forensic documentation about this. All the autopsies were carried out thanks to a distinguished Belgrade expert whom we owe decorations and gratitude because he did this in an extremely professional way.

There is now propaganda, pressure.... In August, over 20 correspondents and television crews came to Srebrenica. Now Mr. Shattuck was given the chance to come on a surprise visit, without notifying anyone, and to see what he liked. Everyone can go and see for themselves. I have heard that there were people exploring the Ljubija mine, looking for mass graves, but the graves they are talking about do not exist. We are not saying that there were no crimes on any side, but this is a civil war. In a civil war, it is civilians who fight, not only armies, but also civilians.

We had no army in the first 45 days of the war. We only constituted the army on 20 May. Therefore, this

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is a grave war about old grievances and old conflicts dating back to World War II. However, our army did not commit crimes. Our army followed orders from the General Staff, and the General Staff commander, [words indistinct] tactical and operative. Therefore, our army and our police did not commit crimes.

The propaganda against us will turn to our advantage one day. We will allow anyone to go anywhere he chooses. Please, feel free to go to Srebrenica. We shall search together for whatever you want to find. If the court in The Hague — although we do not recognize it — if anyone from the international community presents us with solid proof that some of our citizens, be it individually or as a group, committed crimes, we shall try him or them. We, our peoples' court, will try them before the eyes of the entire international community and, without any doubt, we will carry the procedure through in the legally correct manner. As for propaganda, we shall never be able to parry our enemies, because [words indistinct] where this is happening and (?they will not accept it). I hope that this (?exaggeration) [words indistinct] they themselves admitted when they said that Ms. Plavsic had died in Ilidza and made fools of themselves, and [words indistinct] the Green Berets and made fools of themselves again. I do not know, they told many things to their people, they told them for a fact that we had fled to Switzerland and Cyprus, that we were not here, and the following day their residents could see that none of this was true. There is some God's justice in this. Propaganda always turns against the one who instigates it.

[Moderator] Mr. President, there is only one more question left, a question asked by numerous viewers, namely, do you expect sometime soon... [changes thought] Actually, when do you expect the final reply as to whether the deadline for the implementation of the agreement on Sarajevo will be extended, bearing in mind that some deadlines, regarding Mostar and also the exchange of prisoners, have already been extended? Is it possible to find a more favorable solution for Sarajevo in the meantime?

[Karadzic] Perhaps we could even be able not to call this an extension of deadlines or a change of the Dayton accord. It is enough to look at the rights the peoples and the individuals enjoy. It suffices, for example, to look at what is happening in Mostar. Where the Muslims live, the Muslims rule; where the Croats live, the Croats rule. Perhaps, we do not need to request the extension of the deadlines of the Dayton accord. Let the accord be realized. However, it is clear that the war has created a certain new reality. This new reality is the new municipal boundaries. Even the Dayton accord redrew the map of Sarajevo. For example, portions of the Novo Sarajevo, Ilidza, Trnovo, and Pale Municipalities, as well as the town municipality of Stari Grad, no longer belong to their mother municipalities, but have a different status.

Therefore, the international community does not need to try to indulge us, to do us any services. It suffices to realize our rights. Our rights amount to authorities (?only being altered) though elections. If this is the case, then the authorities in Ilijas will stay all the way to the elections. If the authorities (?are to remain until the elections), then the police will also remain municipal, I mean the way it is now, until the elections. If there are elections, the Serbs will win. Naturally, they will have a substantial majority, they will win, and they will have the right to their own administration in their municipality. What we demand of the international community is to embrace this interpretation publicly.

[Words indistinct] (?what went unmentioned) is clear to everyone, namely, that if the Serbs refuse to go, then nobody can do a thing about it. Naturally, the Serbs should know that if they refuse to go, then nobody can touch them. They are their own masters in their home. Naturally, they will have their authorities for as long as they form the majority here, for as long as they want to have this, therefore, for as long as they live here.

The international community is, of course, taking certain risks. We repeat what [words indistinct] in the letters to the representatives of the international community: If you are of the opinion that any sort of (?violence) should be carried out prior to the elections — and no authorities can be changed without the elections — [word indistinct] will remain in power in Grbavica until the elections, and if he wins at the elections, he will also stay afterward. The same goes for Sarovic or Prstojevic in Ilidza. Therefore, even if the international community plans to do something else, it does not plan to impose foreign authorities. We were clearly told: We do not intend to bring the Muslim police into Ilidza. This will neither be our task nor shall we do this. If this is not their intention, then everything is all right. However, if the international community harbors aspirations to annul the Serbian rights, then we request that we immediately be given tents and blankets, and we shall go [words indistinct]. We will [words indistinct]. We will not leave our people in the lurch. Either these people will be their own masters, or we demand sufficient time and material resources to get the people out and create the conditions for them to live normally and freely as their own masters.

[Reporter] Mr. President, in the name of the viewers to whose questions you replied tonight — and they were truly many of them — I thank you for your participation

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in our program. To you, esteemed viewers, also go our thanks for your cooperation. Of course, as always, we will inform you in due time when the president will be your guest again. Thank you!

B-H: Zubak To Remain Federation President For Now

LD2501214496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1711 GMT 25 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 25 (TANJUG) — The Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union Party (HDZ) for Bosnia-Herzegovina has decided that Kresimir Zubak remain president of the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation in the transitional period, Croatian radio said Thursday.

The radio said that the HDZ leadership decided at a meeting in the Herzegovina town of Mostar on Wednesday that the Bosnian Croat community Herzeg-Bosnia should represent a political, economic and cultural community of Bosnian Croats.

The HDZ leadership also decided that the executive authority of Herzeg-Bosnia, which Bosnian Croats proclaimed at the beginning of the Bosnian war in 1992, be gradually delegated to the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation authorities.

The U.S.-sponsored agreement to set up the Muslim-Croat Federation was signed in March 1994 but its implementation has not gone very far.

The HDZ Presidency also demanded that Bosnian Muslims fulfill the obligations regarding the transfer of authority to the Muslim-Croat Federation, which they undertook under the Dayton Agreement.

B-H: Mostar Police Chief on Arrival of Croat Officers

AU2501200596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Jan 96

[Statement by Himzo Djonko, head of the Mostar Security Service, for Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have invited a certain number of Croatian police officers to come to Mostar because the local police forces in the western part of the city have up to this point obstructed the establishment and work of the present joint police force in Mostar.

Namely, based on what we agreed earlier regarding how to set up a joint police force, it is our intention to establish joint forces with the Croatian police officers who will come to Mostar; this means that the Croatian, our [Bosniak], and European police officers will patrol both in the eastern and western parts of the city, where they will guarantee maximum security for all people and their property.

B-H: Croats' Bender Criticizes Federation, Hague

AU2501180996 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 25 Jan 96 p 7

[Interview with Ivan Bender, speaker of the Chamber of Deputies of the "Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia," by Jens Schneider in Mostar; date not given: "Without Our Army, We Will Go Under"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar — His state, "Herzeg-Bosnia," has never been internationally recognized, and it should cease to exist at the end of January at the latest. This has been laid down in the constitution of the federation between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, in an interview for SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Croat Ivan Bender does not really give the impression that he and his supporters are willing to give up the idea of that so-called state, which has, in fact, established itself particularly in Herzegovina and has separate customs authorities, a separate army, and police. It is hardly to be expected that the Croats will soon remove the "Herzeg-Bosnia" signs from the doors of schools or remove the Croat coat of arms from the car number plates. "We will maintain our institutions as long as the security and independence of the Croats is not secured in the joint federation," the leader of the Herzegovina Croats said. "Our army will not melt, but only unite with the Bosnian Army. It is our most important segment. If we give up our army, we will go under."

Bender describes the federation with the Muslims as a "dictate," which the Croats have to accept whether they like it or not. "But we would prefer a state of our own." In the federation, one will now have to secure the survival of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Alija Izetbegovic presents himself as president of all people in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Bender said. "But he is not. He is the leader of the Muslims." The Croats must hold their own as a minority. "We want to be represented with the same numbers as the Muslims."

Bender took over the leadership in Herzeg-Bosna from Dario Kordic only a short time ago. Kordic has been charged with war crimes by the UN Tribunal and, therefore, has given up his office. However, he has not yet handed himself over to the tribunal. Bender says that, on principle, his party, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], would be willing to cooperate with the tribunal in The Hague "but we cannot accept political trials. So far, charges have been brought against

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15 Croats, but not against a single Muslim." However, the war was not conducted by just one side. "Without equal treatment, I have fears regarding the reaction from the population." He is backing the defendants: "Kordic and his people have done their job in line with the wishes of the Croats. You must know that our leadership here was surrounded by the Muslims. They were not even able to commit any war crimes, while the other side was."

B-H: Commentary Views Reasons for Clinton Visit

AU2501193296 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jan 96 p 1

[Commentary by Gojko Beric: "Small Steps"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bill Clinton is the first U.S. President who has ever visited Bosnia-Herzegovina. We can think whatever we like about his short visit, but it was doubtlessly a first-rate political event. In the present critical moment, Clinton's meeting with President Izetbegovic in Tuzla has a complex meaning. It is at least a confirmation of the U.S. attitude toward the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The main reason of Clinton's visit to Bosnia is the support for U.S. troops, whom their President is convinced will bring peace to this region. The United States has traditionally been very sensitive to every engagement of its troops in other countries. The ultimate responsibility for the consequences of such an engagement is — by the nature of the thing — borne by the U.S. President. This also applies Clinton, who, after long hesitation, decided to send 20,000 of his troops to Bosnia. The least he could have done for them was to visit them and address them with words of gratitude and encouragement.

There are other reasons, however, that give this visit a deeper sense: There is a new dangerous crisis in Muslim-Croatian relations. This was Clinton's main motive for meeting Croatian President Tudjman. Washington claims that the Muslim-Croatian federation is the basic interest of the U.S. policy toward Bosnia. The United States has not, however, offered enough practical evidence to confirm that statement. The Washington Agreement was signed almost two years ago, and the Federation is still a half-empty glass. Croatia has been considered the main culprit for that situation.

Heavy incidents in Mostar and an armed conflict in the Usora valley have produced new tensions. The Bosnian Serbs previously tried to undermine the Dayton Agreement by creating chaos in some Sarajevo suburbs. The detonators from Karadjordjevo have been reactivated, since the people nostalgic for it cannot reconcile with the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been split up yet. Commenting on these events, Ljubljana DELO writes that these moves, regardless of whether it is Mostar or parts of Sarajevo that Karadzic must leave, are controlled from one center.

It is no coincidence that, on the eve of Clinton's departure to Bosnia and Croatia, Washington launched several pieces of information and messages to both Belgrade and Zagreb. First, THE NEW YORK TIMES published the news that the Bosnian Serbs had transported heaps of corpses to the abandoned Ljubija coal mine and destroyed them there, and then Mr. William Perry, the U.S. defense secretary, stated that NATO forces would soon become involved in the investigation of mass graves in Srebrenica. At the same time, Clinton expressed his support for Hans Koschnick, the European administrator of Mostar, and the U.S. ambassador in Zagreb stated on the same day on Croatian television that "Herzeg-Bosnia will be abolished" by the end of February.

These small steps toward peace — as President Clinton calls them — could trigger a return of the confidence in the international community.

B-H: Commentary Views Silajdzic's Position

LD2501180696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1528 GMT 23 Jan 96

[Commentary by Zeljko Grujic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jan (SRNA) — The Washington-Bonn created "miracle" of a puppet, stuffed with political straw, and pretentiously named the Croat-Muslim Federation, has been trying, in the aftermath of the Dayton Agreement, to escape the grip of its creators and is gradually turning into a scarecrow whose post-war pointlessness has become obvious to both Croat and Muslim officials.

Despite the perfect division to the spheres of influence: The United States on the Muslims, Germany on the Croats, and Turkey's role of a coordinator, the Federation is not working because both Washington and Bonn, in the absence of positive internal charge in Croat-Muslim relations, were forced to build it on the basis of a negativist principle, i.e. on negating the third factor — the Serbs. And as everyone knows, the principle of negation rarely brings about positive lasting results, not even in politics.

Once the Serbs have accepted the Dayton Agreement, it became obvious that the Croat-Muslim Federation, as a strategically arranged creation for the purpose of war, based on an antagonistic attitude toward the Serbs, and imagined as a nucleus of reintegration of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, simply does not recognize and is ignorant of the logic of peace.

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Silajdzic, Izetbegovic, Tudjman

Before tendering his resignation to the post of the federal prime minister-designate, Silajdzic said, in a way that did not sound very diplomatic, that "the federation was not possible as long as the Croats and Muslims are led by those who caused the war between the two." Although clearly indignant and at the end of his diplomatic tether, he restrained himself from naming names, but it was obvious that he had Izetbegovic and Tudjman in mind.

Silajdzic's accusations that the Croatian president "is in the process of creating greater Croatia' or that he "is behind fascist Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, which must disappear," have become proverbial, but it is no secret that for some time now he has been irritated by Izetbegovic's restraint in the face of the insults that Tudjman hurled at the Muslims on several occasions.

In an interview with LE FIGARO, Tudjman revealed that "by creating the Croat-Muslims Federation the West has entrusted Croatia with a difficult and thankless task of culturally reeducating and Europeanizing Bosnian Muslims." In a symptomatic way Izetbegovic chose to ignore this insult. In his speech following the signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris, Tudjman said, in front of the leading world politicians and without leaving Izetbegovic in any doubt, that he considered the Muslims "a religious community promoted to the status of a nation by a communist decree," and that he did not recognize the legacies of the communist rule. And, as he put it, religious communities cannot have a state of their own. Izetbegovic stoically put up with this slap in the face.

The same, offensive tone, is being increasingly used by other high-ranking Croatian officials when promoting their idea of there being "two reserves set aside for the Muslims in former Bosnia-Herzegovina: Zenica and Tuzla."

Croatian officials insist that "there is no force that can force the Croats to allow their children to learn, in addition to Croatian, some bogus language called Bosnian or to serve in a Bosnian army that will be deployed along the nonexistent border with Croatia." Croats further insist that "to apply the Dayton Agreement literally will disrupt the geostrategic and demographic balance to Muslim advantage, above all in Mostar and central Bosnia."

Izetbegovic took it all quietly, but Silajdzic has obviously had enough. In other words, the Silajdzic-Izetbegovic clash is not simply an issue of formality, but is of a political nature and concerns the party program itself. It will end with the political marginalization of one or the other. In view of the basic idea of [Izetbegovic's] "Islamic Declaration" that "the Islamic and non-Islamic social system cannot coexist," it is clear that, ultimately, Izetbegovic will be prepared for clear-cut demarcation with the Croats both territorially and politically. In contrast, Silajdzic insists that the Federation and its reintegrational role in the whole of former Bosnia-Herzegovina can be preserved only with a strong central government based in Sarajevo.

"The struggle for Islamic renaissance," Izetbegovic says in his "Islamic Declaration," "on the basis of the profound reconstruction of the Muslims society can be undertaken only by tough and trusted individuals rallied within a firm and homogeneous organization that will not be a political party in the style of Western democracies. It is a movement based on Islamic ideology and of clear moral and ideological criteria of affiliation." It is obvious that in the case of Silajdzic these criteria are not being met fully and that it is only a question of time when he will be officially expelled from the Party of Democratic Action.

Silajdzic was not happy, either, with Izetbegovic's criticism of the way the media marked the New Year's Eve, although he must have been aware of what Izetbegovic had said in his "Islamic Declaration": "The education of the people, and those responsible for forming public opinion must be in the hands of people of indisputable Islamic moral and intellectual authority. We must not allow these areas to fall in the hands of perverted and degenerate people. What can we expect if we allow conflicting messages from minarets and TV masts?"

Washington, Bonn, Ankara

Why has Silajdzic decided to step out of line now when he knows that he has no support from either official Sarajevo or Zagreb? The answer is simple: He no longer needs their support since he has the Washington-Bonn-Ankara axis behind him. Silajdzic has obviously decided that the time has come for more liberal forces to enter the stage and that the axis will not for much longer tolerate either Izetbegovic's Islamic rigidity or the crude behavior of the federal partners [the Croats] that has already led to clashes in Mostar and in the area of Usora, and that they will do anything to marginalize Izetbegovic and to rid Zagreb of any potentials for another Croat-Muslim war.

Silajdzic is rightly counting on continuing and synchronized military and political pressure by the United States and Germany on Sarajevo and Zagreb in order to implement and safeguard the Federation. He knows that Washington's arrogant interventionist policy and its

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plans for a "third U.S. empire," which have become too obvious in the example of the Balkans, and Bonn's pragmatism in its declared objective of expanding eastward will not allow some local fanatics to destroy the idea of a Croat-Muslim federation.

Silajdzic is confident that the federation has been planned as the key link in the Balkan part of the Washington-Bonn-Ankara axis, and that at the same time, it will serve to test if the axis is capable of acting in a synchronized way in the efforts to reorganize the Balkans in the post-bloc period by creating small, puppet states and to what extent it can harmonize its strategic interests in order to weaken and isolate the Russian factor.

In other words, Silajdzic reckons that the Croat-Muslim Federation will continue to exist, even with the use of force, for as long as the Washington-Bonn-Ankara axis functions. This is why he is feeling strong enough to do away with his degrading role of an errand boy serving Izetbegovic and Tudjman to which, to put it bluntly, the role of the prime minister of the Federation has been reduced.

Silajdzic feels that he is politically mature enough to take upon himself the task of coordinating and implementing the moves being played by Washington, Bonn, and Ankara in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is not inconceivable that they have already given him a go ahead for this.

It is a thankless task to predict how Izetbegovic and Tudjman will eventually react to his turnabout, but there is no doubt that Silajdzic's resignation marks the beginning of the post-war and pre- election jockeying for position in Muslim ranks. What effect this will have on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, it is hard to predict.

B-H: Commentary Views Opposition's Election Chances

AU2501175996 Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jan 96 pp 8-9

[Commentary by Senad Avdic: "Consolidation of Opposition and Differentiation of Ruling Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week in Sarajevo the leaderships of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina [SDP, former communists] and the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Socialist Democrats [UBSD, former Reformist Party of former FRY Prime Minister Ante Markovic] met. The public was not given much detail of the meeting between the representatives of the two strongest opposition parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it was possible to find out about the content and goals of this meeting that this was the clearest signal yet that in Bosnia-Herzegovina the pre-election realignment of the parties has now begun. We have been told by reliable sources that these two parties have agreed to run jointly in the elections (which, according to the Dayton agreement, are to take place by mid-August this year). The former Communists and former Reformists have made the first step to combine the Bosnian opposition and form a single opposition bloc to run in the coming elections. Representatives of the two parties point out that they have not invited other opposition parties to take part in the first round, but they expect they will join them very soon. In the next elections the opposition will behave according to the same model that it agreed on two years ago regarding its functioning in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly. That is to say, unanimously and jointly. The only thing that could be called exclusive in last week's uniting of the opposition is the choice of the leading people in the joint election campaign. It is almost certain that the SDP and the UBSD will be jointly led in the coming elections by Zlatko Lagumdzija [deputy SDP chairman] and Selim Beslagic [mayor of Tuzla, leader of UBSD].

Izetbegovic Favors Liberals

It is expected that other opposition parties in parliament (the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO], the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO], the Croatian Peasant's Party [HSS], and the Civic Democratic Party [GDS]) over the next few months will join this opposition axis. Unknown are the intentions of the more ambitious Liberal Party and its leader, Rasim Kadic. Over recent months this party has rejected joining the opposition bloc and has acted autonomously. But, to judge from the number of seats in the Assembly (one) and by their objective political influence, Kadic's Liberals are not expected to have a particularly significant influence on the possible unity or disunity of the opposition. It is interesting, however, that in an interview in the New Year issue of OSLOBODJENJE, Alija Izetbegovic, the chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], referred to the Liberal Party as the only opposition party that has a chance of success in the coming elections. The president's forecasts had been corroborated two days earlier by FOKUS, a newspaper close to Izetbegovic, which also predicted the Liberals' success compared with the other "blabbermouth parties" (term used by Izetbegovic).

The Liberal Party has always stood out among other opposition parties because of its ambition, which could sometimes be called pretentiousness. Fully relying on the experience and political strategy of the Slovene Liberals and their leader Jozef Skolje, the Bosnian

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Liberals, having firmly settled down in the global liberal political establishment, have very ambitiously set out their goals. It is known from reliable sources that Kadic is planning to recruit Haris Silajdzic to his party, just as the Slovene Liberals used the authority of Janez Drnovsek! It is also known that the Bosnian Liberals have taken certain steps over this, including the engagement of famous personalities from international liberal circles to talk with Silajdzic on their behalf. Apart from Silajdzic, a hook has been thrown toward minister Hasan Muratovic, who, after the complete defeat that he experienced in going for the premiership of the Federation, being routed by opponent Izudin Kapetanovic at a SDA Executive Board meeting, has probably understood that the SDA is not a political environment for him.

Is Pluralism the Bosniaks' Enemy?

Some more skeptical and distrustful analysts of the Bosnian political scene have interpreted Izetbegovic's favoring of the Liberals on one hand, and them chasing Silajdzic on the other, as an agreement within the SDA, by which they intend to transform the Liberal Party into a liberal faction within the SDA for the next elections, by which, there is no doubt, only a few crumbs of votes would be left to other parties. As was announced at the last pre-Assembly meeting of the SDA Executive Board, at the next plenum of the SDA scheduled for late this month Silajdzic's exclusion from the Main Board of this party will be proposed and probably passed (Silajdzic submitted his resignation as SDA deputy chairman over a year ago).

However, within the leadership of the SDA a lot of speculation and curiosity was caused by the recent tour of Prime Minister Silajdzic through some Western countries, which is interpreted as support and increasingly open sympathy shown by the West toward Silajdzic's possible political independence. The forthcoming plenum of the SDA will most probably be used for a sort of political and personnel consolidation and a reshaping of the ruling Bosniak party. The SDA leadership appears to have become aware that, without any more serious airing of its own policies, victory in the coming elections is not wholly certain. The situation is reminiscent to a degree of the last attempts of the Communist authorities in resorting to democratic instruments to gain legitimacy for their own leadership (so-called differentiation). Thus at the meeting of the SDA Main Board scheduled for 27 January, its members will hold a confidence vote to the members of the Executive Board. A quarter of the (25) members of the Executive Board with the fewest votes of the overall membership of the Main Board will automatically lose their positions and new people will replace them. The vote will be secret and, to judge from the mood in the public, few members of the SDA leadership, the vanguard of the Bosniak people, can feel at ease on the eve of the secret confidence vote in the Executive Board members.

Will it happen, as can already be heard in political lobbies in Sarajevo, that the coming elections will bring about political pluralization, exclusively and solely, among the Bosniak people? Is it already certain that the Bosnian Croats and Serbs will be careful not to waste votes on several political parties and platforms? Is political pluralism, therefore, the natural enemy of the Bosniaks in the atmosphere of a general one-party system in their closer and broader environment?

Before the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections there is still much time ahead (let us remember that it was only six months from the foundation of the first political party until the last elections) and it is certain that the map of political parties in Bosnia- Herzegovina will be considerably revised in the months to come. One should not easily reject the possibility of pluralization among the Croatian nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is still quite active in three political parties (in addition to the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ], there are also the HSS and the Croatian Party of Right). One should not be surprised if a serious breach occurred within the HDZ (certain steps toward differentiation within this party have already been made by Richard Goldstone, prosecutor of the International Tribunal in The Hague), as was recently seen following Dayton's removal of Posavina from the Federation, but also on some less obvious examples. If, at the beginning of the war and throughout, it was enough to turn to Mate Boban to reach any agreement with the Croats and thus get the job done, today it is absolutely impossible to predict whether something that has been agreed on with Zubak is acceptable to, say, Lozancic, or whether Bender will pay any attention to anything accepted by Zubak and Prlic.

Undoubtedly, the HDZ has remained without a leader, which is an elementary precondition for the democratization of any party or state....

The Serb political scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina will divide, as it has hitherto, over the question of recognition, or rather non- recognition of the state in which the Bosnian Serbs live. The real question, to which there is no answer for the time being, is whether the Serb Civil Council will change from a patriotic front into a political party or whether its membership will switch over to other civic parties. There is also the question as to to what extent any truly democratic alternative to the repressive totalitarianism of Karadzic's Serbian

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Democratic Party really exists within the Serb entity. Is any respectable political body of Serbs possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that at the same time is not working for Serbia, or rather, that is not against Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Be that as it may, it is clear that with the first days of peace the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina is beginning to unfold just as the fate of any normal state does. Which is to say, by political means and political struggle. This fact alone shows that peace has come to the region and that its prospects are not poor.

B-H: Bosnian Army 3d Corps Commander Interviewed

96BA0047A Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 95 pp 5-6

[Interview with Brigade General Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Nedzad Latic; place and date not given: "They Will Never Again Think of Moving Against Us That Way!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Latic] Your career as an officer coincides with the line of development of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When you look back, what of your personal desires have been achieved and, in general, what of what is called the concept of an army's development has been achieved?

[Mahmuljin] I have had occasion to be involved in the design and practical creation of Territorial Defense [TO] and the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When in thought I go back to the positions we had at the beginning, from that vantage point I am happy to see the growth of our military power. By all the rules, theories, and rationale of warfare, we were in a position to surrender in 1992. It was on that assumption that the aggressor started the war, and that was the result of logical analyses. There are two things which cropped up and need to be emphasized in this connection. First, I belong to a people capable of defending its state and religion, that is, its identity. Second, that people's belief in God, His providence and mercy, kept us from giving up and, in spite of all the sacrifices, gaining us our present position as to political treatment in the negotiations. Our negotiating delegation has a key trump card which is the only thing esteemed by the world, and that is military power. At this moment, we have a strong army with solid armament. We are ready for both peace and war.

From this vantage point, we also see the mistakes we have made, but the results are favorable.

[Latic] Along with Division General Dudakovic, Brigade Gen. Alagic, Brigadier Cuskic, and the late Brigadier Nanic, the Krajina people have demonstrated the triumph of their mentality, as was fully expected, in the end game of these victories. How did you, as someone from Krajina, feel in 1992?

[Mahmuljin] It is still a delicate matter to engage in such analyses and assessments. It is still difficult to analyze the first year of the war, much less provide a complete survey of the entire military and political situation in these three and a half years. So, without reservation, I will attempt to offer my personal view. It seems to me that there was not sufficient preparation for armed resistance in Bosnian Krajina itself. Perhaps there was too much improvisation there. At the anniversary celebration of the Patriotic League in Mehuric, I looked at the map. What is represented on that map, the force that was counted on, was in a position to defend Bosnian Krajina.

The Krajina segment of the Bosnian Muslim population, along with eastern Bosnia, suffered the most. This is an additional phenomenon if one is to understand that segment of our people: Although it was cut to pieces and driven from its home, in central Bosnia it played a decisive role on behalf of the Army in the conflict with units of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. And now we see that with the 5th and 7th Corps we are altogether taking the initiative on the battlefield. That is an indicator that our Krajina mentality will be taken for what it is when there are no improvisations, and it shows what future it has when it is well organized. All of this is evidence of the immense patriotism of the Krajina people, which they are now showing solely in a desire to go back home.

In Bosnian Krajina, the Yugoslav idea and its entire ideological import had tough roots. The Bosnian Muslims were the nationality most devoted to that idea. I do not oppose the opinion of people who say that in 20 years or so the Serbs would have assimilated us. We were shackled, and we had to tear off those shackles and then defend ourselves against any aggression. I emphasize that this is my personal view of something which still has not been answered. Thus, I am still inclined to think that all of this has given us a chance to survive and to defend ourselves with a free hand.

I have an extremely high opinion of the late Nanic, Cuskic, Alagic, and Gen. Dudakovic, and they provide evidence that the Krajina people realized what had happened to us. In our first steps in the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], we were able to realize that Yugoslavia was actually what is called an expanded Serbia. As a boy, I rooted for the Partizan soccer team.

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In military school in Podgorica, none of my friends rooted for the Bosnian teams, and so in reaction I began to root for Celik. I did not let them put me down as "uncommitted," and in the box marked "nationality" I wrote that I was a Muslim. This was more my defiance as someone from Krajina than national consciousness.

I do not want to talk about the officers of the Army who graduated and served in the former JNA, with emphasis on "former." We are officers of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and nothing else.

In a conversation with an Iranian military delegation, I was told that they reversed the situation on the battlefield only after eight years. Why did it take that long? I asked. All the officers of the Shah's army fled with him, I was told. Only then, when they had trained new officers, could they wage war. In our case, it was altogether different, and this must be acknowledged. We certainly have good and bad officers, those who made their knowledge and themselves available to the people and the state in good time, and those who did that relatively late, and so on, but all of that should be viewed as one would the position of any other man. I do not know any officer whom we summoned but who refused to come, although there are those who have been absent.

[Latic] The time in which you came to Zenica was the "time of the clinical death" of our people. We were beaten down, physically divided, there were shortages and hunger, there was war on two fronts.... As an officer looking back, can you analyze that line of development in the 3d Corps?

[Mahmuljin] Estimates are being made these days that the 3d Corps, with respect to its military organization, is one of the best organized entities in the Army. It is usually said that this did not occur automatically or overnight. That is true. These three years were very difficult. It is a very difficult job to shape an army, or any unit or segment of it. We grew up out of the people, wherever the people organized themselves on any basis—that was our beginning; we began, so to speak, with the rows in the mosque. What other institutions did we have? All of that had to be organized and brought up to the standards of the present-day organizational principles of an army which had to defeat such a difficult enemy. The valley of the Bosna was characteristic in having a great number of fighting men, but also a great number of unconnected units. No one had a dilemma about the objective of the struggle, and it was not mere rhetoric to say there was an integral and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. But it was a very delicate job to find the methods to knit together the spiritual strength of the people to achieve that objective. It is clear that the people in the valley of the Bosna River are characterized by their devotion to Islam; that was the people's greatest strength, and it was clearly expressed through the Army. In our ranks, we had a high percentage of believers, and our success is that we did not encounter problems in correctly channeling that spiritual force and applying it to the proclaimed idea of the struggle for a state which would be integral and sovereign. There were certain units which resisted and, in time, were eliminated. Now, the 3d Corps is a single entity upon which both the General Staff and our government and political leadership can rely on the road to freedom.

[Latic] Today, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not control Romanija, Jahorina, a portion of Velez, and 20 percent of Majevica, while it is on Treskavica, Bjelasnica, Vranic, Vlasic, Ozren, Grmec.... You have "done" Nabozic, you took part in the battle for Vlasic, and you recently went to Ozren. You liberated Donji Vakuf and Vozuca. Is the principal strategy of the Army to liberate the mountains, and what does that mean today?

[Mahmuljin] The basic military theories are based on control of communications, passes, and peaks from which it is possible to control territory. That was the assumption of the chetniks, they put all the communications under their supervision, they concentrated forces on the peaks from which they could be dominant with their equipment and make up for the shortage of manpower. When we liberated Vlasic, we said we had liberated the roof of Bosnia. In good weather, you can see Banja Luka, Doboj, and Bosanski Brod from there....

It is important to be on the peaks from the standpoint of being able to gather data on the enemy's movements, but a more important result for us was that we removed the chetniks from the crown of the head where they were sitting, on top of us.

When we climbed up to Blizna and saw what could be seen, we were amazed that the chetniks had allowed such an objective to be lost at the cost of high casualties. From Blizna in the direction of Ozren, one controls the entire valley of the Krivaja, Gostovic, and part of the valley of the Bosna River. From those peaks, with the guns they had, the chetniks could have paralyzed all of our movements of forces and our economy in those areas. Our strategic task was above all to reestablish communications—telecommunications and transportation, and this internal linkage of the free territory made it possible to move on further.

[Latic] Would there have been those turnarounds without the NATO strikes on telecommunications and the chetniks' military stores?

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[Mahmuljin] NATO took two steps: They destroyed the communications and telecommunications systems and the large military storage depots. The third step, which is to destroy the roads for delivery of aid and supply—was not taken. It would be immodest of us to minimize those NATO steps which were beneficial to us. Still, that was not the decisive factor. The Army was already safely in a position where its strategic pressure on the chetniks on all fronts had to have a result, which in slang means that the watermelon had to burst. This occurred on 10 October at Vozuca, and in just 10 hours we finished Vozuca. The foreign soldiers here were amazed at that.

[Latic] What can you say today about this summer's operation to remove the blockade of Sarajevo?

[Mahmuljin] Several assessments of that operation have been made. We quite naturally have been trying to conceal both our tactics and our strategy, and it will be a long time yet before we talk to the newspapers about our real strategy in the battle for Sarajevo. There are quite a few elements which support those who say that in that operation we attracted the chetniks in that direction in order to strike somewhere else. Perhaps we will once again use a feint, striking in one place, and then doing what we really have in mind at an entirely different place.

[Latic] After Operation "Storm," the Croatian Army [HV] was greatly praised, while the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was criticized. Then the liberation of the cities was first attributed to the HV, and only afterward to the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Mahmuljin] The Croatian Army approached its development strategically, and for four years developed and armed itself and showed its strength at the right moment. But the officers of the Croatian Army were amazed when we liberated Ozren. There was not a single Croatian soldier there. You see Grmec and Sanski Most.... Anyone can express his opinion and do it without much thought, but just let them try us. They will feel our real strength.

[Latic] Do you see the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina joining the NATO alliance?

[Mahmuljin] Some of the assessments to the effect that we are not such a modern army in our organization may be part of the propaganda which does not want to see us in NATO. All serious observers of our situation know that we armed ourselves the best we could. If you look at the weapons with which we have been waging war, it is well-known that they were captured from the chetniks, and they come from the arsenal of the Warsaw Pact. That military alliance was not defeated when it came to weapons. Our people's national interest is certainly to have an army which can guarantee it a future in which it will never again occur to anyone to repeat this. That is why we will certainly devote maximum attention to that; we will take bread from our mouths to do that. The present condition of the Army can be evaluated from our demonstrated capabilities. The concept of development we apply in the future will depend upon our military and industrial capabilities and also upon our existing weapons and personnel. We have excellent engineers who have mastered very sophisticated weapons with ease. The greatest value of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina is certainly its originality in all respects. We did not copy, but instead improved both the system and the weapons. Perhaps people still do not understand us, and so they are not sufficiently familiar with us.

[Latic] At the time of those faint-hearted assessments of the Army, some reproached you for being led by officers who were politically devoted to particular parties, but were not that capable.

[Mahmuljin] We still are not a professional army. We are a people's army. We actually are a people in uniform. A people defending itself or fighting for its statehood with every available means. Surely, it is not a sin to operate politically in uniform while we are offering resistance to prevent our biological and political annihilation. Mr. Ganic said that he joined the Democratic Action Party with the conviction that through it he could do the most to help his people. I have the same opinion. I am not a professional mercenary. My pay is 40 German marks. In peacetime, it is quite natural to think about a professional army. To be clear, I believe that my fighters know who was the first to begin to think seriously about politics. For the present, the prospects are that with that kind of political thinking we are on the way to victory.

[Latic] What is the personnel policy in the Army, that is, the system of ranks?

[Mahmuljin] Many times I have heard people say "Thank God, we have our generals." We have officers who have not been promoted as much as they should have, and also the other way around. But there are no particular anomalies. There have been officers who have not been equipped for the posts they hold. They have been replaced. Again, ranks are not solely the expression of an officer's maturity, they are an expression of something else. I myself would not have this rank in the Army under other conditions. So I realize that the rank of general given to me is more an expression of recognition to the people in the valley of the Bosna River and its tributaries. So I understand congratulations

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of that kind. I make a present of the rank which I hold to that people, and they are all fighters. After the war, I will be in favor of making this only a wartime rank, and we will undertake a different system of ranks for the people who will train new officers and men of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 6]

Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was promoted on 1 November of this year from the rank of brigadier to that of brigade general. He is the 24th general of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Gen. Mahmuljin was born on 13 October 1952 in Kozarac. He graduated from the military high school in Podgorica, and he finished the university as a part time student, while serving as an officer in Capljina, Mostar, and Sarajevo. At the time of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, he was on the republic TO staff. From the first day, he joined the resistance and held posts in the General Staff of the TO of Bosnia-Herzegovina—from sentry, operative, to deputy chief of staff of the commander of the General Staff of the TO. He came to Zenica on a mission for the General Staff of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and was then appointed chief of staff of the 3d Corps. In April 1994 he was made commander, which is the post he holds today.

B-H: Islamic Brigade Said Planning Revenge on U.S.

AU2601101096 Vienna NEUE KRONEN-ZEITUNG in German 26 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by Kurt Seinitz: "Islamic Terror Mercenaries: Alarm for U.S. Troops in Bosnia!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington/Sarajevo/Vienna — There is a new twist in the Yugoslav war: a red alert for the U.S. troops in Bosnia! However, the enemy is not the Serbs, but terrorist fanatics from several Islamic countries who have been fighting in Bosnia as allies of the Sarajevo government.

This Islamic Brigade, which consists of approximately 3,000 men, has found a new enemy: the United States, as the "Great Satan," because the Serbs were only the "Small Satan." When terrorist Shaykh Rahman was sentenced to life imprisonment in New York several days ago, the Islamic mercenaries swore deadly vengeance on the U.S. troops. Under the Dayton agreement, "armed foreigners" are to leave Bosnia without delay, but the Sarajevo Government is either not ready or not able to force them to leave the country. Allegedly they have been given Bosnian passports....

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Croatia: Tudjman, Granic Meet EU's Van den Broek

LD2501224996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Franjo Tudjman received Hans Van den Broek, EU commissioner for foreign affairs, this evening. Drazen Korda reports from the presidential palace.

[Korda] Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, was also present at the talks, which lasted for an hour. In his statement after the meeting, Commissioner Van der Broek said that he felt encouraged by the process of the peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje [eastern Slavonia]. He added that he had an exchange of opinions with his collocutors on how the EU, the United States, and Croatia could contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Mostar and the strengthening of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. We greatly support the role of Croatia in this process, Van den Broek said.

Minister Granic commented that there is particular optimism regarding the process of the peaceful reintegration of Croatian Podunavlje. As for the situation in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and Mostar, Croatia supports the arbitration of European administrator Koschnick in all disputed areas. Minister Granic repeated that President Tudjman is prepared to offer Hans Koschnick as many Croatian policemen as necessary in order to ensure security and freedom of movement in Mostar.

Cooperation with the EU and OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] was also discussed, as was everything that Croatia has done to reestablish the legal order in its liberated areas, Granic concluded.

Croatia: Granic Pledges Support for EU Arbitration

LD2501235596 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After talks with President Franjo Tudjman, EU Commissioner Hans van den Broek and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic made brief statements for the press. Drazen Korda reports. [passage omitted]

[Korda] Minister Granic stressed that optimism concerning the reintegration of the Croatian Danubian area [eastern Slavonia] was expressed during the talks. The normalization of relations with Belgrade was also discussed. Croatia gives its firm support to the resolution of all problems in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzgovina, Granic said. He added:

[Begin Granic recording] We supported Mr. Koschnick and his arbitration in all issues on which a mutually acceptable solution has not been found. We expect Mr. Koschnick to make a decision on the borders between municipalities [in Mostar], and the Republic of Croatia will give his decision its firm support. President Tudjman reiterated that he was ready to offer as many policemen as necessary to be under the command of Mr. Koschnick, in order to establish order in Mostar and set up a joint police force, and eventually establish complete freedom of movement.

We discussed other important issues, too, relating to relations between the EU and Croatia, and relations between Croatia and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], as well as the situation in the liberated areas: everything that Croatia has done in order to establish the rule of a law-governed state in those areas. [end recording]

Croatia: Defense Minister Susak Interviewed

LD2401122196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2150 GMT 23 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent Goran Rotim] Good evening, dear viewers, and welcome to the "Picture Versus Picture" program. Our guest this evening is Gojko Susak, minister of defense of the Republic of Croatia. Good evening and welcome.

[Susak] Good evening.

[Rotim] Mr. Susak, you have had an exceptionally rich and lively day in terms of diplomacy. Yesterday [22 January] too, you were in Mostar. You met [Mostar's EU administrator] Hans Koschnick in the company of a Croatian delegation, and you met Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic, and today you met two defense ministers — from Hungary and Germany. Let us begin with Mostar. What did you agree yesterday? Negotiations and talks are allegedly still going on today but at a lower level. [passage omitted: Susak outlines his recent meetings with Koschnick; explains known Dayton provisions for Mostar]

[Susak] No agreement could be reached [between the Muslims and Croats] on the delineation of the six municipalities, so Koschnick said that by 1200 on Saturday [27 January] the two sides should put forward their proposals, and then the European Union, led by him, would make its own proposal, which would lie somewhere between the positions of the two sides.

[Rotim] What is the problem in all this? Allegedly it is about the size of this jointly supervised district.

[Susak] Well, this district does not exist in the Dayton agreement. This district is something new, proposed by

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us as an interim solution, ahead of the formation of the six municipalities. This district would not be a part of Mostar with a residential population. It would contain offices of the federation — the four ministries as per the Dayton agreement. It would contain the administrative offices of the canton of which Mostar is a part, and the administrative offices of Mostar. We are talking about an area the size of perhaps a couple of parts of the city.

[Rotim] In the center of town?

[Susak] Yes, in the city center. That area should be jointly administered. Yesterday, the European Union put forward a proposal that was supposed to be some kind of solution down the middle between the positions of the Croatian and Bosniak sides.

In principle the Croatian side accepted this proposal, but it had objections to the fact that the so-called district is bigger than what it really needs to be. So we came up with our proposal...[pauses] The Bosniak side, which was led by Silajdzic and Orucevic [mayor of east Mostar], rejected both proposals. I went along with the proposal for a solution in terms of meeting half way, namely that Koschnick — and this took place today — might meet separately with the Croatian and with the Bosniak side in order to try to reach an agreement, and if this failed then both sides would have to accept EU arbitration, in other words the arbitration of Koschnick. [passage omitted]

[Rotim] How does this situation in Mostar — we all know about the tension that has been present over there over the past few weeks — reflect on the federal level and relations with the Republic of Croatia?

[Susak] We had, to put it mildly, much disagreement and misunderstanding with the international community because it viewed the problem of Mostar in isolation from the problem of the federation, from the solutions for the federation and solutions for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In some way its attitude was as if Mostar were an extraterrestrial place whose problems could be solved on its own. If the federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina do not function, one town within them cannot function on its own.

Everyone has finally understood that the parallel process of resolving the problem of the federation is the only path to follow. I believe that the process that has been in progress over the past few days since President Tudjman's visit to Sarajevo gives rise to optimism. Today I spoke to President Zubak, and as I understood, an agreement in principle has been reached regarding the appointment of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina — with the Bosnian side proposing a prime minister-designate other than Silajdzic, which is acceptable for the Croatian side. According to the Dayton agreement, the president of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina may be Bosniak, provided that the minister of foreign affairs is Croat...

[Zotim, interrupting] Are we talking about the union?

[Susak] Yes, about the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while other ministries should be allocated according to the percentage of the population that we represent in Bosnia.

An agreement on the level of the federation has also been reached, with the Croat side appointing the president of the federation and the Bosniak side appointing the prime minister. The Croat side abides by the stand that Zubak should remain president of the federation; the Bosniak side has appointed a new prime minister designate of the federation, which will have 15 ministries — it has been agreed — of which six, including the Defense Ministry, will go to the Croats.

[Rotim] Will this whole process of setting up the federal government and the government of the union be finalized within the time-scale up to elections as envisaged by the Dayton agreement? Let us not forget the important issue — the return of refugees.

[Susak] Well, the problem of the return of refugees is something that will be part of a process in which, unfortunately, the third party must also cooperate, that is the Serb Republic. However, if you had asked me three or four days ago my response would have been very pessimistic, today I am genuinely optimistic. Although agreement has been reached at the level of the union and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the only disputed issue is the organization of cantons. They have had a meeting with Robert Owen who is arbitrator for Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croat side, represented by President Zubak, will present its proposals to him in writing today containing our proposal for the organization of the cantons, since certain issues could not be resolved at the level of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] and Party of Democratic Action [SDA], or representatives of the Croats and Bosniaks, both sides have agreed to respect the decision taken by the arbitrator.

[Rotim] What are the disputed issues regarding the organization of the grand counties, the cantons?

[Susak] The bone of contention is the new map. We had agreed the organization of cantons in Vienna but that was in a different context, where the whole of Posavina was one canton. Now we have a completely different situation and we have a part — Drvar, Glamoc, Grahovo — that did not belong to any canton then. Although the Croat side is in favor of Herzegovina since it is

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an economic, political, and cultural whole, being one canton, and Duvno, Livno — or Tomislavgrad, Livno — Kupres, Glamoc, Grahovo, and Drvar being another. Whatever the arbitrator decides, we will accept, but I believe that...

[Rotim, interrupting] What would be part of the first?

[Susak] In the first canton would be the municipalities — I will list them in order — of Posusje, Grude, Siroki Brijeg, Ljubuski, Neum, Ravno, Stolac, Capljina, Citluk, Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic, and Rama.

[Rotim] There is apparently an idea of a united Mostar within a Croat grand county?

[Susak] The Croat side would agree...[pauses] There is apparently a fear on the Bosniak side that they would be outnumbered [majorizirani] both in the canton and in Mostar. The Croat side would agree in that context, that it should have the status of a mixed canton where authority is shared on a 50:50 basis, both in the town of Mostar and at the level of canton, regardless of the fact that the percentage of the Croat population in that canton is greater than the percentage of the Bosniak population, but I am afraid that even with that guarantee of the division of power, they will still feel that they will be outnumbered.

[Rotim] Minister, how do you assess today's talks with German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe?

[Susak] It was a pleasant conversation. We covered three topics — the problem of accommodation for their soldiers in the Republic of Croatia, particularly in Benkovac [near Zadar] — he is, as you will see from the statement he made today, fully satisfied with what the Republic of Croatia has done with regard to assistance with their arrival and the organization of accommodation. The other topics were the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which we are discussing here — the situation in the union, in the Federation, and in the city of Mostar — I informed him of what I have told you and I got the impression that he was satisfied with the information — and the third topic was military cooperation between the Republic of Croatia and Germany. We agreed that we should send teams of experts and he invited me to pay an official visit in the fall, by which time an agreement on military cooperation would be prepared, which would be signed in Bonn.

[Rotim] Did you discuss the participation of Germans under the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mandate in eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem?

[Susak] No, we did not. [passage omitted]

[Rotim] What does military cooperation between Croatia and Hungary, Croatia and Germany imply? Does this mean arms trading or the purchase of weapons on the Croatian side, or is it something else?

[Susak] Military cooperation is based first on the exchange of information, and then on protection of information, training where needed in both countries — in the case of Germany we will have an advantage because of our cooperation with America, and as you know in the German [?Marshal] Center, which although headed by the Americans, agreement with Germany is needed and we already have a number of Croatian officers there since last year and this year there will be a larger contingent. [sentence as heard] All other cooperation, while the embargo is still in force, will be the subject of discussion.

[Rotim] Mr. Susak, how is it that on 25 January, in two days time, the former Brotherhood and Unity highway to Belgrade is already to be opened and under what conditions?

[Susak] Under the Dayton agreement we made an undertaking and also received a firm undertaking from the main factors playing a decisive role in international politics, that is the United States, Germany, and the European Union as a whole, that they would do everything to reintegrate eastern Slavonia by peaceful means but that bilateral relations between Croatia and Serbia, or if you like between Croatia and Yugoslavia, should be a matter for bilateral negotiation. It would be normal, according to the signed Dayton agreement, that there should be mutual recognition. However, it is our line that it would not be practical or wise to waste time in anticipation of recognition by one or the other, while in all other possible areas, in economic and all other spheres, progress can be made in order to establish contacts, exchange on a goodwill basis, to lessen the fears that exist among the Serb population in the region that is still under occupation. However, let us be clear about one thing. Two or three years ago we were in a different position regarding negotiations. It is no longer a question of whether we are able to resolve the issue by military means or not. That is why we can now allow ourselves to take these steps and to give an opportunity to the international community, and judging by the way General Klein has acted so far, and the U.S. position being what it is, there is no reason not to be optimistic that we will nevertheless achieve what was signed in Dayton by peaceful means within a year.

[Rotim] Still on the subject of the road, will a customs office be established in two days at Lipovac on the Danube?

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[Susak] If there are civilians crossing, there will be Croatian customs at the border.

[Rotim] Is there an agreement allowing civilians to cross the border as early as 25 April, even before the recognition?

[Susak] Not that I know. I have not been following the developments. I was in Mostar yesterday. I was busy all day today, but I know that the official stand is such that if civilians start crossing the border, the Croatian customs office will be set up at the border. [passage omitted]

[Susak] What is most important for us is who will be in command and who will be in charge of administration. We are satisfied with both [word indistinct].

[Rotim] Mr. Susak, thank you for being the guest of "Picture Versus Picture" this evening.

[Susak] Thank you.

Croatia: German Envoy Views Relations, U.S. Alliance

AU2601113696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jan 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Horst Weisel, German ambassador to Croatia, by Marinko Bobanovic; place and date not given: "The Bedrock of Good Relations Between Croatia and Germany Already Exists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the middle of December last year, at the Institute for Development and International Relations, Horst Weisel, German Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia, held a lecture on German-Croatian relations yesterday, today, and tomorrow. It was this that prompted us to ask Ambassador Weisel to tell us a little more about that subject, but also about some questions regarding the most recent situation in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Europe, created after signing the Dayton peace agreement.

[Bobanovic] Mr. Weisel, what is your assessment of the present situation in the region after the signing of the Dayton agreement and the arrival of the IFOR [Implementation Forces]?

[Weisel] It is certainly a big change. After the cessation of combat, it seems that the sides in the conflict are ready to apply the Dayton agreement. Of course, one cannot expect everything to go smoothly. I think that everyone could expect news such as we receive from Sarajevo, where the Serbs have seized a group of Muslims for who knows what reasons. It is most important that all sides are interested in the implementation of the agreement, which is a big change. That is, I dare forecast, the end of war.

Rigid Conditions To Join European Union

[Bobanovic] How will this newly created situation in the region reflect on Europe, that is, on the policy of the European Union toward the states in this region, particularly toward their admission into the full membership of the European Union?

[Weisel] The European Union is making great efforts to stop the war in this region, and in that sense the member-countries have sent their troops. At the same time, the European Union has given humanitarian aid, and it is known that it is ready to give great assistance in the reconstruction of this region.

[Bobanovic] For that, the European Union sets very rigid conditions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, has stated that the sides in conflict, and particularly the Serbs, would not be given any help in the reconstruction if they would not cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.

[Weisel] The European Union has set a couple of conditions or expectations. Namely, any side that wants to receive help in the reconstruction, must respect human rights, minority rights, as well as the third thing, must cooperate with the International Court in The Hague in the prosecution of the persons accused of war crimes. For numerous war crimes occurred in this war. Those are the three conditions for making a decision to offer any kind of help in the reconstruction.

[Bobanovic] Is there any possibility of Germany's suspending the economic embargo against Serbia, following the example of the United States?

[Weisel] The embargo has been suspended by the Security Council, and Germany respects that decision.

[Bobanovic] Can you tell us the exact date when Germany will do that?

[Weisel] That must be congruent with the internal laws of an individual state. On the occasion of establishing the embargo, countries made their own decisions. After the decision on the suspension of sanctions, Germany has taken the necessary steps within the state to implement the resolution. That means that the limitations have been suspended in line with the resolution.

[Bobanovic] Can you tell us what the German stand is regarding the solution of the question of eastern Slavonia, particularly regarding the deployment of troops under the UN flag?

[Weisel] Germany expects a peaceful solution based upon the peace agreement. Demilitarization essentially depends upon the Serbs' good will. In my understanding, a concept of demilitarization with the use of force,

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which would be carried out by some big international military power, would be questionable to a certain extent. And that would already be so because it would probably be impossible to find a sufficient number of countries that would send their troops to participate in a large military power. In any case, Germany will not participate in the international forces. True, we have been sending our soldiers to this region, but that must be done carefully because of the German public. The German parliament has approved the deployment of our soldiers only in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Bobanovic] In which regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina will the German force be active, regarding the fact that it does not have a precisely determined area of activity, like France, Great Britain, and the United States?

[Weisel] The German troops will be accommodated in Croatia, and in principle, will be active everywhere, but taking into account the geographical position of the Croatian neighbor, I think they will be more active in the western and southeastern part of Bosnia- Herzegovina. As long as the Americans in the northern part are trying to be self-sufficient, and think that they have got everything they need, they will not need help from anybody else. Our presence in Bosnia will depend upon logistical needs. We will be close to the British, the French, and the Americans.

[Bobanovic] Nevertheless, after the Dayton agreement, Croatia is closer to integration, is it not? Will Croatia be rewarded in some way for its constructive role?

[Weisel] Yes. It is certain that we will point out the Croatian role in reaching the agreement to our partners. For that, it is very important to determine what the situation is with human rights, minority rights, and the behavior toward the persons accused of war crimes by the Hague tribunal, because that will be closely investigated.

[Bobanovic] You have also said that Germany will be less and less autonomous in bilateral relations with Croatia.

[Weisel] All the European Union members will be less autonomous.

[Bobanovic] Does that mean that Germany cannot decide on its own whether it would approve a loan to Croatia?

[Weisel] That is something else. For instance, when the European Union concludes agreements on trade and cooperation, then it is also a question of a large amount of money. I cannot tell you the exact amount because it is a large sum available on the basis of the Agreement on Trade Cooperation, concluded with former Yugoslavia. The money envisaged by that Agreement has not been spent and it still exists. Apart from the financial protocol in the agreement on trade and cooperation I have just spoken about there is also an idea for supplying help in the reconstruction of the area struck by war. All this is mutually linked with the three aforementioned conditions. Of the total financial help, the German share makes up 30 percent.

On the other hand, member-countries are free to give additional financial help. However, Germany has enormous financial difficulties at the moment. Our goal is for the European Monetary Union to start operating in 1999. All member-countries are making great efforts to satisfy the conditions for membership. One must carefully economize. That means that the probability of additional financial help to third countries is now limited more than ever, precisely because all member-countries want to achieve that goal by 1999.

[Bobanovic] That was the reason for the social riots in France. Could similar problems occur in Germany for the same reason?

[Weisel] Social riots? No, I do not think that will happen.

[Bobanovic] What does the German public think of the European Union and the policy of the German Government regarding the uniform monetary system?

[Weisel] There is a large amount of suspicion toward a monetary union. The Germans do not want to give up the German mark, and I think that many Croats do not want that, either. Yes. There is a huge endeavor and the German Government must fight hard to convince Germans that it is good. The Government has promised that the new currency, which will be called the euro, will be as good as the German mark. One of the guarantees is also that the Central Bank will be situated in Frankfurt, which is, as you know, the headquarters of the Bundesbank, which has given stability to the German mark.

[Bobanovic] The German partners are probably suspicious, too?

[Weisel] They have agreed with the Central Bank's location in Frankfurt, as well as with the name of the new currency. The French had wanted it to be called ecu, but we wanted euro. We have also suggested a so-called package of stabilization measures, as an addition to what has to be done to make the new currency very strong. Those measures have in principle already been accepted, and they will be carried out. There is much to be done to remove that suspicion toward the uniform currency.

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[Bobanovic] The British prime minister, John Major, has also expressed skepticism in his statement that the new currency would cause a big crisis in Europe, and that a possible result could be that Europe would be divided into two opposite camps.

[Weisel] Yes. I think that opinion is shared by many experts. Only a group of the European Union member-countries is capable of satisfying demands to join the European Monetary Union.

[Bobanovic] Even Italy does not satisfy those demands?

[Weisel] Italy would be a problem if it would remain outside. The devaluation of the lira means that they have to be more competitive, that is, that they have to sell their commodities cheaper to that group of European countries. So, that separation is not at all pleasant and does not offer nice perspectives. Therefore some, like the Italians and Mr. Dini, propose the postponement of the date set for the uniform currency.

[Bobanovic] Could it happen that this period will be prolonged?

[Weisel] Everything has been determined already by the Maastricht agreement.

European Security

[Bobanovic] You have said that there must be a consensus of all the European Union member countries in making important decisions. Can you tell us the decision of the European Union, if any, on the strategic defense of Europe. There is NATO, the Western European Union [WEU]...

[Weisel] That is a disputable question. There is the WEU as the nucleus of the future joint European defense. However, the question is how can the European Union be a defense alliance when there are some neutral members — Sweden, Austria, Ireland. I would not like to give forecasts of the results of the future discussions about that issue, nor what decisions will be made, although I think that some changes are possible if France decides to intensify its cooperation with NATO. As you know, France is now a member of the NATO alliance, but it does not participate in military integration. France has, meanwhile, recently embarked on a policy of rapprochement toward cooperation with military structures. Who knows, perhaps precisely that will facilitate the American acceptance of the European pillar within NATO, which the French have been advocating all the time. However, the British are afraid NATO could grow weaker. Perhaps this French decision will create a new situation, but we shall see about that.

[Bobanovic] So, "Pax Americana" is not an accomplished fact, as far as it has to do with Europe?

[Weisel] We, the Germans, have always pointed out to everyone the idea that Europe can be independent from the United States regarding defense. We have always been saying that will not happen in the foreseeable future. Europe still needs the protective alliance with the United States.

Germany Cannot Stay Aside

[Bobanovic] You have recently met with the Head of the President's office, Mr. Ivo Sanader. On that occasion you agreed on the importance of the establishment of the joint Council for Cooperation Between Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Can you tell us a bit more about the results of that meeting?

[Weisel] If my understanding is correct, the Croatian leadership no longer speaks about the confederation. Is the Council a substitute for the confederation? I must admit I did not put that question precisely. This Council for Cooperation is an instrument for the coordination of the whole policy, economy, culture, in short of everything, in order to establish cooperation between the Republic of Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is interesting, because it also involves the Serb entity, then.

[Bobanovic] Can you see that Council as a pilot model for the future internal organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Weisel] It seems to me that it is a good move. There is a pressing need for cooperation, because the roads to Bosnia- Herzegovina pass across Croatia, with the exception of Neum, which is the Federation's only access to the Adriatic Highway. The cooperation is necessary and to mutual benefit.

[Bobanovic] Minister Kinkel and you have visited Trogir. What are your impressions from that visit?

[Weisel] Minister Kinkel was rather impressed by the German-French field hospital in Trogir. The organization is very good, and the soldiers are highly motivated. Minister Kinkel has clearly told soldiers in a number of his statements that they participated in that to bring peace back to this part of Europe, which was so heavily struck by war, and that Germany, regarding the military part of the implementation of peace, simply cannot stand aside.

[Bobanovic] U.S. President Clinton has visited Croatia. Can we expect Federal Chancellor Kohl to pay visit to Croatia soon?

[Weisel] Chancellor Kohl certainly wishes to visit Croatia. The question of the date is open.

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[Bobanovic] Finally, can you give us your appraisal of current German-Croatian relations?

[Weisel] I am very sure that there is a solid bedrock for good relations between our two countries and nations, because 10 percent of the Croatian people live and work in Germany, and they are very much appreciated there, both as citizens and workers. They are, I say it with pathos, Croatian ambassadors. The other thing is that millions of Germans have been coming to Croatia for their vacations, and they have nice memories of it. They will return this year!

[Box, p 6]

We Live in the Sphere of Multilateral Diplomacy

[Bobanovic] At the recent IRMO [Institute for Development and International Relations] you said that German help would depend upon how Croatia behaved in the future. Can we, after the signing of the Dayton agreement and the role of Croatia in reaching it, expect more help from Germany in the process of admitting Croatia into European integrations, as well as in offering financial help?

[Weisel] On that lecture I tried to explain once again that we live in the sphere of multilateral diplomacy, and that bilateral diplomacy, really, is of second-rate significance. What does that mean? The European Union members today have a limited freedom of action in the field of economic and financial cooperation with third countries. It has been determined by an agreement that certain member-states have no right to conclude bilateral trade agreements with third countries. Such authority has been entirely taken over by the European Union. That means that if Germans want to do something for Croatia, they have to represent Croatian interests within the Union.

[Bobanovic] But, Germany can provide an incentive!

[Weisel] Yes, we can suggest, try to convince our partners to do this or that, but first we have to see whether our ideas prevail. As I have said before, the Union has set very clear conditions for cooperation. It is to be expected that the investigation of whether Croatia fulfills the conditions will be complicated. That will be a difficult process, both for Croatia, and for Germany.

[Box, p 6]

Croatia's Constructive Role

[Bobanovic] Allow me to return to the question about the Dayton agreement. What is your appraisal of Croatia's role during the negotiations in Dayton, and what was the role of Germany in those negotiations? Can you confirm that Chancellor Kohl has allegedly personally phoned Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman in order to get the agreement initialed?

[Weisel] I would like to start with your second question. We were trying to be constructive on all sides. In fact, we had close cooperation with two sides, the Croatian and the Bosniak, because we were concentrating, first of all, on relations between the Croats and the Muslims. The situation with the Serbs was different. I think it was wise to concentrate on relations between Croats and Muslims, and simultaneously suggest solutions for the problem, in which the Serb side was involved. The full cooperation in exchanging ideas and suggestions lasted throughout the negotiations.

Unfortunately, I can say nothing about the direct contacts between Federal Chancellor Kohl and Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic.

Regarding your first question, according to our understanding, Croatia's role was very constructive and helpful. As is usually the case on peace conferences, all sides have to make concessions. That is a fact of life — when you are not in a position to dictate over the peace agreement, then you have to make concessions and be ready to make compromises. If the peace conference were to end in a complete defeat of one side, then the other side would not be able to make concessions. When neither side in the conflict is completely defeated, everybody has to make concessions. Without that, it is inconceivable that an agreement can be reached.

[Box, p 7]

I Do Not Know Exact Number of Croatian Refugees

[Bobanovic] Germany has helped Croatia the most in accepting its refugees. What is the current situation with the Croatian refugees in Germany?

[Weisel] Last year the governments of Germany and Croatia concluded an agreement on the return of refugees. The agreement determines several groups of people who should return first, and who represent the largest humanitarian problem. It is determined that some will remain as long as possible, while others will return. I think that Croatia has more detailed data on that. I do not know the exact number of Croatian refugees. I, myself, am surprised at that, because everybody thinks that the Germans are very accurate in establishing correct figures. It is impossible to obtain from the German Ministry of Internal Affairs an accurate and reliable number for the Croats living in Germany. Nobody knows that. Marvelous. And there are so many computers! I would like to add that the refugees have been returning so as to help in the reconstruction of Croatia.

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FYROM: President Gligorov Meets Vatican Envoy

LD2501213496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1539 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Skopje, 25 Jan (TANJUG)—Kiro Gligorov, president of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], received Monsignor Edmond Farhat, the first Holy See nuncio, in Skopje today who handed him his letters of credence.

According to a statement issued by the Office of President Gligorov, the president said that "this act represents an expression of support that the Holy See has been lending to Macedonia from the very beginning of its independence in the interest of peace and stability in this region."

Gligorov expressed gratitude, as the statement says, "to the support that the Holy See gives to the independence of the Macedonian Orthodox church, which has persisted in its holy mission of coexistence in love and harmony with other communities." [passage omitted]

FYROM: Early Mutual Recognition With FRY Viewed

AU2501151896 Skopje MIC in English 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] are very close to mutual recognition and establishment of full diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level, NOVA MAKEDONIJA writes today on the first page. The intensity with which matters are progressing, the constructive atmosphere, which according to the announcement of the Foreign Ministry prevailed in the two rounds of preliminary talks in Skopje and Belgrade, as well as the maximum respect that the two sides showed each other during the course of these talks, indicate that the two countries are quite likely to recognize each other soon as independent and sovereign states. The results of the past two rounds of negotiations are being analyzed in detail at the moment, and if no delays come up in this phase, it can realistically be expected that the act of recognition takes place by the end of this, or the start of next month.

The to-date dialogue between Skopje and Belgrade is given a special quality by the comprehensiveness of the topics and questions discussed by the representatives of the two ministries at the preliminary talks. Practically, the dialogue encompassed everything of interest for the present and future relations and the cooperation between the two sovereign neighboring states. From the recognition and permanency of the existing border, the mutual communication, to the question of continuity of the former federation, which is still not straightened out. NOVA MAKEDONIJA has learned that both sides are seeking modalities for a mutually acceptable solution, however, without having to have Macedonia give up its legal continuity of former Yugoslavia, on which official Belgrade insisted until a while ago. All of this contributes to the eventual acceptance of the future agreement between Macedonia and FRY as the first complete and comprehensive documents that the FRY signs with one of the former Yugoslav countries.

NOVA MAKEDONIJA comments that soon, Macedonia will be the only one of the former Yugoslav republics to have an embassy from official Belgrade.

FYROM: Negotiations Not Reported in Belgrade Press

AU2501205896 Skopje MIC in English 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In the Belgrade press yesterday, there was practically no information whatsoever on the two-day negotiations between the delegations of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and FRY [the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], over the normalization of relations between the two countries, held in Belgrade.

The Macedonian public was informed about the talks by a couple of independent newspapers that reported FYROM Government spokesman Gjuner Ismail's statement from the news conference in Skopje on Tuesday [23 January] , that "the modalities of cooperation between Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia, as well as the mutual recognition are the topics discussed in Belgrade."

An official announcement on the course of the negotiations has still not been issued.

The independent Belgrade newspaper NASA BORBA writes that Skopje expects normal relations to be restored in the next couple of days, adding that the regions inhabited predominantly by Serbs and Montenegrins expect the Serb President Slobodan Milosevic to make a return visit soon.

FYROM: Court on Greek Accord's 'Constitutionality'

AU2501205796 Skopje MIC in English 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Following the Law on Ratification of the Interim Accord Between the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the Republic of Greece, signed in New York on 13 September 1995, the Constitutional Court of Macedonia decided yesterday not to initiate a procedure to evaluate its constitutionality.

This is connected with the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic

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Party for Macedonian Unity] initiative, according to which the Interim Accord was signed between a representative of Greece and the private person Stevo Crvenkovski, on behalf of Macedonia, and that it was actually an interim agreement, and not an interim accord. According to VMRO-DPMNE, this comes as a result of the fact that the agreement was not signed on behalf of the state Republic of Macedonia, by the President of the Republic of Macedonia or the Macedonian Government, as prescribed in the Constitution, since it was not signed in the name of the sovereign Republic of Macedonia or its authorized representatives. Therefore, the initiator requested that the first article of this law be annulled, since, according to them, it is not in accordance with the Constitution.

FYROM: Serbia Reduces Taxes on Macedonian Exports

AU2501205996 Skopje MIC in English 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Government has introduced tax reductions for imported goods from the former Yugoslav republics, including Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Yugoslavia—FYROM]. Taxes are abolished on all goods in which over 51 percent of the built-in parts are of Macedonian origin. Other goods are subjected to 4 percent tax, in addition to the customs tariffs, while this percentage ranges between 1 and 9 percent for certain goods. This tax reduction does not include the cigarettes, for which the customs and tax adds up to 18 percent.

On the other hand, Macedonia is not making any changes to its customs policy towards FRY, however, eventual changes are possible after the establishment of full relations between the two countries and the signing of an agreement on economic cooperation, the Director of the Macedonian Customs Administration, Ilija Iljovski says.

Iljovski informed that Macedonia has introduced a customs regime towards Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the frequent occurrence of reporting Bosnian goods as being produced in FRY, thereby entering Macedonia without being cleared through customs. Iljovski says that the situation will remain as such until the two foreign ministries agree which certificate to accept as valid.

FYROM: Outlook for SDSM-LP 'Marriage'

AU2601101196 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 25 Jan 96 p 8

[Commentary by S. Padori: "'Marriage' Has Chances"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reconstruction of the government cabinet, which Prime Minister Crvenkovski announced in a number of interviews nearly a month ago, seems to be coming to a finale these days. What the representatives of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the LP [Liberal Party] say—that they will refrain from any statements and commentaries until the prime minister has the last word—is respected. However, there is the impression that the silence itself is an indication of the seriousness and the political importance of the possible changes, not only in the government cabinet, but also in the accomplishment of the preelection campaign of the SDSM and the LP, which won the 1994 elections, and after which they formed the government with the Liberals represented by technocrat ministers.

On the Level

Essentially, before the prime minister says anything about the possible changes in the cabinet, there will be a debate on the relations between the SDSM and the LP within the framework of the SDSM Presidency and the SDSM Central Board (on Saturday or Sunday—27 or 28 January) where matters will take on an official character. We say 'essentially' because, no matter how much ado is raised about the reconstruction of the government cabinet, the entire matter is in fact an interparty relationship of the SDSM-LP, which is normally most illustratively reflected in the government that is represented by participants of both parties.

The basic matter that will have to be solved from the political interparty aspect is whether the preelection coalition and the marriage of interests will be able to endure everything that has been going on between the Social Democrats and the Liberals. In other words, whether the SDSM will thank the Liberals and the coalition will "split up," after which the technocrat ministers representing the LP will leave the government. Well-informed SDSM sources say that the further fate of the Social Democrat-Liberal relations had been explored among the SDSM membership in the country. So, the further course of events will depend on what is going to be said at the scheduled meetings of the SDSM bodies during the week.

The main "jolt" that contributed to going into "fifth gear," after which the Social Democrats asked for resolution of the relations with the Liberals, was the communication released by the Republican Department of the LP in support of the prime minister's efforts for reconstruction of the government, which also insisted on the "announced analysis of the one year's work of the government." If all the prime minister's statements in the last month or two are reviewed in detail, it becomes obvious that the analysis to which the Liberals refer has

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not been announced anywhere. At least not in the mass media!

Probability

In any case, the move that the prime minister is going to make concerning the future "partnership" with the Liberals will depend on the SDSM's stance (particularly the one that will be adopted at the upcoming session of the Central Board). In other words, if the Social Democrats decide to annul their "marriage" with the Liberals, the consequences will most discreetly be manifested in the government, and therefore the prime minister will have to make structural changes in his cabinet as well. It seems that this had been the elementary thesis—to shift the responsibility for the fate of the Alliance for Macedonia [preelection coalition's name] in the hands of the Social Democrats and thus prove that the Liberals are in favor of the Alliance and back every decision of the prime minister....

Well-informed sources consider that the other alternative, which is that this stance of the Liberals will "amortize" the determination of the Social Democrats for uttering the last word, represents a strategic action that can eventually result in a "softer" reaction and a milder cut by the prime minister in his cabinet. This is the reason for observers' thinking that most probably, again in the interest of maintaining the positions obtained, the misunderstanding will be solved in "a gentlemanly manner" and the "marriage" will be safeguarded by eliminating just a part of the causes which allegedly comprised the "unfaithful triangle." In any case, at this moment, it is possible to say that every deliberate calculation is in some way counterproductive and that the parties—that is the partners—will eventually find their own way of surmounting the conflict, this way or another, larger shifts in Crvenkovski's cabinet!

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Poland: President Accepts Oleksy's Resignation

LD2601121496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1200 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksandr Kwasniewski has accepted the formal resignation of Jozef Oleksy from the post of head of government and has asked him to act as prime minister until a new council of ministers is formed. In accordance with the interim constitution, the president now has 14 days to present a new candidate for prime minister to the Sejm.

Poland: Oleksy's TV Debate With Journalists

LD2501193696 Warsaw Polsat Television in Polish 2045 GMT 24 Jan 96

[Studio debate with former Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy and a panel of journalists presented by announcer Jacek Brzeski and moderated by Barbara Gorska of Polish Radio Zet and Konrad Piasecki of Polish Radio RMF; from the "Plus, Minus" program—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Brzeski] Welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to a special and longer—one-hour—edition of the "Plus, Minus" program.

Ladies and gentlemen, two days ago we asked Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy to meet in our studio journalists who, over the past few weeks, have been reporting on the case referred to as the espionage affair with the prime minister's participation. This would satisfy the request from Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy himself. He put forward this idea last week. Today we are going to talk about this subject in a wider group of journalists. In a moment we shall witness an exchange of views on the subject.

Today's program is exceptional for another reason, also: It is being relayed by three radio stations—the Third Program of the Polish Radio, Radio Zet, and Radio RMF.

In the studio I would like to welcome Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. I also welcome the journalists chairing today's program: Barbara Gorska from Radio Zet and Konrad Piasecki from Radio RFM. I welcome as well Monika Olejnik from Polish Radio's Third Program, Mr. Stanislaw Janecki from the weekly WPROST, Mr. Piotr Pacewicz from GAZETA WYBORCZA, and Bronislaw Wildstein from ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

I trust that today we are going to witness a discussion about facts and facts alone. As the studio host, I shall be trying to ensure that it is so. Now over to the journalists chairing the program.

[Gorska] The military prosecutor's office decided today to start an investigation in the case of allegations made by the internal affairs minister against Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. Less than two hours ago you resigned, Prime Minister. Our program is the first public opportunity to ask the prime minister questions and to hear the reasons for his decision to resign.

[Piasecki] Prime Minister, in the plast few days you spoke several times about wanting to meet journalists, those journalists who had launched the strongest attacks against you. Why with journalists and why so soon after your resignation from the office of prime minister?

[Oleksy] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This indeed was my initiative, admittedly submitted to [Polish Television's chairman] Mr. Walendziak's public television. But Mr. Walendziak did not deem it useful, after two months of critical public presentation of the case, after two months of its presentation, for the prime minister, who had been behaving fairly quietly and objectively, to enter a debate on at least some of the allegations.

That was why I explicitly asked for this, because these were the journalists who attacked me in the fiercest manner, expressed the most extreme views in this case, and formulated hypotheses that were most shocking to the readers and, I think, the public. I was not thinking of a debate with journalists. I was thinking of a discussion with those who expressed their extreme views a great many times during these two months and did so very firmly.

And why did I want this? Here I would like to thank Polsat, a private but to my mind truly independent television station, which was not afraid that the prime minister, accused from every side, could say something different from that which the accusations attempted to ram down the public's throat. I believe that Polsat is a TV station that wants to remain objective and wants to present all sides. I also think that those radio stations that expressed interest in this meeting are also guided by a willingness to look at matters from all sides and break this ominous one-sidedness that, in my opinion, of course, has been going on from December until today. And this is...

[Olejnik, interrupting] Sorry to interrupt, Prime Minister, but why do you say two months. You say that you have been attacked for two months.

[Oleksy] I'm sorry—one month. I thought of December and January. I counted these as two months.

[?Janecki] This time seemed to be much longer to you, Prime Minister.

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[Oleksy] But there is a deeper reason, there is a deeper reason, ladies and gentlemen, for this initiative. And let us try to make use of this program. As I said, I feel no anger today, but there is a lot of sadness and reflection. Let us try to make use of this program and talk about this matter in different terms from those judgments voiced by some papers that have already passed judgment as sensationalism took hold. Because this certainly is sensational, but I think you can look at even the greatest sensation with self-restraint and try to show the public something that is not the sharp edge, a hit, something ominous but to present all circumstances and angles that can be deducted from such matters.

[Olejnik] If I could speak on behalf of my colleagues, I do not think that in this company we could pass any judgments. Well, Third Program has not issued any judgments; there were just opinions on this subject...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Well, we have the WPROST weekly, we have GAZETA WYBORCZA, we have ZYCIE WARSZAWY. Ms. Olejnik, you know full well how the matter was reported...

[Olejnik, interrupting] We have the Prosecutor's Office for this purpose, and the accusations against you were voiced by [former] Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski.

[Oleksy] This is the point of departure.

[Olejnik] Yes.

[Oleksy] Ms. Olejnik, let me say one word more because this will supplement what I wanted to say. Everything that has been taking place from the moment of the unprecedented accusation by Minister Andrzej Milczanowski has followed a different course from that announced in the slogans.

It was said publicly that impartiality, the law, procedures, democracy would decide. Meanwhile, you know perfectly well, ladies and gentlemen, and I have stacks of press cuttings, that judgments were passed a week later in headlines, commentaries, expressions of indignation, expressions of public scaremongering, and in taking a certain side. This is the heart of the matter I wanted to present publicly to the most rabid journalists in this whole affair. Why did you act this way?

[Olejnik] Prime Minister, I want to say that it was Minister Andrzej Milczanowski who began it all. Bound by the Sejm resolution, he voiced his reservations against you.

[Oleksy] Yes. [passage indistinct]

[Oleksy] Why don't you allow the lady to finish? So what conclusions can you draw from this?

[Olejnik] That journalists should collect information on this subject.

[Oleksy] Yes, truthful information.

[Olejnik] True information.

[Oleksy] Rather than speculations. Do you agree?

[Olejnik] What, according to you, are the speculations that we have collected?

[Oleksy] No, you started this. If Minister Milczanowski formulated accusations and everyone in Poland as one man declared that democracy required that this should follow the legal route, why this lack of confidence in the legal route?

[Olejnik] And why, Prime Minister, your lack of confidence in the special services? You immediately said in the Sejm that it was a dirty provocation by the special services?

[Gorska] The prime minister's words are clearly to a large degree addressed at the weekly WPROST. Let us hear the WPROST journalist speak on this point.

[Janecki] Well, we are certainly here...[pauses] I think I am speaking not only on my behalf but also on behalf of my colleagues because we respect the viewers who would like to know a lot in this case, who would like to be well informed, but I shall admit this frankly, I did not expect we would be talking to the prime minister here today. I think that a much better interlocutor for you here would be Minister Milczanowski, [current Interior Minister] Jerzy Konieczny, possibly General Fonfara [one of the security chiefs], possibly Colonel Miodowicz [outgoing head of counterintelligence].

But if you invite us here and you turn us into one of the sides, then I would firmly like to say that, contrary to what you say, we are not a side in this case and categorically insist on that. The sides in this case are you and the prosecuting bodies. We are people who have learned whatever was possible to learn in this case and reported it to the public. No more and no less than that.

[Oleksy] Well, this is where we differ because many Poles will concede that some of the media were a side, quite deliberately. Your weekly, in particular.

[Wildstein] Prime Minister, I think this is not the only thing we differ about. You speak of your lack of aggression, of wanting to debate this issue with us calmly. At the same time, you speak of rabid attacks. Today in your speech you repeated the argument about a dirty provocation. You have just told us that you behaved in a calm and restrained fashion. Since your

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speech at the Sejm you have been talking about a dirty provocation, about a provocation by the State Protection Office [UOP] directed against you, or you kept on repeating things of this kind.

We have been trying—I am thinking of journalists here—to ask questions and do our duty—that is, to speak on behalf of the public. Wherever there are doubts, we wanted to hear questions. So it is a good thing that now we shall be able to talk rather than just hear statements by you because that is important.

And one more thing. I do not think any of the people present here have said that the prime minister is guilty. We said something quite different.

[Oleksy] You jest, sir.

[Wildstein] We spoke about precedents...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Perhaps you could quote these lines.

[Wildstein, continuing] ...about precedents that exist in the civilized states. About the fact that a prime minister facing allegations put forward by very serious circles, by a minister in whom up to that moment you had declared full confidence, if he faces such allegations, that in the interests of the case he should distance himself from the case, rather than speaking on your own behalf, as you happen to have done.

[Gorska] Ladies and gentlemen, if this is to be a discussion we have to let the prime minister reply [several words indistinct].

[Oleksy] You know, I don't think you will delude anyone, especially as a representative of ZYCIE WARSZAWY. You will not delude anyone with the present statements that you merely sought arguments and facts. You passed opinions. Let us be honest about this one thing, that that's indeed how it was because these words appeared in print, and your commentaries also appeared in print. So let us not quarrel...

[Wildstein, interrupting] What commentaries?

[Oleksy] I do not to any extent deny the papers' right to pass opinions. But let us remember that this is a very special case. This is the highest accusation. So perhaps it was necessary to use more restraint and calm so that the citizens could get the best possible balanced view in this case. But the issue of passions, the issue of tone, is up to the editorial offices and up to the journalists themselves. I can have my own opinion of this.

But if you think that my interlocutor here should be someone other than journalists, that would undoubtedly also result in an interesting debate, but let us leave that to the legal procedures. Once these are over, I think there will be plenty of opportunities, equally in legal proceedings and in journalistic discussions, to return to these cases because there is one thing that we certainly have in common: This case is unparalleled, it is unprecedented.

[Janecki] And it was not us that made it up.

[Oleksy] And it was not you who made it up. Of course. I do not mean to make that kind of allegation.

[Piasecki] Prime Minister, to calm down the passions, let us for a moment not speak about the past. Let us speak about the future, which might perhaps be easier than the past. Prime Minister, does the resignation from the office of head of government mean you are withdrawing from politics?

[Oleksy] There is no such connection, and I do not know where it would come from. I want to say that, with a lot of pain I heard those demands, just a week after the start of the whole thing, when in your papers and on your radio waves you called for resignation, immediate departure, removal, disappearance. We should recall the way it was presented and that has lasted until today. Ladies and gentlemen, let us try to understand that it should not be the case that the presented accusation will result in immediate actions. What would we achieve in a country where we are supposed to respect the rules of democracy and law if anybody slandering somebody else would cause that person's resignation, disappearance, and humiliation?

[Janecki] But you are not just anybody, Prime Minister. You are the head of the Polish Government.

[Oleksy] I agree, but I am also a citizen.

[Olejnik] Let me just add examples we had in the world: Willy Brandt who resigned—he was not accused, only his secretary, Kazimiera Prunskiene. Such examples can be multiplied, Prime Minister.

[Oleksy] We all like to transpose examples from other countries, and I would very much like to shape our own habits.

[Gorska] So to try and shape the Polish habit...

[Pacewicz, interrupting] If we are to shape the Polish democratic habits, I think it is only sensible to note that unfortunately this is a norm of democracy. Democracy can sometimes be cruel, but this is not mindless cruelty.

[Oleksy] We do not differ in this respect. On the other hand, there is just one condition that standards of democracy are treated as a whole, not just selectively when they fit a given case. Here we have a situation in which judgments were passed in the name of democracy, in the name of the law. If I were to begrudge

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something, then it would be this: While calling for objectivity and independence of activities of the mechanisms of democracy and the law, some people, not all, decided impatiently to put their appeals aside and pass judgment for their own reasons.

[Wildstein] Prime Minister, no paper wrote that you were guilty. On the other hand, your party declared unequivocally, without any proof, that you were innocent, and this aroused a certain unease among journalists...

[Oleksy, interrupting] You are wrong, the party only said it did not believe in my guilt...

[Wildstein, continuing] ...and show interest in how these procedures could function. This is one thing. I would also like to point out that everyone here was saying something else. We all said that accusations should be checked first, and to do that it would be difficult for a person against whom accusations were addressed to stay in the highest office in the country. On the other hand, I would like to draw your attention that insofar as these accusations were voiced by us, you, Prime Minister, made a very serious accusation of dirty provocation, which was repeated by a number of people from your party. These are accusations, too, and very serious ones, against the most important state institutions.

[Oleksy] You have to make up your mind when you are examining my accusations, which were not accusations but opinions, because these were expressed by me, you will agree, after the shattering and astonishing address by Minister Andrzej Milczanowski in the Sejm hall. This is what I consider an unparalleled precedent in Polish history. Unparalleled precedent...

[Olejnik, interrupting] But the Sejm agreed to this...

[Oleksy, interrupting] ...so that in the name of statehood and in the name of the defense of state interest act in such a way After all, cases of violation of the law and state secrets are being examined and are already proved, but this matter does not interest anybody today, but I think it will. You see, you have so skillfully gone over to the matter of interference in objective treatment of the whole issue.

I would like to ask you the following: I acted very honestly. I announced that I would be unbiased, and when the unparalleled demands to remove myself, to go on leave, to disappear, came, I, in spite of my doubts, decided it was a solution. Now I think perhaps I should have taken a long leave. But after a while I went on leave and I looked at what was happening. And what was happening? While I removed myself so that there would be no suspicion of interference, attempted interference, what was unleashed in the mass media? The other side unceremoniously passed appraisals and sentences, published leaks, truths, half-truths, and lies.

That was why I decided that in this instance there was no equality of the sides, there was political aggression, and I decided that my avoidance of presence made no sense, especially because the main allegations were directed against me.

But I trust you will agree that, contrary to the allegations, I did not exceed the proper degree of self-defense.

Now I have a very important question for you. Do you believe there is no bias if the head of the Solidarity union yells out that there would be demonstrations and strikes if, God forbid, the military prosecutor's office issued a decision contrary to the public view? Have we had such statements? We have. Printed in the mass circulation press. Without commentaries. And you, gentlemen, were not outraged at that.

Do you believe it is right if Mr. Ryszard Czarnecki [Christian-National Union, ZChN, leader] threatens the military prosecutor and warns him about what he is to do to keep the ZChN happy? Could you give me an example of a journalist who was outraged about this not being unbiased? That this amounts to forcing an opinion on the military prosecutor.

[Janecki] Prime minister, let us say...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Let us look at the case this way...

[Olejnik, interrupting] But we are not responsible for the politicians, Prime Minister, for what they say...

[Oleksy, interrupting] No, but I am saying how...

[Wildstein, interrupting] [Words indistinct] very ably...

[Gorska, interrupting] Very briefly, Mr. Bronislaw Wildstein, and then Mr. Stanislaw Janecki.

[Wildstein, continuing] ...are changing the subject. The subject, and I think a very interesting one...

[Oleksy, interrupting] We are talking about objectivity...

[Wildstein, continuing] ...is not the case of Mr. Czarnecki, not the case of Mr. Krzaklewski, although sometimes one can get the impression that this is the case of the State Protection Office [UOP], the case of Mr. Milczanowski. Unfortunately, the subject of interest is the case of Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy, and that is what we should be talking about, rather than something else. And about the fact that you concluded only after some time that you should go on leave so that you did not influence what was going on. Only after some time you concluded that your intimate contacts with agents of the former KGB and later the Russian intelligence

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service were perhaps improper. All that happened after some time, perhaps precisely because there is public opinion that can speak about it.

[Oleksy] And do you know why it happened after some time? Because it took me quite a while to overcome the shock that this could have happened in Poland at all. Maybe you will not believe that, unless you activate goodwill, but that is the truth about my personal reaction.

[Wildstein] But I would ask you to activate goodwill, Prime Minister, toward UOP, which is occupied with facts like the relationship between the supreme state official or one of the supreme state officials and the agents of a foreign intelligence service.

[Oleksy] Sir, this is too great a simplification, and by such simplifications, you too—some people, fortunately not everybody—have created the impression of a sensation and a prejudged sensation.

[Olejnik] Sir, what would you have done in Minister Milczanowski's place, if you had been minister and had found out, if you had had evidence, that the suspicion existed that a high-ranking official was collaborating with foreign intelligence? What would you have done, Prime Minister?

[Oleksy] First, dear Madam Editor, all that will be explained in detail, who discovered what when. Second, I would like the citizens watching...

[Olejnik, interrupting] I wanted to find out what you would have done.

[Oleksy] All right, I will answer your question. I would like the citizens watching this program to know that to this day I do not know any material on this matter, and I regard this as my great virtue and convenience at the same time, for from more and more sources I know various statements, publications, and leaks, and there are discussions of different detailed subjects in various circles. Nobody has acquainted me with either Minister Milczanowski's speech or the supplementary material from UOP, or with anything apart from what I myself presented at the Sejm commission.

[Olejnik] (?Maybe because you did not ask) you were not given it.

[Oleksy] I did not...No, I did not demand it because I thought that somebody at some point would acknowledge it as desirable to acquaint me with this material. If I had of my own free will and on my own initiative sought access to this material, I tell you I would have managed to get to it, but if anybody had found out, you know what an uproar there would have been about interference, about lack of impartiality, about an attempt to exert influence. And so, a certain...

[Wildstein, interrupting] But, Prime Minister, you have not yet seen the material and you are formulating the unambiguous thesis of provocation. On the basis of what?

[Oleksy] No, sir, please talk about today, and I formulated the thesis of provocation in the Sejm speech, because then my shock was so great—and remains so to this day, in fact—that I, knowing the truth, and I ask you once and for all to take note of this, and (?perhaps) not to concentrate on my words, but on the nature of the case, which will at last be cleared up. [passage indistinct] I will come back to that in a moment. I forgot [words indistinct]. I, sir, know the truth, and I proclaim it loudly. I know the truth. The accusations against me of spying are not true. They will have to be learned because they are so resounding; and because I know them, having heard unexpectedly what Mr. Milczanowski said in the Sejm, how else could I have I reacted when I know the accusation of spying is untrue?

In this connection, I played host a day earlier to the president at a session of the government, and at the proposal of Minister Milczanowski, the government session was held behind closed doors. This was a day before the Sejm session, and Minister Milczanowski did not even tell the Council of Ministers behind closed doors one-tenth of what he told the Sejm.

[Gorska] But he told the president...

[Oleksy, continuing] Can you imagine my reaction?

[Olejnik] But, Prime Minister, let us stick to the chronology of events, if you don't mind. After all, President Kwasniewski, the president-elect at that time, received Minister Milczanowski and [former Foreign] Minister Bartoszewski and they received information about you. Does that mean that the president elect did not inform you of this?

[Oleksy] The president-elect told me.

[Pacewicz] So you did know about this!

[Oleksy] Listen, I only knew one thing, and this was that Minister Milczanowski was preparing documentation about me containing the accusation that I had been involved in spying activities.

[Olejnik] So you were not really surprised and shocked in the Sejm, seeing that you knew about this earlier.

[Oleksy] No, that is not true. This was such a serious matter that I was.

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[Olejnik] But anyway, you knew about this from the president-elect, who conveyed this information to you.

[Oleksy] Yes, in general terms.

[Pacewicz] Let us talk for a short while about these details, but I think that, in general, we should also talk about certain mechanisms and in more broad terms about the whole matter. I, for one, wish to say that I think today is a sad day, but at the same time it signifies a success for democracy in Poland. But let us return to the details: You said that Ministers Milczanowski and Bartoszewski met Kwasniewski and showed him a note and suggestion that you should resign. You call this blackmail. Well, what did President-elect Kwasniewski say to you exactly?

[Oleksy] The president-elect told me...

[Pacewicz, interrupting] After the meeting with the ministers...

[Oleksy, continuing] ...that he was given a note, a summary of the documentation, which in its conclusion contained the accusations. And Mr. Milczanowski and Mr. Bartoszewski added, although this was not down in writing, that there would be a way out if I tendered my resignation and also disappeared from the scene by giving up my deputy's mandate while Lech Walesa was still in office. Then the matter would not have seen the light of day. This is the version that reached me, and I consider this to be blackmail, and I repeat that this is blackmail.

[Pacewicz] I, as a representative of the democratic media, am faced here with a certain contradiction. On the one hand, as someone who expresses public opinion, I have to condemn something like this because I think that matters such as these, accusations at such a high level and made by politicians at such a high level against a politician at such a high level as yourself, Prime Minister, should see the light of day, whatever the consequences might be. But one should note that it is fairly normal procedure throughout the world that such matters should be dealt with quietly for the sake of state interests. Perhaps it might have been better for the Polish state if you, Prime Minister, had accepted this suggestion. Do you have any comment on this?

[Oleksy] I can agree that, looking at world practice, there are a number of examples when even if the facts have been proved and are indisputable, things have been resolved in a kind of secret way, and there are instances of this kind in the world. I think that this is correct.

[Pacewicz] In the interests of the state...

[Oleksy, interrupting] In the interests of a state that has already been hit as a result of a matter like this having been conducted differently. But, first of all, this should be presented to the person involved himself, whereas these gentlemen had no intention at all of talking with me. And this is borne out by the correspondence between me and Mr. Milczanowski some time before my conversation with the president-elect. But the person involved should be given the chance of acquainting himself with the level and nature of the accusations. And, influenced by these facts, he should then be able to make up his own mind, shouldn't he? But the third version, which says we have something on you and it would be best if this and this happened, is not the same thing. Second...

[Pacewicz, interrupting] Can I ask you, Prime Minister, if you have some theory about why Ministers Milczanowski and Bartoszewski confronted not you but the president-elect with this?

[Oleksy] No, I have no theory about this.

[Pacewicz] Do you not think that the nature of these accusations, as well as the contents and version that they know and of which they are convinced and which made it impossible for them to approach you, prime Minister...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I'm sorry, but why? After all, this was about my resignation. Why would it rule it out? Pardon me, would you go for the concept of a verdict by default, political and personal decisions by default, without acquainting oneself with the essence of the case?

[Pacewicz] No, I think...

[Oleksy] I will add that the material Aleksander Kwasniewski obtained filled nine pages. That was a precis and a general note. On that basis, without presenting any reliable evidence, can a note by one person be regarded as the basis for resignation and disappearance from political life and so on?

[Olejnik] But after this fact, did you try to ask Minister Milczanowski what it was all about?

[Oleksy] No, I did not try because Minister Milczanowski was, oh horror, a minister in my government the whole time; what is worse, I persuaded him to remain in the government. [passage indistinct] And I say that he could, and I blame him for that, what he talked about fairly poorly in [the TV program] "Pulse of the Day" yesterday. I proposed to Minister Milczanowski, and Aleksander Kwasniewski did, too—and I still without knowledge of the matter—Aleksander Kwasniewski, knowing about the matter, proposed to him that he stay on in order to be able to keep an eye on these matters.

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[Olejnik] And if you had known about the matter, would you still have proposed to Minister Milczanowski that he stay?

[Oleksy] I would not have gone for any negotiations, but if the good of the wider cause had indicated it, with all certainty I would, especially because I did not conceal at the time, after all, an entirely positive opinion of Minister Milczanowski's work.

[Janecki] Prime minister, we have jumped over a certain stage in this matter fairly easily here—namely, its political context. The moment this problem appeared in the Sejm, the norms of European democracy dictate that the interested party should let parliament decide, resign or go on leave, and immediately the whole political context of the case is simple and clear.

[Oleksy] Could you give me an example of these European norms?

[Janecki] This is a European norm.

[Oleksy] No, no, I want a specific example.

[Janecki] All right then. The moment Mr. (Bjorn Engtholm), the star of German social democracy, the almost certain candidate for German chancellor, was running for head of the government of Schleswig-Holstein and concealed just one thing, that he knew about the provocation prepared by his rival Uwe Barzel before he told the public. That information came out, and he resigned at once. I will not talk about the example of Minister Profumo, who had contact with the same woman as a representative of the Russian Embassy.

[Oleksy] Wouldn't you like to mention the Dreyfus Affair, for instance?

[Janecki] The Dreyfus Affair is irrelevant here, Prime Minister...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Do you think so? I don't. It has a symbolic relevance.

[Janecki] It has a totally different context. But let us return to the political context. I would like to cite the article by Andrzej Szczypiorski that appeared in GAZETA WYBORCZA exactly a week ago. Don't you think Mr. Szczypiorski is right? That there is something inappropriate in your remaining in this post, that it is dishonorable behaviour, so to speak? Nobody is accusing you here; nobody has yet pronounced you guilty.

[Oleksy] Well, first, Mr. Editor, you are not telling the truth when you say nobody is accusing me.

[Janecki] Please let me finish.

[Oleksy] Read the newspapers, for God's sake.

[Janecki] Let me finish. The day after Minister Milczanowski's decision, when nobody had yet prejudged anything, you would have retained exceptional respect for yourself as somebody who was trying to resolve the matter impartially, if you had suspended your exercise of office, and all the legal procedures were set in motion; but you did not behave like that. In view of this—and there was a problem because, after all, it was not a problem of whether you were guilty or not, but of whether it is fitting that the head of state, whether he knows or does not know, to contact the agent of a foreign intelligence service...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Now you are losing the thread. Let us stay with the first point.

[Janecki] No, because this is the political context. That is enough...

[Oleksy, interrupting] We will come back to it in a minute because this is also one of the public lies that has appeared here. But let us take a calm, a really calm look at this. We talk about the practices in Europe, about a standard that requires the removal from office as soon as the suspicion arises—this is how you put it.

[Janecki] Unfortunately, that is what it is like in politics.

[Oleksy] I am not so sure that it is as absolute as that. But why am I not sure, I ask you? Well, this is not how things happen in France, in Germany, and in the stable country of Britain, where every man in the street knows what is done in cases like this is and where...

[Janecki, interrupting] But you had the opportunity of initiating such a practice.

[Oleksy] Please allow me to finish what I was saying. Cases like this occur in fierce political struggle and after a fierce phase of the political struggle, which is still not over. They occur after such public statements and threats during the election campaign, which give people the right to think that this is an element in the continuation of the same political struggle. I wish this were not the case. Personally, I would prefer this to be only a mistake restricted to an attack on me and to all the effects that this will have on me. You see, the matter is considerably broader in its scope when one considers preelection statements that suggest that the results of the elections will not be accepted, and when we look at the whole campaign connected with these elections and when straight after elections there is—and let us not mince words—an unprecedented attack on the prime minister. Why don't you take this into account when you assess my stance on this matter?

[Janecki] Well, why don't you look at the left-wing parties, which also took part in these elections and which

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also talked lots of different kinds of rubbish? You are selecting the rubbish from only one side and not the other. I do not wish to hack the matter to death...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Why do you call threats about smashing people's spines and mouths and about destroying the whole of the parliamentary and government system a load of rubbish? Is this rubbish?

[Janecki] This is normal election fever.

[Oleksy] Maybe this is rubbish as regards your weekly.

[Janecki] No, it is not.

[Oleksy] But for me these are political threats.

[Janecki] This is election fever.

[Oleksy] We differ in our description.

[Olejnik] It would be nice, Prime Minister, if you perhaps could tell viewers about your friendship with Mr. Alganov, the first secretary at the [former Soviet] embassy. When did you get to know him?

[Oleksy] I do not wish to change this meeting into something that should be taking place elsewhere.

[Olejnik] But why not? After all, it was you who invited us to this discussion.

[Oleksy] Because someone might accuse me of trying to impose a public character on one version or other. But all this will doubtless be of interest to the prosecutor's office, where I will be answering all questions.

[Olejnik] But you talked in an interview to POLITYKA about your contacts. Why don't you wish to talk about them now? I would like to find out if you thought that Mr. Alganov was a KGB agent or an employee. Didn't you know about this?

[Oleksy] Of course I did not, and I have already said this dozens of times, so you must have some specific aim in mind.

[Olejnik] My aim is to...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I would like to give you here one distortion of the truth that keeps on resurfacing and that I would like to pass on to you, ladies and gentlemen, and to other journalists via this program. I am not underestimating this matter, irrespective of what I think about my innocence; I do not underestimate the effects of the matter that has already arisen in both the social and public domain, that has had an effect on the minds and feelings of citizens, and that has had an effect on shaping practices and on how people assess the way democracy works. This is our joint concern. May this remain outside the discussion. But there are also lots of nuances in how one can teach the mass media how to operate in a professional manner, but I would like to say one thing here. For instance, the very fact that I knew [Soviet Embassy official] Alganov, which I do not deny, although I could make light of it and play down its meaning, but, no, why should I, I said how it really was...[pauses] Fairly frequent contact [Polish: znajomosc], but, I should say at the outset, with gaps of a few years...

[Olejnik, interrupting] You mean friendship [Polish: przyjazn]?

[Oleksy] Meanwhile, it was called friendship on the other side. I am not playing tricks with this word.

[Olejnik] Mr. Alganov said friendship.

[Oleksy] Well, that is what he said, and I think it was to my detriment, because people in Poland understand friendship to be very sincere and deep. But that is all water under the bridge. I would like to draw attention to the fact that you presented the situation in the mass media as though Mr. Alganov did nothing but stay on in Poland because of me. Lots of people have really gained this impression.

[Olejnik] I'm sorry, I did not want you to start telling us here what was in the mass media but to answer my specific questions; in other words, that you tell us when you got to know him and under what circumstances.

[Oleksy] But I am meeting the mass media here and I wish to talk about what is conveyed to the public.

[Janecki and Olejnik together] But we simply wish to speak about the facts.

[Oleksy] But I cannot start up a discussion about facts apart from maybe about some I know. I have already told you that I am not familiar with the documentation in which this is all described and explained. What I say might not be the same as what is contained in the documentation. But if you really want to know...

[Olejnik, interrupting] Yes, I do.

[Oleksy, continuing] ...then I can confirm yet again, even though you have already invented exceptionally juicy headlines out of this such as: Spy Is Prime Minister's Friend. Do you know what such a headline suggests? It suggests that he is the prime minister's friend right now. None of you here separate the period during which these contacts took place from the time when I carried out these lofty functions, which add special significance...

[Janecki, interrupting] You said the last time you met him was in July 1994. Is that so long ago?

[Oleksy] That is a long time for me.

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[Janecki] You were Sejm speaker at the time.

[Oleksy] So what?

[Janecki] Well, the thing is that I found out yesterday from a handbook for young people that even the director of a big factory in Poland, when he takes on this function, tells the special services about this, and that this is called securing the factory grounds against possible foreign intelligence infiltration. Such a person [the director] is informed about who visits the factory and about people one should not have contacts with. Do you think that you, when you were Sejm speaker, did this?

[Oleksy] What is more, I can see that you do not know what is what. Already back in February 1995, when I was making up the composition of the government ...[pauses] It is necessary that people occupying high positions should be irreproachable...

[Janecki, interrupting] It is not ministers I am concerned about but about contacts.

[Oleksy] Hang on a minute, editor. I asked Minister Milczanowski and the head of the State Protection Service—perhaps I am wrong to state publicly but I have already done so once—to give me any information that might have any influence on these people being able to fulfill a public function in the state. I did this because Mrs. Suchocka [former prime minister] told me that she had also done this.

[Janecki] But that is not my point, Prime Minister.

[Oleksy] But I tell you: I put the name Jozef Oleksy at the top of the list, although I did not have to.

[Olejnik] But perhaps then the Interior Ministry did not have that evidence.

[Oleksy] Well, that will be the subject of ...[passage indistinct, as all talk at once]

[Olejnik] Prime minister, I would like to know...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Please do not make light of this. If we would like to talk about a healthy situation in the state, then we know well that the Polish special services conducted the Alganov case considerably earlier because Mr. Czempinski [head of State Protection Office] gave me a warning long before I took up the post of prime minister because it was in September 1994. And, Mr. Editor, if in February 1995 I ask about people's purity, so to speak, in inverted commas, and put my own name at the top of the list and get what answer...

[Janecki, interrupting] Prime Minister, either you do not understand me, or you do not want to answer my question.

[Oleksy] There are no counterindications.

[Janecki] Maybe you do not want to answer my question. My question is simple: If you were the Sejm speaker and did not ask—because it is a simple question—which diplomats do the special services more or less know are at the same time working for intelligence, that means what? That you did not want to know, or you did not care. It was your duty to do so.

[Oleksy] You must be joking. There are more than 130 embassies in Poland, each of which numbers at least a dozen or so people.

[Janecki] But excuse me, the Central African Republic...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Would you like me to ask... [pauses] Just consider, maybe you have the suspicious mind of an agent...

[Janecki, interrupting] Definitely not.

[Oleksy, continuing] ...but I have not. What would be the sense of asking, of the Sejm speaker asking which of 130 embassies are agents...

[Wildstein, interrupting] Prime Minister, now you are making fun of us, because, of course, if one does not differentiate between the Chadian Embassy and the Russian Embassy, then, of course...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I'm sorry, but you asked a general question, asking which diplomats in general may be agents.

[Wildstein] Yes, but most probably it was not a question of the Chadian ambassadors, after all, but the point was that you had more bad luck, because you not only contacted Alganov but also contacted his successor, Yakimishin. You have admitted it. You even admitted, what is more, in an interview for POLITYKA, that perhaps those residential agents wrote you down on the list of intelligence collaborators, in a completely unauthorized way of course. But if they did write you down on the list of those collaborators—and even you envisage such a possibility—then what can the State Protection Office concern itself with if not such a situation? And, generally, you have such terribly bad luck. I think it is dangerous for the state to be headed by somebody around whom so many doubts are concentrated.

[Oleksy] Sir, you are crossing the bounds of objectivity now because you want to prove your argument regardless. Go and do this in your newspaper because here you are presenting the matter in a very biassed way. What sort of an accusation is that: that it is dangerous if somebody in a state post has such contacts? What do you mean by that? I could mention...

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[Wildstein, interrupting] That someone in a state post should not have contacts with foreign intelligence agents. Just that.

[Oleksy] With all certainty, if you say honestly that not with agents, and with diplomats. You did not do that in your own newspaper.

[Olejnik] Prime Minister, excuse me, your colleague Mieczyslaw Rakowski has said...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Excuse me, you, sir, all the time, also in your own material, you write: The prime minister's contacts with agents, and I beg your pardon, with diplomats. [indistinct passage]

[Janecki] But (?if somebody is an agent), are we not supposed to know it?

[Oleksy] You know now, Mr. Editor, just like me.

[Janecki] Good. It is very important.

[Oleksy] You know now, so please say: with diplomats, who later turned out to be agents.

[Olejnik] Excuse me, I would just like to say that Mieczyslaw Rakowski, your colleague, has said that he would not maintain such contacts in such a post, and he did not.

[Oleksy] Well, Mieczyslaw Rakowski has expressed one opinion, which I happen to share, but from today's perspective. Today I too know that no close friendship can be justified and should not happen in the case of a Pole and a foreigner, but let us be sensible. Let us differentiate honestly between the situations of the contacts of the public persons of the prime minister and the Sejm speaker and those that took place then.

[Gorska] Could we say, please, Prime Minister, if there was any such counterintelligence work done during the period when you, as Sejm speaker, contacted diplomats...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I do not know, I do not know. I will be asking about this during the case.

[Gorska] But did you order such counterintelligence work to be done?

[Oleksy] I have already said that I ordered it. There is no such custom as checking out an institution by the counterintelligence services. This is probably done by the State Protection Office. This is one of the tasks of counterintelligence. Out of the many bulletins and secret reports I received and that I still receive from this institution...

[Wildstein, interrupting] You have made a big mistake, and now you know this. You made a big mistake...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I did not say it was a big one—those are your words.

[Wildstein] In my eyes it is a big one, but it might not be so big for you. But the question arises that if this was a mistake, do you not think that a statesman, when he commits such blunders, should be made somehow responsible for these blunders? Maybe not by going on trial...

[Oleksy, interrupting] You are indulging in demagoguery right now because this is just one of many situations and not a crime. This is not a crime.

[Wildstein] We are talking not about crimes but about mistakes.

[Pacewicz] I think that two different lines of reasoning are getting mixed up in this matter—that is, the responsibility of Jozef Oleksy, which a court might possibly have to establish, and I wish to quote here that we have on many occasions written, for example: We do not prejudge your guilt. What is more, I personally wish to believe that you are not guilty. That was a quote from GAZETA WYBORCZA.

[Oleksy] But you have also written various highly interesting features, and you have also published leaks, very interesting and amusing leaks. [passage indistinct, as all talk at once]

[Pacewicz] But let us return to the matter of Alganov. I have a question on the version you are putting forward, the version that you were completely unaware you were being treated as a source of information. Or are we dealing here with low-level intelligence gathering, and that the information you were passing on unconsciously was accumulating somewhere in a Russian intelligence folder? I think this is a fact we do not dispute. Now I have the following question. You used, I think, the phrase that this was happy-go-lucky, that you can see today that they were...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Inappropriate.

[Pacewicz, continuing] ...inappropriate.

[Oleksy] That's right.

[Pacewicz] Let me point out then an expression used as regards both you and Mr. Alganov—the word: getting together [Polish: biesiadowanie]. This appeared in both contexts. So as I understand it, what happens during such a getting together is that people talk about lots of things. I have a question for you, and I cross my heart that this is a sincere question, as a citizen.

[Oleksy] Sincere in a newspaper version?

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[Pacewicz] Maybe you do find this surprising, but I am asking you not as a newspaper but as a citizen. The question is: Did you never doubt, during all those contacts over all those years, that what you were saying might be exploited in some way different from what normally takes place during getting-together meetings? The second question is whether you tried to control in any way what you were saying because you mentioned in your interview for POLITYKA that political discussions and situations were discussed a lot. This is quite understandable among acquaintances and friends. But I wanted to ask you if in any way—as holder of such important positions, even if these were not yet state positions, but being an important political person—you asked yourself this question and tried in some way to, in inverted commas, censor what you were saying.

[Oleksy] Well, you see you have to be aware of the period when this took place. Because all along you, ladies and gentlemen, will not acknowledge the fact that the high point of this acquaintance came before the period when I played any kind of role. Let us say frankly that this was before 1989, and later, I suspect, and perhaps I even know something about this: Mr. Alganov had really little interest in the Left. He was very interested, and not just he but many diplomats, in the new ruling circles. Let us put that to one side for the moment because, I say this again, one could get the impression that Mr. Alganov's only purpose in staying in Poland was to be in my company—well, I am joking.

But when you ask about care in conversations, then of course my intellect should instinctively prompt me about taking such care. Why can I not confirm that its presence was highly evident? Because you have to know what we talked about. He was a young diplomat with a fairly critical attitude to the realities in his country but, being a diplomat, quite aware of the processes taking place and their importance.

[Janecki] And you believe this is sincere.

[Oleksy] Why should I not believe? Why should I not? During the numerous discussions ...[pauses] I can go even further...

[Janecki, interrupting] So now that you know he was a trained intelligence employee, you of course know that it was not sincere.

[Oleksy] Now, now I can have a different ...[pauses] I can revise some of my (?views) of the time ...

[Janecki, interrupting] Yes, but you are not Joe Bloggs, you are the prime minister.

[Oleksy] Now, I say this to you again, do not hold so stubbornly on to your initial argument. Today is one thing, then it was quite another...

[Janecki, interrupting] But you were a politician...

[Oleksy, interrupting] You asked me about then.

[Wildstein] But you were meeting Alganov when you were already Sejm speaker.

[Oleksy] I met him once or twice. Does that illustrate for you a difference between the version in your newspaper about constant contacts and one or two instances of meetings, and even then in a wider group? For goodness sake, why don't you apply some measure of comparison?

And now to return to my answer. You know, as far as I was concerned, these were interesting discussions, and for him they evidently were interesting for a different reason. This is something I regard as an exceptionally dirty trick, as regards the deceit that took place, that he as an agent held discussions that he subsequently, as I gather from these statements, recorded as his intelligence-gathering conversations, I can only...

[Janecki, interrupting] But as we all know, in politics there is no mercy.

[Oleksy] I don't know, I have a different view...

[Janecki, interrupting] It is a high-risk profession.

[Oleksy] I believe that politics does not have to be ruthless and immoral.

[Janecki] Therefore not everyone must be preoccupied with it.

[Oleksy] Perhaps then it is naivete, and perhaps I am paying the price for this naivete. But let me finish. These were conversations in which, you will not believe this, I sometimes even had an ambition to explain certain issues concerning Polish processes and changes because, from what he was saying, I thought they had been in a pretty mess and that he would learn something from it, that he could look at transformations—I am an economist—and we talked a lot about economy. I never told him about economic indexes, we only discussed processes of transformations.

[Olejnik] And did you give Mr. Alganov any documents?

[Oleksy] No, I did not give him any documents.

[Olejnik] No documents? Never?

[Oleksy] I already said so. I already said so. So if you view those discussions and talks in this way, it all looks

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different. I was younger then, too. And I found some of these discussions to be quite interesting, and the occasions where there were just the two of us were rare. We were not hiding in any secret places. The conversations were in the company of others and with the participation of Polish scientists, whom I knew and I do not think...

[Olejnik, interrupting] As well as during the hunting parties.

[Oleksy] No.

[Olejnik] No?

[Oleksy] You are wrong. Somebody circulated an untrue story.

[Olejnik] Mr. Alganov said: We both were at a hunting party, we did not hunt, but this fact is at issue here.

[(?Janecki)] In the Bialowieza Forest.

[Oleksy] Well, I have never been in the Bialowieza Forest with Mr. Alganov, and neither Mr. Alganov nor I went hunting at that time.

[Olejnik] But he said so at the news conference.

[Oleksy] I must have missed this bit.

[Pacewicz] If I could add to this issue, could you tell us, Prime Minister, if this assessment...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Excuse me, somebody apparently also mentioned tennis courts...

[?Pacewicz, interrupting] You already denied that you played tennis...

[Oleksy, continuing] ...games of tennis together, while I do not play tennis at all. There were all sorts of oddities...

[Olejnik] And you never played tennis together with Mr. Alganov?

[Oleksy] Of course not.

[Olejnik] Never?

[?Pacewicz] Even at Mera [tennis courts]?

[Oleksy] I was there once. It was during Easter 1994. My family made me go to the courts once, and I played with my 12-year-old son just to find myself totally exhausted after one hour. And on the adjoining court Mr. Marian Zacharski [Polish superspy] was playing. This was the one time I met him.

[Pacewicz] But if we could resume this thread. Could you tell us please? You made a very important decision today, which, in my opinion, is a success of democracy, although you presented it in a different context—as a success of a plot against you. I would like to ask you: What part in your decision was played by the theme we have just mentioned—that is, to what degree this decision is a result of your evaluation and assessment that this imprudence really took place. What percentage of this decision was the admission that a politician in such office, who in the past had such political imprudences, cannot be the head of state?

[Oleksy] I will tell you that the largest percentage and reason for it was the aggressive propaganda of hate. I made such an assessment, and guilt is not the underlying factor of my decision. It is not and I will not change my position because if I did on the grounds that I found elements of my own guilt, I would not then be able to face myself. And I consider myself to be a man of honor.

[Wildstein] That means, Prime Minister, that you feel you behaved rashly, improperly, but that this is not your fault, as a politician?

[Oleksy] I feel that I did not, and please do not generalize this, that a politician has to be an angel. [words indistinct]

[Pacewicz] No, no, we are speaking about certain fundamental principles for a politician, and not about aspects of character.

[Oleksy] I will just reply to Mr. Pacewicz because, above all, I made the decision from the point of view of an evaluation of the situation within the state. Those various phenomena and situations that have started to multiply, and, as always, of course, the strong, a strong political conflict. Well, at a certain stage, it ceases to be the property of anyone at all, or of the authorship of anyone at all. It becomes a phenomenon that influences the functioning of the state and the efficiency of action of the authorities. I will tell you, for instance, that one of the, one of the threads in my decision was the fact that, despite the great effort I was putting into separating my stress and my troubles from the obligation for the government to function efficiently, this did not succeed. This was beginning to be not completely possible. I had already begun to observe delays in deadlines, already a certain slowing down of activity in the ministries, things were already beginning not to be ready on time, in accordance with the timetable, and I began to feel that this was associated with this situation where there was an atmosphere in general, in general, dragging me away from work. That is one thing.

[Janecki] Could you not have come to such conclusions earlier?

[Oleksy] Second, ...Pardon?

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[Janecki] Could you not have come to such conclusions earlier? Because the signs were there.

[Oleksy] As you can see, I have gone through a certain thought process, which was not as fast as perhaps yours would have been. I came to the conclusion when I did, but honestly.

[Janecki] But did this not cost the state too dearly?

[Oleksy] No. I do happen to think that your thesis, and that of your weekly, about a crisis in the state, about great mafias, about God knows what, and the necessity of delegalizations—all of this is, you know, still [words indistinct].

[Gorska] [words indistinct]

[Janecki] [words indistinct] any delegalization.

[Oleksy] ...(?requires) looking at calmly. On the other hand, if you are asking seriously—and that is how I take it—the issue at the heart of my resignation is, above all, responsibility for matters in the state. You again might say: Why so late and why not immediately? Even Mr. Walesa said that the decision of Mr. Oleksy is very much delayed and that, and that I will (?drag it out).

[Gorska] Prime Minister, you stressed in your speech that you also wish to shield your party from this campaign.

[Oleksy] No, I do not wish to shield it, the party will shield itself. On the other hand, I do feel that an exceptionally indecent tone arises when an attempt is made to make of the entire Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], and that is your achievement and no mean one, of the entire SdRP—this smells to me of the bad periods in the 1950's [sentence as heard]. This very much smells to me of that.

[?Gorska] [words indistinct] for you come from out of that formation.

[Oleksy] Making of the party some sort of demon in the service of foreigners because that is what your are concerned to do.

[Janecki] No, not at all.

[Oleksy] And returning to the theses decided by a court in the past—I am speaking of the Moscow money, although this is a matter that I have never examined thoroughly—you know, the political will and the political intention [words indistinct].

[Janecki] Prime Minister, let us speak facts and facts alone.

[Oleksy] But you tell me, do you feel that it is politically comprehensible to put forward a motion for the delegalization of the SdRP, a party that has two times won democratic elections?

[Janecki] Excuse me, has WPROST made such a suggestion?

[Oleksy] You are turning [words indistinct]

[Janecki] That's a misunderstanding of some kind. What you are saying is not true.

[Wildstein] The thing here is that election success is one thing and the law is quite another. It so happens that in a democracy even a criminal can win, and this has already happened in democracies. Also agents can win and we can envisage this. It can happen. And then there are legal norms that intervene in such situations. Well, it is unfortunate...

[Oleksy, interrupting] But are you trying to say that a suggestion to ban a party is a serious suggestion?

[Wildstein] Well, if there are justifiable accusations.

[Oleksy] In these circumstances, because of the Russian loan?

[Wildstein] Well, the loan was apparently only a part of a greater whole. I wanted to point out that...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Apparently or was it really?

[Wildstein] Well, there are some data that show that it was a part of a larger whole. Actually, I wanted to say one more thing, Prime Minister. You said the issue of the Moscow loan had been settled by the court. It has not at all been settled by the court. It was Justice Minister Jaskiernia who did not continue the case. The case was suspended and it dissipated.

But I wanted to return to your speech today. You say a great deal here about aggression, about threats. Well, I have to admit that, when I was listening to your statement, I heard quite a few threats in there. For me the fundamental threat was...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Do you not think that it could be called bitter reflections?

[Wildstein] I will tell you in a moment what I am on about.

[Oleksy] No, really, what words did I use?

[Wildstein] What I mean is that without using the word provocation, you constantly suggested that there was a provocation against you. But I wanted to speak about something else. You said at some point that you demanded that everything be revealed. And you repeated several times: everything, all of the State Protection Office papers. So you are demanding that

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the State Protection Office be dissolved, that the lives of a number of people who collaborate with these agents be put at risk, and that the state be exposed to enormous risks. Well, to me this sounded like a threat, unfortunately just like the statement by the president who at some point said: Well, the fun and games are over, gentlemen.

[Oleksy] Well, I don't know, perhaps this is the professionalism of the journalistic practice, but something does not quite sound right to me here when you yet again perform a confabulation in public. Why do you speak of a threat? It is an old argument, I know that you use it, that Kwasniewski's proposal is a threat to the state, high treason. You know, I spoke today about revealing everything in my case, and somehow you...

[Wildstein, interrupting] But in your case it also concerns collaborators, no...

[Oleksy, continuing] ...and somehow you missed this point.

[Wildstein, continuing] ...collabrators who collaborate with the State Protection Office in Russia. It of course has to concern the whole network, you are perfectly aware of this, Prime Minister, you are an intelligent man.

[Oleksy] You know, as far as my case is concerned, you must forgive me, but your concern about anonymity of informers does not convince me in respect of the public accusations against me as the prime minister.

[Wildstein] These informers report in the interests of our state.

[Oleksy] Forgive me, but I see no threat to the state in this.

[Wildstein] Every intelligence service has collaborators.

[Oleksy] I see no threat to the state if KGB agents, whose reports about various times of day and night are the source of slanders against the prime minister, are unmasked. Why is this to be a secret source of intelligence, and why do you think that the revelation of this would mean annihilation of the state? Be serious.

[Wildstein] I said revealing everything, I said revealing everything, which is what you said...

[Oleksy, interrupting] In my case...

[Wildstein, continuing] ...that is all of the relationships between the Polish intelligence service and Russia.

[Oleksy, continuing] ...in my case you will not be able to bend my statement toward your general argument, which I am familiar with, of course.

[Gorska] Excuse me, but we are soon going to be ending our program. Could we have two brief questions to the prime minister—the Third Program and GAZETA WYBORCZA—and then the prime minister.

[Oleksy] But I would like to ask you a question, ladies and gentlemen.

[Gorska] But, Prime Minister, we just want two brief questions.

[Oleksy] But I would like to ask a question and then I need not come back to it again.

[Gorska] Perhaps we could save it for the very end?

[Oleksy] Ladies and gentlemen, perhaps this is of more interest to the listeners, but you, ladies and gentlemen, keep on avoiding a subject I have put forward—that is, the circumstances and the political background of the emergence of this aggression against me. Doesn't it tell you anything? Do you think that there is no connection between this aggression and the defeat of Lech Walesa and his camp? I invariably state that there is. Please recall Lech Walesa's and Andrzej Milczanowski's remarks.

[Pacewicz] I think there are two dangers in this whole affair. One danger is connected ...[pauses] Both are similar to one another—that is, that this whole affair we call the Oleksy case will be put into two enormous and complicated political contexts. One danger is that it will be presented in the way you described it: one great conspiracy theory in which Lech Walesa, helped by the State Protection Office, carries out a coup, and your today's quotes are genuinely horrifying. You are presenting this as if...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Do you think they are untrue?

[Pacewicz] I think that they are untrue.

[Oleksy] Do you deny that there were no such remarks?

[Pacewicz] Just a moment, just a moment. And the second theory that presents, and for once at least I agree with you, Prime Minister, that presents accusations against you, concrete accusations made at an extremely high level that will be judged by the court. These accusations will be spread onto the whole party of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] so we demand its ban, and we make the election outcome null and void. We must not do this, either. Essentially, this is a simple matter, although very painful and rather unusual in a democracy. Specific accusations were voiced, we have political responsibility. Here, in the assessment of this responsibility I do not agree with you, Prime Minister, and think that your decision today is a proper reaction to political responsibility, without

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prejudging your guilt, I stress. On the other hand, the whole context is a completely different matter, and mixing all these things simply does not have any sense at all. Let us deal with this matter, the court will clarify it, you—I now want to praise you, although perhaps not in a manner that will please you—you were right today when you respected the judgment of democracy in which the media played their essential role.

[Oleksy] You do not have to praise me. I know that I acted properly, and I know that I acted for reasons of state.

[Pacewicz] I also think that.

[Oleksy] Let us leave the rest to legal procedures, but again I am worried that none of you has said at least a word in support of my opinion that the mass media were a side in all this; at least the right-wing media were a side in this matter. They did carry accusations, yes, they did.

[Wildstein] I agree with you, Prime Minister, they were a side, they represented the public, public opinion.

[Oleksy] Excuse me, which part of the public?

[Wildstein] The entire public.

[Oleksy] You do look at poll results, don't you?

[Wildstein] You quote me selectively. The public wanted to know.

[Oleksy] And you were not worried by the fact that the public is changing its opinions and views much more slowly than you do in your commentaries?

[Wildstein] But sufficiently quickly for the majority of the public being in favor of you currently not holding the office of prime minister.

[Oleksy] I am not sure on what basis you maintain this.

[Wildstein] On the basis of polls.

[Oleksy] I have different data. [passage indistinct, as everyone speaks at once]

[Olejnik] Anyway, in this case there are two persons, two institutions that are being accused: the institution of prime minister and the person of Jozef Oleksy, and the special services. You, during this month-long fight, have made very serious accusations against the special services.

[Oleksy] No, I made accusations against several gentlemen from the special services.

[Olejnik] I precisely wanted to learn what were the benefits for these gentlemen who formerly worked in the [pre-1989] Security Service from pursuing your case. How do Messrs. Fonfara, Libera benefit from this?

[Oleksy] It is not a question of benefits; it is a much deeper question. It is a question that ought to be left for another discussion.

[Olejnik] But could you tell me what...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I can only say that I am not accusing the special services because that would make no sense. They exist in every state, and they are necessary and very important in the functioning of the state. Their place and awareness of their place are very important, as is the right to use that which they do and which they gather. That is a separate issue. Here I have some doubts.

But my main accusations are against a group, set up by Minister Milczanowski, because under him a specially appointed group for the Oleksy case worked for him...

[Olejnik, interrupting] But these were not new people, these were people who worked there for a long time, so I wanted to learn from you, Prime Minister...

[Oleksy, continuing] ...and I am entitled to a view about this matter.

[Olejnik] Excuse me, the president comes from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], a formation including the SLD is in power, so what benefits could be derived by these gentlemen who did not just arrive in that office but had been working for security services for a long time?

[Oleksy] Please remember what Lech Walesa said, that this case was not to erupt now. It was planned—and I cite his version here—for a different period, after Lech Walesa's victory, for the period before the next parliamentary elections.

[Olejnik] And that benefits these gentlemen?

[Oleksy] I am sorry?

[Olejnik] I am asking about the benefits for these specific gentlemen.

[Oleksy] Which gentlemen?

[Olejnik] Fonfara, Libera.

[Oleksy] I do not know whether they were motivated by benefits or by fanaticism. I do not know what motivated them.

[Olejnik] Well, there you are—fanaticism.

[Oleksy] I am appraising their actions.

[Janecki] Do you have any evidence, Prime Minister?

[Oleksy] What I am appraising is the fact that inside the special services in which they had the duty to serve

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the state and only the state, they recognized only one command center. I know this because I was the prime minister, who apparently oversaw everything.

[Olejnik] But their command center was their minister, the minister of internal affairs.

[Piasecki] Prime Minister, while on the subject, could you say why you dismissed [deputy interior minister] Henryk Jasik? You spoke about a violation that should have had official and disciplinary consequences. What kind of violation was it?

[Oleksy] That should be enough. I do not want to take this further.

[Olejnik] Excuse me, but because you do not want to take this further, let me remind you that you said you had lost confidence in him earlier.

[Oleksy] That too.

[Olejnik] But when was the disciplinary violation?

[Oleksy] It was earlier. It was certainly before the dismissal, I can assure you of that.

[Olejnik] The disciplinary violation was after the dismissal.

[Oleksy] It was before.

[Olejnik] Well, we have different information.

[Oleksy] Then we shall have to check that.

[Janecki] (?But when did you) know, before or after?

[Oleksy] I knew enough to give me sufficient reason.

[Pacewicz] Prime Minister, you speak a lot about your sense of duty to the state, that it was a decision in the interests of the state. Do you not fear that directing such serious accusations against the very hierarchy of the state protection services, writing about the purchase of appraisals and opinions by foreign agents [as heard], about judgments about morality, about putting at risk Poland's sovereignty, using today, two hours ago, such strong words, the result you are achieving is to undermine the citizen's confidence in the state body the task of which is to protect the state and that, as I see it, in good faith performed this task in respect of Russian ...[pauses]

[Oleksy] That is not my intention, of course.

[Pacewicz] But these are the results.

[Oleksy] Every sentence can be interpreted in various ways. If it is true...

[Pacewicz, interrupting] But putting Polish sovereignty at risk, Prime minister, these are the strongest words imaginable.

[Oleksy] Just like you, ladies and gentlemen, wrote at great length about how Poland's sovereignty and independence were threatened by the mere suspicion of the prime minister's collaboration with a foreign intelligence service. Let us use the same measure in our assessments. On the other hand, since you ask, it happens to be just a coincidence in which I say what I have heard: that information implicating me was obtained from agents of a foreign intelligence service.

[?Pacewicz] This is how the intelligence services work all over the world.

[Gorska] Prime Minister, how are we to interpret the allegation about manipulation of people who change their allegiance every three months and essentially forget that they should be loyal to the state—that is, the suggestion, I don't know, that the change of team...

[Oleksy, interrupting] Every man has to accept it in the way his conscience tells him; this is a sufficiently general statement.

[Pacewicz] I wanted to ask you the following. It transpires that you read newspapers very carefully. I wanted to quote an excerpt and ask what you thought about its arguments. I quote: The prime minister must step down, otherwise, how is he to go on foreign visits while this matter hangs over him? End quote. Do you think this argument is an honest one, or is it in the form of...

[Oleksy, interrupting] This argument fits with the categories of my thinking about my resignation. The resignation has taken place, so I can only admit that this is just one of the complications that have been accumulating during my tenure. And because I thought these could accumulate and intensify, I decided that in the interest of the state there were no other options, and I should not remain in office, irrespective of all other circumstances.

[Olejnik] What do you most regret, Prime Minister?

[Wildstein] The things you have said today, things that happened in your life, your contacts with diplomats who turned out to be agents, would be enough to arouse the interest of any efficient state protection agent. And at the same time you made those officers into the heroes, the antiheroes of your today's remarks. On what grounds have you done so, since the logic would prompt the question: What should these people be interested in?

[Oleksy] I am greatly puzzled by your concern today about everything other than that which is the most important for me today: my resignation and my situation and case. You seem to lean in a peculiarly favorable manner toward those who prepared papers against me,

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but I can understand that. And I can especially do so in the case of the WPROST weekly.

But because we are approaching the end of the program...

[Piasecki, interrupting] Unfortunately we must finish now...

[Oleksy, continuing] I just want to say a final word, ladies and gentlemen.

[Janecki] This is a dangerous insinuation, Prime Minister, and I cannot leave it without an answer.

[Oleksy] Of course you can respond. I know what I am saying and I speak in general enough terms so that you do not get too irritated.

And, finally, allow me just one sentence. Having decided to go ahead with this discussion, I think that it failed to raise many subjects that could have followed from it. You stuck to, as it were, an investigative form by asking questions about details and my guilt. I, on the other hand, had thought this would be a discussion about repercussions, about what was going to happen next, about the interpretation of what constitutes threats to the state because there had been so many headlines and articles indicating there was a crisis in Poland, that the state was coming to an end, that there was destruction, and so on.

Perhaps we could, but we will not have time for this. I thought that we would discuss these issues, that we would discuss the philosophy of effect, which is objective and independent of my interpretations. These are the facts.

[Olejnik] But it is necessary to talk about (?the causes) as well, prime minister.

[Oleksy] Pardon?

[Olejnik] About the causes as well, and thus our question to you.

[Oleksy] We have concentrated on the causes today, but I think it would also be important for the listeners if they were to hear today how we look at what is going to take place next, because one phase is going to end somewhere and the next ones will be more longer lasting.

[Gorska] To end, Prime Minister, could you tell us something about your political plans? In short, are you going to be a candidate for the post of chairman of the the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]?

[Oleksy] You know, it is 11 o'clock, and after a hard day today, and many consultations and talks I had to hold, I do not at the moment have any plans.

[Gorska] You do not know if you will be a candidate for the chairmanship of the SdRP? Are you considering the possibility of...

[Oleksy, interrupting] I have already made statements on this subject, but since I am a responsible individual, I will in association with this consider everything, many times over, so as not to disturb anyone.

[Gorska] And will you ask the chamber to suspend your [parliamentary] immunity, or not?

[Oleksy] There is no such reason or need for the time being.

[Piasecki] You have announced that you will take those who accuse you to court. Is this the politicians or the journalists?

[Oleksy] Certainly not the journalists, as I have often given you assurances that the task of a journalist is to ferret out all secret things and the task of their possessors is to defend them. And here we have a mutual playing field in this matter, I think.

[Gorska] Thank you very much for this interview.

[Brzeski] I thank all those in the studio for a calm, balanced discussion. I think that we will return, in our journalistic programs, to the subjects proposed by Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. The last word in the case of Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy belongs to the lawyers. We will all be waiting for this last word. I today thank the prime minister, I thank the journalists gathered in the studio, and I also thank those of you gathered before television sets and radio receivers. Good night.

Poland: Potential Candidates for Prime Minister

WS2501135396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Agata Nowakowska, "PSK": "There Are Several Candidates for Prime Minister Following Oleksy's Resignation; The Alliance Has Its Variants"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *For the last week, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has been pressuring its coalition partner to have the Cabinet restructured. Unofficial sources claim that the PSL wants the prime minister's office and the dismissal of Justice Minister Jerzy Jaskiernia.*

The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is preparing to take the initiative. It wants to use the precedent created by the Peasants when Prime Minister Pawlak was dismissed: the PSL presented its coalition partner with several choices to choose from at the time. Two influential SLD politicians told GAZETA WYBORCZA what these variants are.

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Variant I: Prime Minister Zych

[Sejm Speaker] Jozef Zych of the PSL would be appointed prime minister and [Deputy Sejm Speaker] Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz of the SLD would be appointed Sejm speaker. "Zych, however, does not want to be prime minister and is doing everything he can so that his colleagues do not accept this suggestion," said our interlocutor. "The speaker came up with a different idea: that we make [Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister] Grzegorz Kolodko prime minister. And we bought it."

Variant II: Kolodko or Rosati

"Would you agree to be prime minister?" reporters asked Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko after his meeting with the Polish Business Council. "If it would cause the inflation rate to fall and production grow, yes. I would have to ask my wife, however," he said. Kolodko stressed that "unlike politics, the condition of the economy is good, if not excellent. The economy is healthy, politics are sick."

Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati might join the fight for the premiership. "His candidacy surfaced for the same reasons as Kolodko's," said an SLD minister who asked to remain anonymous. "Both are nonaligned experts."

Variant III: Prime Minister Cimoszewicz

Another candidate being considered for prime minister is Cimoszewicz. As we learned from unofficial sources, President Kwasniewski has already asked if he would accept, and he received a positive answer.

The deputy Sejm speaker, however, has opponents within the SLD who still remember his critical remarks on the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] (Cimoszewicz is nonaligned) and the fact that he distanced himself from [Labor Minister] Leszek Miller who was involved in the so-called Moscow loan [when the SdRP borrowed money from the CPSU].

Why Pietrewicz

The SLD politicians are flexible. They point out that the new prime minister will stay in office only until the fall of 1997, possibly not even that long, because President Kwasniewski is said to be considering presenting a draft law on general elections to the Sejm. That draft would provide for parliamentary elections to be held in June and not in the fall. The new government could thus pass the budget law it would later implement.

"Everything can be agreed upon provided the economy does not go wrong and Minister Miller is able to carry out a reform of the social security system," say our interlocutors.

"Does that mean that the candidacy of the head of the Central Planning Office [CUP], Miroslaw Pietrewicz, is also open to discussion?"

Anonymous SLD politician: "We do not even know whether this is a candidate of the entire PSL or only Waldemar Pawlak's." Our interlocutor claims that Pawlak came up with Pietrewicz because the CUP head "will definitely not run for PSL chairman; therefore, he poses no threat to Pawlak." [passage omitted]

And what about Oleksy? He confirmed that he would run for chairmanship of the SdRP at the convention scheduled for 27 January ("We believe that the prosecutor's office will discontinue the investigation and [former Interior] Minister Andrzej Milczanowski will be placed before the State Tribunal," said our interlocutor from the SLD).

Oleksy might, however, have a dangerous rival in current Deputy Chairman Miller. During the 26 January session of the SdRP Chief Council, the supporters of both candidates will feel out their chances.

Poland: Candidates for Prime Minister Considered

WS2601124096 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 26 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "IGO, POZ": "The Government. The Coalition Splits Power Again; Can the PSL Have Both a Prime Minister and a Speaker?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday before noon Jozef Oleksy handed in his resignation to the president. After the meeting, Kwasniewski met with a delegation of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], headed by Chairman Waldemar Pawlak and Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych. In the afternoon the coalition members presented the names of their candidates for prime minister. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] mentioned Marek Borowski, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers, and Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, deputy speaker of the Sejm. The PSL gave the name of Miroslaw Pietrewicz, head of the Central Planning Office.

Pietrewicz is Pawlak's candidate. For the SLD, however, the only acceptable PSL candidate would be Speaker Zych. Zych himself is greatly unsettled by such trust. Before the coalition met to decide about its future, Zych complained to reporters: "What have I done wrong as speaker to have you want me out of the job?"

Other PSL representatives are not enthusiastic about seeing Zych leave the Sejm. They all agree the speaker is currently the party's greatest asset. If they wanted to get the prime minister's office, however, they would have to give up the Sejm speaker's office. The post-communists will not allow for their coalition partner

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to hold all of the key offices: the prime minister and speakers of both houses of parliament. Hence, Zych's earlier suggestion that Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko, closely affiliated with the SLD, could be appointed prime minister.

As for the SLD candidates, Borowski is completely "unacceptable" for the PSL. Pietrewicz, on the other hand, has a small chance of being approved by the postcommunists. Other names are thus being brought up: Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati [nonaligned, considered to be affiliated with the SLD] and the PSL's Deputy Prime Minister Aleksander Luczak (generally very complaisant toward the SLD).

After a two-hour meeting between SLD and PSL politicians, Jerzy Szmajdzinski and Waldemar Pawlak announced that further talks would be held, pointing out that on 27 January the chief council of the PSL and the leaders of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] were to meet.

The PSL National Council is to decide about Waldemar Pawlak's political future. Some of his opponents have signaled over the past few days that the chairman will be ousted (already in December the Council did not pass a vote of confidence in Pawlak). However, PSL politicians tend to claim now that, in the context of negotiating a deal with the SLD, changing the chairman would be risky.

The SdRP will elect its new chairman (to replace Kwasniewski). A few days ago the SLD deputies still maintained that Jozef Oleksy was the strongest candidate. Currently, the names of Szmajdzinski and [Labor Minister] Leszek Miller are mentioned more frequently.

Poland: Oleksy's Last Defense Appointments Noted

WS2601132896 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 26 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by GAC, LUZ: "The Prime Minister's Colleagues Will Not Be Left Stranded"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although Oleksy has lost his position, before he left he had managed to ensure positions for his closest aides. He appointed one of them deputy defense minister and another government secretary at the Committee for Defense Issues [KSORM].

The individuals' names are Andrzej Macenowicz and Andrzej Zalucki, respectively, chief of Oleksy's office and his deputy.

One day before he announced his resignation, Oleksy promoted Macenowicz to under secretary of state at the Council of Ministers' Office. He also gave him the position of government secretary at the Committee for Defense Issues. Before that, the secretary at KSORM was Stanislaw Dobrzanski, but he has been recently approved as defense minister.

Macenowicz used to work at the KC PZPR [Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party]. Between 1992 and 1995 he was managing director of the Popular University in Rozalin. Right now he is involved in litigation with the legitimate owner of Rozalin, Krystyna Krysowska. Three days ago, at a trial in the district court in Pruszkow, one of the witnesses accused Macenowicz of taking bribes during his tenure as director in Rozalin.

The prime minister's other colleague is now also going to focus on defense matters, occupying the position, unfilled for almost one year, of under secretary of state for parliamentary issues. Danuta Waniek of the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] was the first, and so far only, deputy minister for contacts with parliament. Her successor will have slightly more responsibility, inasmuch as his power will also encompass social relations in the Army.

Zalucki, 54, graduated from the department of philology and history at the WSP [expansion unknown] in Krakow. In his youth, he was a student activist, beginning his career at the ZSP [Union of Polish Students].

In compliance with a pledge by the Defense Ministry chief ("because we are the fifth client of the budget, our management of finances should be looked at through a magnifying glass"), a new position was created at the ministry: deputy minister for economic issues. It has been filled by Tadeusz Grabowski, previously the chief of the Defense Ministry's Financial Department.

Poland: Reward Offered for Proof of Oleksy Spying

AU2601073096 Paris AFP in English 2328 GMT 26 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Warsaw, Jan 25 (AFP)—A Polish newspaper on Thursday [25 January] offered a $100,000 reward for hard proof that espionage allegations that brought down prime minister Jozef Oleksy are true.

The mass circulation daily SUPER EXPRESS also opened a telephone hotline as part of its investigation into the charges that Oleksy spied for Moscow for more than a decade.

The daily said it would submit the evidence it obtains to the military prosecutor's office that on Wednesday opened a formal probe into the allegations against Oleksy. Hours later he resigned, all the while insisting he was innocent.

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Poland: Walesa: Moscow Wants Poland Back

WS2601113496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jan 96 p 6

[Report by "S.P." under the "Day in the World" rubric: "Lech Walesa Accuses Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Walesa accused Moscow of realizing its own interests by "playing out the Oleksy case." "If affairs such as that of Oleksy appear, it means that the Russians are trying to incorporate Poland into their structures again," he said for AFP. Formulating the charges, Walesa appealed to the West to support Poland in the bid for the EU and NATO. "The West must understand," Walesa argued, "that if Russia succeeds in bringing the development of the Polish economy to a halt it will lose a market of 40 million people." Commenting on the Jozef Oleksy case, Walesa said that the former prime minister is a "victim of the sovietization of Poland."

Poland: 'Moscow Loan' for Polish Communists Detailed

WS2601113196 Warsaw GAZETA POLSKA in Polish 25 Jan 96 pp 1, 4

[Article by Anita Gargas: "TRYBUNA and SdRP for the KGB Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] GAZETA POLSKA has obtained protocols of interrogations of top PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] and KPZR [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] officials conducted by UOP [Office of State Protection] and the Prosecutor's Office in connection with the so-called Moscow loan case. The documents suggest that PZPR First Secretary Mieczyslaw Rakowski, under KGB patronage, deliberately took from his Communist comrades a loan to reform the PZPR into a new party, set up the party's newspaper, TRYBUNA, and launch the party's commercial activities.

Although warned of criminal responsibility for false testimony, Leszek Miller, PZPR and later SdRP Central Committee secretary who participated in the illegal transaction, lied when he said that he had learned about the loan from press reports and tried to shift the blame to Rakowski.

The information obtained by GAZETA POLSKA confirms that the money received by Rakowski's group went to establish economic structures not formally connected with the party. "Such organizations as joint-stock partnerships, foundations, limited-liability companies, and so on are used as a protection against attempts to take away property for political reasons," said a memo written by A. Postovalov, deputy chief of the KPZR Central Committee General Department, who took part in one of the training sessions organized by the KPZR for the SdRP to work out the principles of economic activities by the Communists.

After the eruption of the "Moscow loan" scandal, Aleksander Kwasniewski admitted that the SdRP, which he led, conducted an informal "registration of companies." We give those companies money and they invest it. And we are not interested in how they do it. They may trade in potatoes or operate in the tourist business, he said. This concurs with the contents of a memo for Gorbachev written by G. Yanayev, KPZR secretary and vice president of the Soviet Union, in November 1990, in which he said: The SdRP leadership is going to put $200,000 from the KPZR's credit in circulation. GAZETA POLSKA has a copy of the protocol of Yanayev's testimony (made in custody following the abortive coup) confirming the memo.

Rakowski started seeking a loan in October 1989—three months before the PZPR was disbanded. Following a conversation with Gorbachev, Rakowski, during his official visit to Moscow, reached a fundamental agreement that the KPZR would provide financial assistance to the PZPR in the form of a credit. Rakowski explained his request by the need to cover expenses connected with organizing a congress of the PZPR and the Constituent Assembly of a new Polish leftist party, as well as compensations for discharged PZPR apparatus workers, testified W. Svyetlov, a longtime member of the KPZR Central Committee apparatus. Rakowski again took up the credit issue in December 1989 during a working visit by Fyodorov, first deputy chief of the Central Committee Foreign Department. Rakowski received Fyodorov and me in his office in the Central Committee building. He asked for a specific amount, promising to pay it back in one year, after activating the party's commercial activities. He quoted the amount in Polish zlotys, and it was higher than the credit that had been given to Rakowski.

The dollars were brought to Poland by Comrades Svyetlov and Shevchenko. They had no problems leaving the airport—the Polish Central Committee arranged for them to go through a checkpoint for diplomats.

In Rakowski's office, Svyetlov handed over the currency, which was also counted there, Shevchenko testified. The money was counted by W. Tychmanowicz and A. Borowicz, who remembers that it was a hefty sum: The counting took 45 minutes, even though they summed up only the figures indicated on the seals of bank note packets.

The money transfer was attended by me and liaison officers and, from the Polish side, Rakowski, his deputy

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Miller, and another two men. The currency was delivered in diplomatic bags called "pouches." Rakowski acknowledged the receipt of the currency, Shevchenko said.

According to Syetlov, in the summer of 1990, he told his two colleagues that Rakowski's debt should somehow be repayed. The conversation was connected with preparations for the visit by Yanayev, Political Bureau member and KPZR Central Committee secretary, to Poland. The visit took place on 18-20 October 1990. Yanayev and Rakowski had a conversation on Aleja Roz Street following a farewell dinner given by the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] leadership in a villa on Klonowa Street. After the meeting with Rakowski, Yanayev told me the morning after that he had agreed, in principle, with Rakowski on partial repayment of the debt in the amount of $500,000. Upon return to Moscow, I made a report for Gorbachev on the Yanayev-Rakowski conversation.

Yanayev had confirmed this. During my working visit to Poland, Rakowski and Miller, OKW [expansion unknown] SdRP general secretary, informed me privately that the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic was in extremely difficult financial condition because of the discrimination on the part of the present power, which stripped the party virtually of its entire property and income sources. About $700,000 was left of our credit. As much as $300,000 was spent to establish the new party daily TRYBUNA and $200,000 to pay the compensations. The SdRP leadership is now ready to return $500,000 to the KPZR, as well as to invest the remaining $200,000 and to repay the debt in installments from profits to be derived from the investments.

As it turns out from KPZR testimonies, Gorbachev was regularly updated on the whole matter. He also agreed to defer the debt payments and to use KGB channels to receive a portion of the repaid credit. Svyetlov and Vyershinin, a high-ranking KGB officer whose true name is Silvyestrov, went to Poland to collect the money.

In the evening, Vyershinin and I went to an apartment in the vicinity of Wilanow. (Now we know that the apartment belonged to Alganov, a KGB officer who recruited Oleksy for collaboration—remark by AG). After us, Leszek Miller and his wife came to the apartment. Miller and Vyershinin went to another room for a couple of minutes. I learned from Vyershinin that, in that room, Miller gave him a copy of the credit agreement, signed by Rakowski, pledging repayment of $600,000.

During the questioning in the Prosecutor's Office, Miller let his fantasy loose. He testified that Rakowski had repaid the debt at the dinner on Klonowa Street. He carried a full plastic bag. At first I thought that he had done some shopping earlier.

That Rakowski arrived for a meeting with the Russians with a bag has been confirmed neither by the restaurant waiters nor by the rest of the dinner participants, including Kwasniewski (who said under oath that he had a higher economic education).

Let us assume that, in 1991, when the loan case surfaced and people wondered where the due amount of credit was, one of the KPZR Central Committee members publicly "called for taking a closer look at the activities by some Polish and mixed companies actively operating in the Soviet market."

One should put under scrutiny the lineup of the SdRP delegation that visited Moscow and KPZR activists who participated in those meetings, he advised. This may suggest that the financial cooperation between Polish Communists and the KPZR had not ended after the PZPR's disbandment.

At that time, those statements received no attention.

Poland: Sejm: UOP Not Involved in Elections

WS2501145696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 24 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Jerzy Jachowicz: "Sejm Secret Services Commission: UOP Innocent in the Presidential Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Sejm commission for the supervision of the intelligence and counterintelligence services announced yesterday that the secret services were not involved in the presidential elections.*

The commission examined complaints filed by politicians from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]—among them Danuta Waniek, Jerzy Dziewulski, and Zbigniew Siemiatkowski—that the Office of State Protection [UOP] was involved in the presidential campaign on Walesa's side.

Colonel Konstanty Miodowicz (former head of counterintelligence who resigned from UOP on 2 January) found this outrageous and wrote a letter to the commission asking that the charges be elucidated. Yesterday the commission heard Danuta Waniek, head of the Presidential Chancellery, Siemiatkowski, deputy chief of the National Security Office, and SLD Deputy Dziewulski, who was responsible for Aleksander Kwasniewski's security in the campaign. Dziewulski told reporters that UOP attempted to recruit a high-ranking state official

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as an agent. "The Polisa affair [so-called red web scandal in which Kwasniewski's and Oleksy's wives were involved] was the trump card," he added.

"I do not see anything that would point to intervention on the part of the secret services," said commission member Ryszard Bugaj of the Union of Labor. "The recruitment attempts began long before the election campaign. There is nothing unusual about the fact that they were continued."

Poland: Work on Draft Vetting Bill Discussed

WS2601111896 Poznan GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI in Polish 20-21 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Wlodzimierz Braniecki and Walerian Ignasiak: "Secret/Open"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Will Malachowski Committee Be Set Up?

President Aleksander Kwasniewski has decided to propose a legislative initiative that zeroes in on revealing all Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW] and Office of State Protection [UOP] records. In the President's Chancellery, a team is working to prepare a draft bill in the next few days. It provides for establishing a special committee that is to be in charge of the disclosure of documents. After a 45-minute talk with the president, Deputy Sejm Speaker Aleksander Malachowski agreed to chair the committee.

An announcement to reveal the records, made by Marek Siwiec, a secretary and one of the closest aides to Kwasniewski in the President's Chancellery, in an 18 January TV news broadcast on the Panorama program, can stir up a revolution in Poland's political life. Thus far, a majority of parties and their leaders have been against looking into the records. Only a few people have had access to them. Shortly after the 1989 events, the so-called Milczanowski committee, whose members were people now associated with the present Freedom Union [UW], drafted a secret chart of Polish special services collaborators. It was in line with 64 names revealed in June 1992 by then Minister of Internal Affairs Antoni Macierewicz. The MSW records remained closed, but, time after time, various secret materials, as well as warnings against using these materials to blackmail some people, have appeared.

In a situation where the MSW's and UOP's unverified and still "leaking" records are again to decide about the fate of the nation, President Kwasniewski has decided to disclose all records and opted for open sessions of the committee in the Oleksy case. No one could charge the left wing with concealing something. The announcement—it is not known if it will ever be implemented—can disillusion, not to say blackmail, some politicians from the old opposition who are trying to heat up the atmosphere around the Oleksy case

Former President Lech Walesa, who on many occasions has been charged with cooperating with the former "security service" secret police as an agent nicknamed "Bolek," said that he liked the idea. But he added: "How does it relate to the law, the Constitution, and the potential?" He also criticized Aleksander Malachowski for being named as head of the committee.

Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych criticized the idea, recognizing that the state should possess secret materials of special importance.

On Friday and in the days preceding, hectic work on the draft bill was under way in the Presidential Chancellery. The head of the president's political service, Marek Siwiec, did not have time to talk.

GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI asked Aleksander Malachowski, deputy Sejm speaker, Krzysztof Kozlowski, a senator and former minister of internal affairs in the Mazowiecki government, and Antoni Macierewicz, former minister of internal affairs in the Olszewski government, their opinions of President Kwasniewski's idea.

Aleksander Malachowski: The president called me at night and proposed that I chair the committee. In Germany, the Gauck committee has been appointed; here we will have the Malachowski committee, a vetting and research group. I agreed. There are many draft vetting bills—those of the Union of Labor [UP] and Freedom Union [UW]—and this is good. Perhaps it will be possible to draft a good bill. I have a few initial conditions for this committee. It has to be absolutely independent of the special services and the MSW. The committee activity should be focused on three areas. The first area is to prevent a situation where a man elected to perform an important public post has something in his biography that makes his performance of the public mission harder—what exposes him to blackmail or where his post is a reward for his ugly past.

The second matter, which I think is the most important one, is the possibility to clear wrongfully accused people before public opinion. Thus far, it has never happened. The Macierewicz chart included people who were national heroes, spent many years in prison—for example, Jan Zamoyski and Wieslaw Chrzanowski. Macierewicz was a ghastly conceited and incompetent man. He established a "youth brigade" for his action and harmed many people. And, finally, the third direction of the committee's work: the people who, although they were disloyal to their milieux, wrote something that

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they should never have written, yet afterwards they were brutally treated. Random figures should not work on this important committee, only judges.

Krzysztof Kozlowski: One can discuss ideas if they are concrete. There is no draft bill, and what we have here is a vague statement made by Mr. Siwiec, which I heard on TV at midnight. It is very easy to say we are setting up a Gauck committee in Poland, meaning that Malachowski will chair it. I would like you to remember that in Germany 3,000 people are working on the Gauck committee, and its annual budget totals [DM]250 million. No budget in the President's Chancellery will be big enough for that, and the processing of the materials that are in the MSW headquarters and in the regions would require not one presidential term but quite a few Kwasniewski terms. One cannot reveal everything anyway because current intelligence and counterintelligence operations must be secret. If we disclose everything, we will liquidate intelligence and counterintelligence at the same time. Yet, obviously, one should gradually disclose the information. Milczanowski opened the MSW records up to 1956, and one should go further and hand the remaining annals of the files over to historians.

Antoni Macierewicz: A prerequisite for credibility of the current vetting draft bill is to base it on the principles my coworkers and I adhered to back in 1992, without classifying and determining who was and who was not an agent. The bill should only make it easier for the concerned people to access the MSW and UOP records. This is how it has been done in the Czech Republic and Germany, and what we partly did by having disclosed 64 one-time collaborators among the Sejm deputies. Every citizen must have a right to access the records and files gathered against him by the special services. Open access to the secret service files is the foundation of democratic transformations.

If the most recent Kwasniewski initiative had been implemented in this way, if the people who are in charge of it were fully credible, not those who not long ago were against vetting, then I am convinced that we could clear the political atmosphere in the country. For the time being, however, special services still "shake" political life in Poland. The people linked once to intelligence are active today in all political groups. What is their objective? Perhaps their objective is to preserve the nondisclosure of such corrupt schemes as that of the Foreign Debt Service Fund [FOZZ] and others that drained the Polish economy.

Poland: Kwasniewski Outlines Draft Vetting Law

WS2501150496 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 25 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by "LUZ": "The President Will Help Review Secret Files"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, in the cloakroom of a military unit in Krakow, the president revealed the first details of the draft vetting law to reporters.

"There is no audacity in this," said Aleksander Kwasniewski, when asked to comment on a statement issued by former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski. Milczanowski said that the idea of uncovering files of the secret services not only from before 1989 but also those after 1990 "verges on state treason."

"I do not wish to destroy the agent network or hamper the process of building a legitimate state. I want to defend people who feel helpless today because they have no way of learning whether media reports and public statements are true," said Kwasniewski. He refused to give a clear answer to the question of whether his idea meant that current agents and informers of the Office of State Protection [UOP] would be revealed.

According to the president, the recently established Sejm Secret Services Commission is not enough and a Public Trust Commission should be formed. "Files of the Security Administration, the Security Service [SB], and UOP could be deposited at that Commission," Kwasniewski suggested.

The president outlined his view of how this commission would work. Someone charged with working for UOP, for example, could turn to the Public Trust Commission and ask it to explore whether there are any materials proving such cooperation and establish how they were collected. The case would then be turned over to judges, who would rule whether the materials are credible.

At the request of the State Electoral Commission, it would also verify statements submitted by deputy and senatorial candidates on whether they had collaborated with secret services during the Polish People's Republic.

At the request of the court, it would also reveal the files of SB agents or collaborators, as in the case of Stanislaw Pyjas [student murdered by the SB]. Kwasniewski also wants the law to give each citizen access to his own files. "We could finally stop threatening each other with files," said the president.

Kwasniewski promised to disclose further details in the next few days.

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Poland: Mass Enfranchisement Referendum Team Set Up

WS2501154496 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 24 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by Wojciech Saramonowicz: "Mass Enfranchisement. Referendum Team; Apolitical Supervision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksander Kwasniewski has established a team to carry out the referendum on mass enfranchisement. It is headed by Marek Siwiec, secretary of state at the Presidential Chancellery. The members include the president's economic aide, Professor Marek Belka; Andrzej Gliniecki, under secretary of state at the Chancellery; and Presidential Spokesman Antoni Styrczula.

The team is to ensure "that the referendum campaign runs smoothly, that all sides can present their views and to guarantee that the citizens receive comprehensive information about the referendum." The team will cooperate with the State Electoral Commission and the National Radio and Television Council.

Styrczula said that the president will "prevent the discussion on issues related to the referendum being dominated by politics."

Meanwhile, Solidarity activists have announced that over the next few weeks they will distribute 10 million leaflets popularizing the referendum.

Solidarity will call on the Poles to say "yes" to four questions:

—Are you for mass enfranchisement?

—Should liabilities to senior citizens and employees of the state sector be covered by means generated by the privatization of national assets?

—Should part of those assets be allocated to pension funds?

—Should privatization coupons be included in the enfranchisement project?

Solidarity will encourage a "no" to the question of whether the number of companies within the National Investment Fund [NFI] project (supported by the Democratic Left Alliance, among others) should be increased. The trade unionists claim that the NFI project "has nothing to do with mass enfranchisement."

Poland: MSZ Appointments Said To Strengthen Coalition

WS2501145596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 25 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "KRZEM": "Wyzner and Koltun Promoted; The Coalition Strengthens Its Position at the MSZ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The prime minister appointed Eugeniusz Wyzner secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MSZ] yesterday [24 January].*

Wyzner has thus become the highest ranking officer at the MSZ and acts as head of the ministry when, for example, the minister is abroad. The remaining deputy ministers have the rank of under secretary.

Wyzner was Prime Minister Oleksy's candidate for head of the MSZ when Wladyslaw Bartoszewski resigned after the elections. Oleksy appointed him acting head of the ministry until a new minister was appointed. Wyzner, 65, worked as a diplomat for the Polish People's Republic from the mid-1950's. From 1981 to 1992, he worked for the UN, for several years as deputy secretary general. He returned to the MSZ as deputy minister in the fall of 1994.

When Dariusz Rosati became foreign minister, his first decision was to appoint Wyzner as his first deputy, replacing Robert Mroziewicz, who had represented Poland in the UN under former Minister Skubiszewski and before that was an activist of the democratic opposition.

Jan Koltun is to be appointed deputy foreign minister on 1 February. He will replace Deputy Minister Stanislaw Szymanski of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], who was recently appointed ambassador to Ireland.

Jan Koltun, 46, is a lawyer. In the 1970's he was an activist of the United Peasant Party [ZSL] in Lublin, from where he moved up to secretary for cultural issues at the ZSL Chief Council in Warsaw. In 1980 he completed a postgraduate course in diplomatic service. From 1981 to 1985, he was deputy consul in Malmoe, Sweden. From 1986 to 1990, he was deputy head of the foreign department of the ZSL Chief Council, and from 1990 to 1994 he was a consul in Toronto. In January 1995, when Waldemar Pawlak was prime minister, he became head of the cadres department at the Office of the Council of Ministers. He is a member of the PSL.

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Romania: Ukraine's Serpent Island Military Base Viewed

AU2601105696 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 22 Jan 96 p 3

[Report by Doru Iordache: "A Geostrategic Explanation of a Dispute With Military Implications: The Range of the Radar Stations Located on Serpent Island Reaches the Libyan Coast"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt]

The History of the Island

[Passage omitted] At 45 degrees 15 minutes north and 30 degrees 14 minutes east, just in front of the Sulina arm [of the Danube River], 45 kilometers from the town of Sulina, Serpent Island has a surface of 17 hectares [41.99 acres] and is the largest of the very few islands in the Black Sea. [passage omitted] In 1949, immediately after the Soviets occupied the island, they set the territorial waters surrounding the Soviet Zmenyy Island [Russian name of the island] at 12 nautical miles. The distance separating the Romanian coast from the island is 21 nautical miles, and thus, according to the Soviet delimitation, Romania loses three nautical miles of its territorial waters.

Serpent Island Today

Serpent Island has a surface area of 17 square hectares and does not have any fresh water source. The natural circumstances on the island do not allow for any independent economic life. However, because of the reconnaissance-observation center placed on it, the island represents an important strategic place for Russia. The radar stations on the island carry out long-range air and sea surveillance. Observation of the air space covers a range that encompasses the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea down to the coast of Libya. The observation data gathered here are transmitted to a command center. This is the place where they also store intercontinental nuclear information referring to Ukrainian territory. Furthermore, there is a jamming station on the island, as well as a listening station for radio and cable conversations. There is always a helicopter on the island to ensure the link with their continental bases. The island is defended by a frigate-type vessel, a patrol vessel, and one or two submarines. [passage omitted]

The Island Is Connected to Odessa by Means of Radio and Underwater Telephone Cable

—As territory, it belongs to Ukraine;

—As utility, the island shelters a military garrison with several independent subunits, including one of border guards, the personnel of which run a helicopter landing site, a mini navy port, radar stations, storehouses, electricity supplies, a lighthouse, and a guard and defense system to protect the Ukrainian state border;

—The island has special importance, because from it, by means of their radar system, they can exert control over the mouths of the Danube River, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, the entire surface of the Black Sea, and a significant part of the Mediterranean Sea, as far as the north African coast and the space controlled by Israel;

—For the defense of the military base located on Serpent Island, they permanently deploy here combat navy vessels, as well as antiaircraft weaponry;

—The island is linked to Odessa by means of radio and an underwater telephone cable.

The Position of the Ukrainian Political-Military Leadership

—Ukraine claims that Serpent Island is Ukrainian territory, and, consequently, no talks can be conducted on the right of this state to the island itself or to the continental shelf surrounding it with a radius of 12 nautical miles."

—From the economic point of view, the Ukrainian political-military leadership assesses that the oil and natural gas deposits existing in the depths of the continental shelf surrounding the island represent extremely important strategic reserves for the energy supplies of the country. They intend, by means of foreign investments, to urgently begin the extraction of those ores, since Ukraine so badly needs them.

—From the military point of view, Serpent Island has special strategic importance, as the two high-performance radars situated here, together with their rocket systems and fighter aircraft fleet, ensure the antiaircraft defense of the southern border of Ukraine. [passage omitted]

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Federal

FRY: Commentary Surveys 1996 Economic Policy

AU2501194196 Belgrade BORBA in English 24 Jan 96 p 13

[Unattributed commentary: "Yugoslav Economic Policy for 1996"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade — The Yugoslav government adopted at the end of last year economic policy for 1996 as well as several strategic documents relating to economic and social development.

The policy aims to create an open, export-oriented economy, to integrate it quickly into international trade and to improve living standards.

A priority will be to keep prices and exchange rates stable by means of measures, instruments and mechanisms based on market principles. In the opinion of the government, the stability of prices and exchange rates will in turn help to intensify economic activity in general, above all the based on exports.

Output and exports are also expected to benefit from the lifting of sanctions, the normalization of relations with international financial organizations, the intensification of international cooperation and bilateral relations and the realization of existing and the conclusion of new foreign trade arrangements.

The main economic policy commitments, objectives and measures as well as projections rest on the assumption that in spite of the suspension of sanctions no major and rapid improvement in relation to 1995 can be expected. The shortage of foreign exchange and low domestic accumulation will continue to be the main impediments the government predicts.

Monetary policy will be restrictive and geared to internal convertibility of the domestic currency. The government will seek to reduce the percentage of public expenditure in social product and to fund in entirely from real sources.

A main feature of foreign trade policy will be the further liberalization of exports and imports in line with the standards of the World Trade Organization (WTO), along with appropriate measures to protect domestic production above all from the point of view of national economy and security considerations.

Pricing policy will encourage free prices for goods and services and the influence of foreign competition. The prices of infrastructure products and services and of goods having the character of natural monopolies will continue to be under direct control.

Earnings will be paid from real sources in order that the aggregate should remain within the framework of the realized social product. In the productive sector of the economy earnings will be formed freely according to the growth of output, social product and labor productivity along with strict financial discipline.

The main object of social policy will be to enable the working- age population to earn an income in line with economic policy measures.

The government adopted documents on foreign exchange policy and a projected balance of payments as well as a platform for resumption and promotion of cooperation with the European Union.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic on 'Lasting Peace' in Region

LD2501183896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1717 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tokyo, Jan. 25 (TANJUG) — Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said in an interview to Japanese State Television NHK that the signing of the peace accords had set conditions for lasting peace, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but in the entire region as well.

In the interview which was aired late Wednesday [24 January], Milosevic praised the results of the peace process, which he said was important for all peoples of the Balkans.

Pointing out that there were still obstacles to the peace process, he marked as the opponents of peace certain forces among Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Western Herzegovina, but said he believed Croatia was mostly for peace and would manage to control these forces.

The Serbian president said it would be possible to evaluate the real results of the peace process when legal institutions of power were established in the field.

Only then will refugees be able to return to their homes in peace, Milosevic said.

Japanese television introduced President Milosevic as one of the key participants in the peace process in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

Serbia: Milosevic Meets Ukrainian Foreign Minister

LD2501184996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1239 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 25 January (TANJUG) — Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy

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Udovenko, who is paying an official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In cordial and friendly talks the two sides confirmed their mutual interest and readiness to develop closest relations and intensify interstate contacts and top-level links. Both sides said the interest in widening comprehensive economic cooperation was of particular interest for both countries.

It was stressed that Ukraine represented one of the most important future economic partners of Yugoslavia because of numerous comparative advantages, geographic closeness, a direct river link via the Danube, natural resources, and positive experience from similar cooperation in the past. It has been estimated that trade between our two countries may soon top 2 billion dollars.

Objective possibilities for intensive development of the two economies can be found in the following domains: transportation, machine industry, electronic industry, chemical industry, agriculture, production of farming machinery and equipment, ship-building industry, trade and others. In addition, a perspective has been opened for modern, sophisticated forms of economic cooperation, joint investment, scientific and technical cooperation, and joint participation at foreign markets. The two countries attach great importance to Yugoslav businesses expressing interest in joining Ukrainian programs of restructuring industrial resources and transport infrastructure, and the current programs of transformation of the military industry. The two sides also expressed interest in deepening cultural, scientific and sports cooperation, on which the two foreign ministers yesterday signed a separate treaty.

It was emphasized in the talks that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia highly appreciated Ukraine's objective attitude towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia, and particularly its persistently active and positive approach towards our country's aspiration to gain an equal place in the international community, which is best shown in the normal functioning of diplomatic relations at the top level.

In conclusion, the Ukrainian foreign minister conveyed to President Milosevic an invitation from Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to pay a visit to Ukraine, which was accepted with pleasure.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Milutinovic.

Serbia: Ukraine's Udovenko Praises Milosevic Role

AU2501204696 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Jan 96

[Report by Jugoslava Zagorac on news conference by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, prior to his departure, at Belgrade airport on 25 January — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zagorac] Assessing the results of his visit to Belgrade, the high guest from Ukraine placed special emphasis on the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Stressing the Serbian president's great contribution to the normalization of the situation on the territory of the earlier Yugoslavia and the implementation of the peace agreement, Minister Udovenko said that the cooperation with the Serbian president, as a part of the relations with Ukraine, contributed to the strengthening of the relations and opening of the new possibilities for cooperation between the two countries.

He was particularly impressed by President Milosevic's stance regarding privatization. Ukraine will apply the Yugoslav experiences and solutions in this department, Minister Udovenko emphasized.

Answering to a journalist's question about in which areas of economic cooperation the two sides were interested the most, the Ukrainian foreign minister replied:

[Udovenko, in Ukrainian with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] Apart from the protocol and the agreement on the scientific and technical cooperation that we signed yesterday, we also signed an agreement on the establishment of air transport today. We also agreed on the formation of the Yugoslav-Ukrainian commission for trade and economic relations. Trade between Ukraine and Yugoslavia is expected to amount to $2 billion this year already.

Apart from trade, we also agreed on cooperation in shipbuilding, and there is particular interest in the opening of joint ventures as well as free trade zones.

[Zagorac] Economic relations also dominated Prime Minister Marjanovic's visit to Kiev last year. They have been taken to a higher level now, and, in the future, they will definitely help accelerate the development of both countries.

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Serbia: Marjanovic Receives Ukrainian Foreign Minister

LD2501225396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2105 GMT 25 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 25 (TANJUG) — Serbian Premier Mirko Marjanovic received on Thursday visiting Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko, the Serbian Government said in a statement.

The officials reaffirmed the great importance of and mutual interest in developing durable, stable and comprehensive bilateral cooperation in all fields, the statement said.

Both sides said that annual bilateral trade could realistically be expected to reach between 1.5 and 2 billion dollars in value now that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro) had been suspended.

There is great potential for cooperation in the building industry, railway reconstruction, agriculture, ship overhaul, the engineering industry, trade, tourism, transport and the production and exchange of cars.

The two side agreed to intensify the application of basic economic agreements, and said it was necessary to step up work on forming an inter-governmental commission on trade and economic cooperation.

The Ukrainian minister's visit continues a dialogue started with Marjanovic's visit to Ukraine in August of 1995, which Udovenko described as having given a major impact to the development of overall bilateral relations, especially in the economic field.

Udovenko said that Ukraine would support efforts in international fora for incorporating Yugoslavia speedily in world economic and political affairs.

Serbia: Ukraine's Udovenko on Talks With Milosevic

LD2501230696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2154 GMT 25 Jan 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan 25 (TANJUG) — Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko said on Thursday [25 January] that his visit to Yugoslavia of the past two days was of special importance to the further development of overall bilateral relations.

Cooperation with Yugoslavia is important to Kiev, Udovenko told reporters at Belgrade Airport prior to his departure for Ukraine, and stressed that there was political goodwill to expand cooperation in all fields, and particularly in the economic field.

He said that he had had fruitful talks with top Yugoslav and Serbian officials, especially with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who he said had contributed greatly to the normalisation of the situation in former Yugoslavia. Udovenko said he had discussed with Milosevic a number of questions of importance to the two countries, including privatisation. Udovenko said Milosevic had praised Kiev's help in lifting international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro) and stressed Ukraine had always supported efforts to bring Yugoslavia back into the world community as an equal member. Ukraine will uphold Yugoslavia's swift reincorporation in world economic affairs, Udovenko added.

He said that trade between Yugoslavia and Ukraine might reach two billion dollars in value in 1996, and that prospects were especially good for cooperation in agriculture, the building, engineering and ship-building industries and trade.

Udovenko said that the visit had resulted in the signing of an agreement on cooperation in culture, education and sport and a protocol on consultations between the two countries' foreign ministries. An agreement on air transport has also been signed, and the two sides have agreed to set up an inter-governmental commission on trade and economic cooperation, he added.

Serbia: Volunteer Guard To Stay in Baranja Until April

AU2601123996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by "D.P.": "Demobilization of 'Tigers' at the Beginning of April"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade — The Serbian Volunteer Guard is still present in the Srem-Baranja region, and will be demobilized after the deployment of UN troops in that area, most probably at the beginning of April. This was stated by Borislav Pelevic, acting president of the Party of Serbian Unity [SSJ], at a news conference yesterday. The guard will not be moved to FRY territory because, as Pelevic said, there is no need for it at the moment.

"If, God forbid, fighting breaks out in Kosovo, we will set up the guard again and place it in the service of the Serbian people," Pelevic said.

Pelevic has urged the Serb side in Srem and Baranja, as well as the leaderships of Serbia and Montenegro, to prevent by political means the integration of that

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territory in Croatia, otherwise "all victims of the last war would be in vain."

The SSJ will participate independently in the elections in the Serb Republic, where it has 200 local committees, and "will spoil the game for many." "We are amazed by the statements of some officials from the Democratic Party that they, together with some other parties, will win in the Serb Republic," Pelevic stressed, adding that Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan will not run for the president of the Serb Republic, "as this would be frivolous considering that he is a citizen of the FRY." Stressing that Arkan is an honorary citizen of Prijedor and Bijeljina, Pelevic appealed to all parties in Serbia to take a united stand on the future status of Kosovo.

As stated yesterday, the SSJ has recently founded its youth organization, which will be headed by Zeljko Simic, known as Zeks.

Serbia: Babic Favors Joining Partnership for Peace

LD2501233096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2245 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 25 (TANJUG) — Serbian Government Minister Milan Babic told a press conference on Thursday [25 January] that uniform and balanced regional development, privatization and Partnership for Peace were conditions for Yugoslavia's economic and other prosperity.

A member of the executive committee of New Democracy (ND), a coalition partner of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, Babic said the implementation of program 2 was also a condition for the country's economic recovery, as was an uncompromised enforcement of the valid laws.

Joining NATO's Partnership for Peace must be comprehended as a peaceful international orientation of our country, and the right way to enter Europe, said Babic, adding that ND had not yet broached the topic with SPS.

Babic said it was evident from statements by foreign statesmen and a positive change in relations in international forums that Yugoslavia's position had improved in the international community, and 'ND is exerting a meaningful effort to improve it further.' Babic said that in reconquering international sympathy, local politicians had to rid themselves of unproductive national rhetoric and advance to the world from the position of peace.

Babic expressed satisfaction over the constructive approach of the United States and Germany in resolving post-war problems in the former Yugoslavia. With such an approach, the United States and Germany are helping Yugoslavia's efforts in solving developmental questions in peace and presenting itself as a permanent and reliable factor of stability in the Balkans and Europe, said Babic.

Serbia: Seselj Assails SPS Part in RS Elections

LD2501232496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1934 GMT 25 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 25 Jan (SRNA) — Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], believes that the participation of the JUL [Yugoslav Left; Milosevic's wife's party] and the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] in the elections in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS] "is an attempt to bring to power people who have been compromised, and who would push the [Bosnian Serb] republic under Muslim authority."

Seselj confirmed at a news conference in Belgrade that his party will take part in the forthcoming elections in the Serb Republic, and explained his offer to put himself at the disposal of the Hague tribunal.

As he said, he intends to testify in favor of the people from the Serb Republic who have been accused of war crimes without any evidence, or to put himself at the disposal of the tribunal if he himself is indicted.

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